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November 1942 – 27th August 1944. 
 
The highly effective leadership of General Richard Nelson Gale overcame the haphazard 
nature of airborne operations 1939-1945, and enabled the unproven British 6th Airborne 
Division to achieve its objectives during the Normandy Campaign of June – August 1944.  
Despite its scattered parachute landings 6th Airborne achieved its D-Day goals and held the 
line for three months, a task for which it was not equipped. The historiography of the 
Normandy campaign and British Airborne Forces has recorded this achievement, but the 
reasons have not been explored. This thesis examines the factors that made this possible 
and analyses Gale’s impact on the Division’s organisational development, preparation and 
training which lay behind this success. 
 
To establish the environment within which Gale had to operate, this thesis explores the 
shaping forces which influenced the creation of 6th Airborne Division: the constraint of 
inadequate resources and the absence of a clear applied airborne doctrine, inter-service 
politics and the influence of key war figures such as Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.  The 
study pursues the links between war situation, the cost and capability of equipment and 
manpower, developing technology, and ongoing training through to distinguishable impact 
on the enemy. Two unique models form the heart of the study. The first shows the process 
of 1940-1945 airborne assault methods based on British cognisance of 1940-1943 
operations. The second exposes the influences needed to create high value military 
formations based on 6th Airborne’s experience – with Gale acting as a critical accelerant.  
 
The leadership provided by Gale in the creation, development and Normandy operations of 
6th Airborne Division was critical. The capability of the Division was developed through a 
tough regime of realistic and relevant training which also forged a robust identity. 
Aggressive and inventive leadership was selected and employed throughout the order of 
battle, while intelligent but simple operational planning was used as the base of briefing 
which was then cascaded throughout. The impact of surprise in the landing operation and a 
pragmatic approach toward co-opting the firepower of surrounding forces then maximised 
6th Airborne’s combat effectiveness. It was Gale and his leadership culture which 
underpinned the development of the capability of the airborne soldier and the cohesion of 
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Abbreviations and Glossary 
I. General abbreviations 
II. British Unit title abbreviations 
III. Glossary of codenames – exercises and operations  
 
I. General abbreviations      
2ic - Second-in-command  
AA – Air Assault Museum, Duxford 
AA - Anti-aircraft 
AAEF - Allied Air Expeditionary Force  
ACI - Army Council Instructions  
ADGB - Air Defence Great Britain 
AFV - Armoured Fighting Vehicle  
AGRA - Army Group Royal Artillery  
AHB - The Royal Air Force Air Historical Branch 
AL - Airlanding (glider) 
AM - Air Ministry  
AOC - Air Officer Commanding 
AOER - Army Officers Emergency Reserve 
APDS - armour piercing discarding sabot 
A.Tk - Anti-tank 
BAM – Freiberg (Militärarchiv) 
Bde - Brigade 
BEF - British Expeditionary Force 
Bn – Battalion 
Bty - Battery  
CAS - Chief, Air Staff 
5 
 
CIGS - Chief, Imperial General Staff  
C-in-C - Commander-in-Chief 
Cdo – Commando 
Cn - Canadian 
CO - Commanding Officer 
COC - Combined Operations Command 
COS - Chiefs of Staff 
COSSAC - Chief of Staff to the Allied Supreme Commander. A key D-Day planning post 
before the actual Supreme Commander was appointed 
Coy - Company 
CRA - Commander, Royal Artillery 
CRS - Commander, Royal Signals 
CSM - Company Sergeant Major  
CT - Combat temperament  
Div - Division  
DSO - Distinguished Service Order 
DZ - Drop zone (parachute) 
Eureka/Rebecca – Two part system was made up of a ground-based transmitter beacon 
(Eureka) which emitted a radio signal detected by a receiver (Rebecca) mounted in either an 
aircraft or glider 
F.J.R. - Fallschirmjäger Regiment 
FOO - Forward Observing Officer 
FOsB - Forward Observers Bombardment  
Gee - Bomber Command navigational device invented in 1942 
GHQ - General Headquarters  
GOC - General Officer Commanding 
Gp - Group 
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Gren - Grenadier 
GSO - General Staff Officer 
HQ - Headquarters 
HMS - His Majesty’s Ship (RN) 
HMSO - Her Majesty’s Stationary Office 
I.D. – Infantry Division (German) 
Ind - Independent 
Inf - Infantry 
ITC - Infantry Training Centre 
IWM - Imperial War Museum  
Ju - Junkers 
Lt.Col - Lieutenant-Colonel  
 LZ - Landing zone (glider or parachute)  
MC – Military Cross 
MMG - Medium Machine Gun (Vickers in the case of 6 Airborne Div) 
NCO - Non-commissioned officer 
OKW - OberKommando der Wehrmacht, the German Armed Forces Supreme Command 
OODA Loop - The phrase OODA loop refers to the decision cycle of observe, orient, decide, 
and act, developed by military strategist and USAF Colonel John Boyd 
ORs - Other Ranks  
Para – Parachute 
Pdr – Pounder 
PIAT - Projector infantry anti-tank 
Pl - Platoon 
Port. - Portal Papers, held at Christchurch College Oxford 
PP - Parliamentary Papers 
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Pz. - Panzer  
Pz. Gren – Panzer grenadier 
SS-Pz.Kps - SS Panzer Corps  
PTC - Primary Training Centre (GSC assessment centres) 
RAF - Royal Air Force 
RM - Royal Marine  
RN - Royal Navy 
RSM - Regimental Sergeant Major 
RTU - Returned to Unit 
RUSI - The Royal United services Institute 
RV - Rendezvous 
SHAEF - Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
SMG- Submachine gun 
SOE - Special Operations Executive  
SPG - Self-propelled gun 
SPW - Schützenpanzerwagen (German AFV, usually a half track) 
SS (British) - Special Service troops – commandos 
SS (German) - Schütz Staffeln-Waffen SS troops 
SWWEC - Second World War Experience Centre  
TA - Territorial Army  
Ultra – Allied signals intelligence gathered through Bletchley Park 
VCAS - Vice Chief of Air Staff 
VCIGS - Vice Chief, Imperial General Staff  
VC – Victoria Cross 
WE - War Establishment  
WO - Warrant Officer  
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WO - War Office 
 
II. British Unit title abbreviations 
AAC - The Army Air Corps 
6 AARR - 6 Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment 
6 AL Bde - 6th Airlanding Brigade 
Border - The Border Regiment 
Camerons - The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders 
Coldstream - Coldstream Guards  
Devon - The Devonshire Regiment 
DCLI - The Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry 
DLI - The Durham Light Infantry 
Gren Gds - Grenadier Guards  
Green Howards – Green Howards  
Gds Armd Div - Guards Armoured Division 
GSC - General Service Corps 
Hamps - The Hampshire Regiment 
HLI - The Highland Light Infantry  
13/18 H - (13th/18th) Hussars 
Indep Para Coy - Independent Parachute Company (pathfinders) 
King’s - The King’s Regiment (Liverpool) 
KOYLI - King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry  
KSLI - The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry  
KRRC - The King’s Royal Rifle Corps 
Leicesters - The Leicestershire Regiment 
MGC - Machine Gun Corps  
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Mx -The Middlesex Regiment 
Norfolk - The Royal Norfolk Regiment  
Northamptons - The Northamptonshire Regiment 
Oxf Bucks - The Oxford and Buckinghamshire Light infantry 
PWV - The South Lancashire Regiment 
RA - The Royal Regiment of Artillery 
RAC - Royal Armoured Corps 
RASC - Royal Army Service Corps 
RE - Corps of Royal Engineers 
REME - Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
RM - Royal Marines 
RUR - The Royal Ulster Rifles 
RWF - The Royal Welch Fusiliers 
RWK - The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment 
SAS - Special Air Service 
SG - Scots Guards  
Som LI - The Somerset Light Infantry 
S Staffords - The South Staffordshire Regiment 
Suffolk - The Suffolk Regiment 
TA - The Territorial Army 
Warwick - The Royal Warwickshire Regiment 
W Yorks - The West Yorkshire Regiment  
Worcs R - The Worcestershire Regiment  
Worcs Yeo. - Worcestershire Yeomanry (53 Worcs Yeo. was 6 Airborne’s organic field 





III. Exercise and Operation Code Names 
Ambassador - Commando raid, Channel Islands (July 1940) 
Arena - Proposed operation to use ten airborne and air portable divisions to create an 
airborne bridgehead near Paderborn (March 1945) 
Avalanche - US Fifth Army landings at Salerno, Italy (September 1943) 
Band - Possible additional Neptune invasion beach in the Cabourg area  
Barratt Two - As part of Eastern Command, 223 Bde acted as ‘break-in’ attack force (October 
1942) 
Baytown - British 13 Corps landings, Italy (September 1943) 
Biting - C Coy 2 Para Bn captures Bruneval radar station secrets (February 1942) 
Bizz II - Exercise in which 6 Airborne landed by either glider or parachute complete (March 
1944) 
Buster and Buster II - 6 Airborne Div anti-tank gun positioning exercises (August and 
September 1943) 
Chariot - The commando raid on St. Nazaire (March 1942) 
Charity - 7 Para Bn Exercise (May 1944) 
Check - A coy 10 Som LI exercise practising a river assault with small boats (October 1942)  
Cobra – US First Army’s breakout operation (July 1944) 
Colossus - Airborne raid to destroy the Tragino aqueduct, Italy (February 1941) 
Clumsy - 6 Airborne Div staff exercise (November 1943) 
Demon - Exercise by 13 Para Bn in Manchester, a propaganda visit to the North-West to 
boost civilian morale and give training to the Home Guard. (January 1944)  
Deadstick - Reinforced D Coy 2 Oxf Bucks operation to capture the Caen Canal and Orne 
bridges, as part of Tonga (D-Day) 
Eclipse - Proposed operation for a two corps airborne assault onto Berlin (March 1945) 
Frigate - 6 Airborne Div exercise (July 1943) 




Fustian - Airborne operation by 1 Para Bde in support of Husky (July 1943) 
Gold - Neptune assault landing beach for 50 Div (D-Day) 
Goodwood - Offensive mounted by Second Army involving three armoured divs - Gds, 7 and 
11(July 1944) 
Husky - The Allied invasion of Sicily (July 1943) 
Jubilee - The large scale commando raid on Dieppe (August 1942) 
Juno - Neptune assault landing beach for 3 Can Div (D-Day) 
Ladbroke - Airborne operation by 1 AL Bde in support of Husky (July 1943) 
Longcloth - The first Chindit operation (February 1943) 
Lookout - Exercise for 6 Airborne Intelligence Section (May 1944) 
Mallard - 6 AL Bde evening glider landings (D-Day) 
Market Garden - British Second Army’s drive to capture the bridges in Holland culminating 
in a Rhine bridgehead at Arnhem. Market being the airborne element (British 1, 82 US and 
101 US Divs) and Garden being the ground forces with British 30 Corps (September 1944) 
Merkur - The German airborne-led invasion of Crete (May 1941) 
Mush - 6 Airborne’s last exercise before D-Day, with 1 Airborne Div as the enemy (April 
1944) 
Neptune - The Allied codename for the Normandy landings 
Omaha - Neptune assault landing beach for US 1 and 29 Divs (D-Day) 
Overlord - The Allied codename for the Battle for Normandy 
Paddle – First Canadian Army’s pursuit of German forces as they fell back along the Channel 
coast. This army included British 1 Corps and therefore 6 Airborne Div (August 1944) 
Pegasus - Gale’s first exercise for his brigadiers to analyse the problems inherent with an 
airborne landing in support of an amphibious assault on the coast of NW France (June 1943) 
Plunder (see Varsity below) 
Rob Roy - RAF resupply operations to 6 Airborne post D-Day 
Rufus - 6 Airborne Div exercise (October 1943)  
Shingle - The Anzio landings operation (January 1944) 
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Roundup - Planned operation for a rapid Allied invasion of France in the event of either 
Germany or the USSR suddenly collapsing (1942/1943) 
Rutter - The initial plan for the large-scale commando raid on Dieppe, later replaced by 
Jubilee 
Skyscraper - The Allied plan to use large numbers of airborne troops to facilitate an invasion 
of France in 1943 when landing craft numbers were inadequate 
Sledgehammer - Planning for a large scale Allied invasion of NW Europe (1942) 
Spartan - A massive Home Forces exercise (March 1943) 
Sword - Neptune assault landing beach for 3 Div (D-Day) 
Thursday - The second Chindit operation into Burma (March 1944) 
Tony - An exercise carried out by 1 Para Bn (April 1944) 
Tonga - 6 Airborne Div’s night landing (D-Day) 
Utah - Neptune assault landing beach for US 4 Div (D-Day) 
Varsity - The airborne element of 21 Army Group’s Rhine crossing operation, Plunder 
(March 1945) 
Victor - The large British Home Forces anti-invasion exercise (January 1941) 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The glider and parachute troops that descended on Normandy on 6 June 1944 represented 
the largest British airborne effort to date, and a considerable investment of role-specific air 
assets and manpower. The 6 Airborne Division (Div)’s1 operations formed part of the most 
crucial offensive operation staged by the western Allies during the Second World War, a 
‘landmark in history’,2 and for these democracies the ‘most complete manifestation of 
modern war.’3 This was the formation’s first action; the Division had been in existence since 
6 May 1943, though it had only achieved establishment strength at the beginning of 1944.  
   The Division suffered a disaster on the night of 5/6 June. Due to miss-drops its parachute 
brigades were badly scattered. These strewn landings not only meant a diminution of 
fighting power but also a reduction in command and control. When 3 Para Bde (3rd 
Parachute Brigade) and 5 Para Bde moved off to attempt to achieve their objectives, they 
were at thirty per cent and sixty per cent strength respectively. 4 Yet the Division’s D-Day 
performance revealed some ‘outstanding qualities’5 as it strove to achieve all of its 
objectives. 6 Airborne then maintained a high combat reputation as it adapted to hold the 
line for nearly three months in ‘a long attritional slog’ – a task it was ill-equipped to 
perform.6 The Division was certainly well supported by 1 Corps’ divisions and other assets, 
and also Royal Navy (RN) gunfire support and the Royal Air Force (RAF); but lacked the 
motorised transport and heavy weapons of a standard infantry division. However, as events 
                                                          
1
 British 6th Airborne Division will typically be referred to throughout the study using the 1943/44 
nomenclature ‘6 Airborne Div’, sometimes simply as ‘the Division.’ 
2
 Richard Holmes, D-Day: The Concise History (London: Carlton, 2014), p. 7. 
3
 Hew Strachan’s foreword. Paul Winter, D-Day Documents (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. xv. 
4
 TNA CAB 106/970 ‘Report on Operations of 6th Airborne Division in Normandy 1944 6 Jun – Aug 27’, 1944, 
pp.6-7. 
5
 Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (London: Pan, 1985), p. 148. 
6
 Holmes, D-Day: The Concise History, p. 24. 
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unfolded the Division’s lack of vehicles did not hamper the static role it played for the three 
months it held the front line. On 17 August, 6 Airborne took part in Paddle, the pursuit of 
German forces by First Canadian Army which included British 1 Corps.7 With limited mobility 
and taking the Belgian Infantry Bde, the Princess Irene Dutch Bde Group and two Special 
Service Commando Bdes under command, the division advanced. 8  After fighting difficult 
river crossing battles at Putot-en-Auge and Pont l'Évêque 6 Airborne concentrated around 
Honfleur/Pont Audemer on 27 August to be withdrawn to the UK. How did 6 Airborne Div 
achieve this notable operational performance? This is the thesis question. The elements that 
acted together to make possible Gale’s 6 Airborne Div in generating and sustaining its high 
combat effectiveness will be shown in this study.  
This introductory chapter will now show the organisation of the thesis beginning with the 
historiographical and primary source survey. Second, the study’s phraseology and 
definitions will be explained. Third the thesis and research questions and themes will be 
outlined. Finally, the research methodology will be described and chapter sequence 
explained. 
I. Historiographical Survey and Primary Sources 
 
What more is there left to say about 6 Airborne (Div) Division in Normandy?9 Much has been 
written about the story of British airborne forces during the Second World War and of their 
role in the D-Day operations in particular.10 This thesis first requires an overview analysis of 
                                                          
7
 Richard Nelson Gale, With the 6th Airborne Division in Normandy. (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 
1948), p. 129. 
8
 Gale, pp. 127–29. 
9
 ‘Div’, the common abbreviations of the British Army will be used throughout this thesis, as will be explained 
later. 
10
 John Buckley’s first chapter has reviewed the D-Day/Normandy popular bibliography closely. John Buckley, 
Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe, 1944-5 (London: Yale University Press, 2013). For 
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what has already been written directly about the division regarding its creation and June-
August 1944 operations, and where it is referenced in more general works concerning the 
campaign. 6 Airborne Div’s historiography has moved alongside that of the Normandy 
campaign with three phases of writing focussed on D-Day and the Normandy campaign – an 
initial populist phase (beginning with Eisenhower and ending with Cornelius Ryan); a critical 
phase (D’Este and Hastings) and a final revisionist phase (finishing with Buckley). Various 
monographs that have highlighted the impact of airborne forces are woven into the three 
stages of study, the revisionist section of this survey ending with an overview of those 
writers with close ties to British airborne forces who have proven to be strong advocates of 
their contribution to the Allied victory in the Second World War. In the final group the 
methodology of three recent theses which addressed British airborne forces will be 
discussed.11  
  Eisenhower’s report for the Combined Chiefs’ of Staff was published in 1946 and 
represented an early published account of 6 Airborne’s actions on 6 June and beyond. Its 
content and style formed a basis for many following accounts, and therefore it is worth 
presenting it here:  
In the British sector, the very accurate work of the Pathfinder force enabled the RAF 
groups to overcome the difficulties arising from the use of different types of aircraft, 
carrying various loads at various speeds, and the 6 Airborne Division troops were 
dropped precisely in the appointed areas east of the Orne River. Thanks to this good 
start, all the main military tasks were carried out, and at a lower cost than would 
have been paid in using any other arm of the service. The party charged with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a detailed view of the first forty years of the subject’s historiography see Christopher R. Gabel, ‘Books on 
OVERLORD: A Select Bibliography and Research Agenda on the Normandy Campaign, 1944’, Military Affairs, 
48.3 (1984), p. 144–48. 
11
 W.F. Buckingham, ‘The Establishment and Initial Development of British Airborne Forces June 1940 - January 
1942’ (unpublished Ph.D., Glasgow, 2001); John William Greenacre, ‘The Development of Britain’s Airborne 
Forces during the Second World War’ (Leeds, 2008); Timothy Jenkins, ‘The Evolution of British Airborne 
Warfare: A Technological Perspective’ (University of Birmingham, 2013). 
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mission of securing the Bénouville bridges over the Orne and Caen canal was 
particularly successful.  
Landing exactly as planned, in a compact area of just one square kilometre, the 
troops went into action immediately and secured the bridges intact, as required, by 
0850 hrs. The tactical surprise achieved, coupled with the confusion created by the 
dropping of explosive dummy parachutists elsewhere, caused the enemy to be slow 
to react, and it was not until midday that elements of 21st Panzer Division 
counterattacked. By that time our men had consolidated their positions and the 
enemy’s efforts to dislodge them were in vain. During the day reinforcements safely 
landed in gliders, against which the German pole obstructions proved ineffective; the 
operation went off like an exercise, no opposition was encountered, and by nightfall 
the division had been fully resupplied and was in possession of all its heavy 
equipment. This formation continued to hold the flank firmly until our lodgement 
area had been consolidated and the break-out eastward across France relieved it of 
its responsibility.12 
 
 Eisenhower chiefly focuses on the action of Major John Howard’s reinforced 2 Oxf Bucks 
company carrying out Operation Deadstick (the capture of the Orne river and Caen canal 
bridges), and its positive tone perhaps reflects a political attitude by the author to laud the 
actions of Allied forces. This brief account is also extraordinary, in its statement that the 
troops were ‘dropped precisely in the appointed areas,’ is untrue. Similarly, the statement 
that during the day ‘no opposition was encountered’ is quite startling considering the heavy 
combat 7 Para Bn was engaged in with elements of 716 Gren. and 21.Pz. Divs for example. 
The account then turns to the action of US airborne forces, before examining the near 
disastrous landing at Omaha, which Omar Bradley later referred to as a ‘nightmare.’13 
Eisenhower’s incorrect account of 6 Airborne’s initial landings and general success appears 
to be based on second-hand knowledge and captures a sense of relief that one component 
of Operations Overlord/Neptune plans has been executed relatively smoothly. Further on in 
the report, Eisenhower’s account applauds 6 Airborne for their successful landings on 6 June 
1944 and consequent reliable defence of the Orne bridgehead, and then eliminates them 
                                                          
12 
LHCMA, Alanbrooke: 6/1/8 [1946], ‘Report by THE SUPREME COMMANDER TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF 
STAFF ON THE OPERATIONS IN EUROPE of the ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945’, pp. 
22-23. ‘Signed’ by Eisenhower and dated 13 July 1945. 
13
 Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2002), p. 534. 
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from further comment.  
   The spirit of Eisenhower’s 1945/46 account regarding the success of 6 Airborne Division 
formed an important starting point in many popular narratives devoted to the D-Day 
landings and/or Normandy campaign.  Howard’s coup de main is highlighted, then Lt.Col T.B. 
Otway’s bloody 9 Para Bn (9th Battalion, Parachute Regiment) assault on the Merville 
battery, the chaos caused by the night-time scattering on the night of 5/6 June; before the 
authors focus on the broad sweep of the seaborne landings and the grim bocage fighting. 
This typically begins with close attention paid to the losses on Omaha, the controversy 
surrounding the failure to capture Caen, before Operation Cobra breakout and the carnage 
in the Falaise pocket.14 An important representation of the action of British airborne forces 
on D-Day is offered by Daryl L. Zanuck’s 1962 Hollywood epic The Longest Day, the film 
adaptation of Cornelius Ryan’s 1959 narrative. 15  The execution of Operation Deadstick 
assault is presented as a dramatic sub-plot unfolding alongside the main seaborne landings 
of the D-Day narrative. With this cinematic drama the common and accepted ‘simplistic’ 
narrative of 6 Airborne appears to have become firmly set.16 
  The official histories of the Normandy campaign and of British airborne forces during the 
Second World War were published in parallel to the early populist monographs that 
culminated with Ryan’s 1959 book.  By Air to Battle was written by Air Marshal Trafford 
Leigh Mallory’s AAEF (Allied Air Expeditionary Force) Historical Officer, Hilary Saunders in 
1945.17 This volume gives a brief but straightforward summary of the genesis and 
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subsequent actions of airborne forces, its opening passage detailing the encounter between 
Georges Gondrée and the men of 6 Airborne in the early hours of D-Day. The closing line of 
chapter one sets the tone for the rest of the book, ‘... British airborne troops, harbingers of 
freedom and victory, when they landed by parachute and from gliders on the morning of 
the Allied invasion of Europe.’18 Saunders’ work outlines the selection and training of 
airborne troops, but does not explore the conceptual basis of Britain’s airborne forces in any 
way, or contextualise their development within that of the wider army. A more complete 
study published in 1951, was carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Terrence Otway (as 
mentioned above) ‘having been given access to official sources of information, and every 
endeavour has been made to ensure the accuracy of the work as an historical record.’19 As 
originally part of a War Office confidential series, ‘the object of which is to preserve the 
experience gained during the Second World War 1939-1945, in selected fields of military 
staff work and administration.’20 Otway wrote the history between 1946 and 1948, when he 
resigned his commission ‘disillusioned with the post-war Army.’21 He delivered a 
comprehensive survey of the expansion of formations and operations, including the creation 
of airborne forces in other theatres and administrative and technological developments. 
Otway’s work holds a tight focus on the development and expansion of airborne forces, but 
does not place their expansion into any kind of wartime context which would give some 
perspective on the decisions made which affected resource allocation. Otway has also been 
admonished by a more recent writer for ignoring the contribution made by Polish airborne 
forces to the early direction of British airborne development, but his book does offer a 
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wealth of detail clearly set out.22 Otway’s monograph therefore presents the progress of 
British airborne forces 1940-1945 as a linear development, a common feature of narrative 
histories of British airborne forces which present their expansion as a measured 
progression. The paucity of aircraft resources is acknowledged, but in reality their 
development was more haphazard, swayed by the current demands of the war situation at 
each stage of its evolution. Otway thoroughly succeeds in capturing the timeline of the 
creation of airborne forces, but like Saunders has omitted a wider perspective.  
    The official HMSO history of the D-Day landings and Normandy campaign, written by 
Major L.F. Ellis was published in 1962. While Ellis considers the build-up and preparation for 
the amphibious landings, he makes no reference to the creation of airborne forces and their 
preparations for NEPTUNE; first referring to them in terms of the numbers available.23 In 
recording the action undertaken by the Division Ellis held to a similar narrative line to 
Eisenhower. Ellis ended his detailed summary of 6 Airborne’s actions with a review of the 
situation as the dawn of D-Day approached, ‘All their primary tasks had been accomplished. 
The bridges over the Orne had been captured and bridgeheads on both sides were being 
held and strengthened.’24 Further mention is made of the division in the link-up battles with 
3 Division later on 6 June, and then the breakout battles along the coast on the second half 
of August, but little analysis is undertaken regarding the nature of the 6 Airborne’s 
Normandy operations.25  
The architect of the Allies’ final plan stimulated a second school of Normandy campaign 
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writing, which has also referred to the airborne effort. Montgomery’s26 stand that he had 
managed the campaign perfectly provoked a succession of attacks on his performance in 
various memoirs, while he was defended by his old cohorts in other texts.27 This exchange in 
turn prompted other writers to question the combat effectiveness of British armour and 
infantry in NW Europe 1944-45, indeed all allied forces, a school of thought which elevated 
the combat performance of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS. Chester Wilmot had seemingly 
begun the process of scrutiny in 1952, highlighting the disappointment with 21 Army Gp 
(Group) efforts to take Caen and break out in the east: 
Was it ever intended, as Eisenhower states in his Report, that the British “should 
break out towards the Seine”? Did Dempsey fail at Caen? Was Montgomery forced 
to change his plan?28  
 
Carlo D’Este’s magisterial Decision in Normandy analysed Montgomery’s failure to meet the 
phase lines, which he maintained Montgomery had agreed with Eisenhower, D’Este moving 
his argument forward to generally criticise Allied combat performance.29 In these books the 
effort of Gale’s formations has been viewed as daring in attack and stoic in defence. Max 
Hastings lionised the Wehrmacht in his 1984 book, and used 6 Airborne with its ‘outstanding 
qualities,’ to further castigate some British infantry divisions who ‘were considered too 
                                                          
26
 B.L. Montgomery, the General-Officer-Commanding (GOC) 21 Army Group and Allied ground forces 
commander during the Normandy campaign. 
27
 Montgomery’s claims were fought over for the next twenty-five years as both British and US generals wrote 
their memoirs adding further contentious elements to the squabble. Bernard Law Montgomery Montgomery 
of Alamein, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, 1st ed. (London: Collins, 
1958); Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1950); Omar Bradley, A 
Soldier's Story (New York: Holt, 1951); George S. Patton, War as I knew it (London: Allen, 1947); D.D. 
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (London: Heinemann, 1948); David Belchem, Victory in Normandy (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1981); David Belchem, All in a Day’s March (London: Collins, 1978); Omar Bradley and Clay 
Blair, A general's life: an autobiography (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983); P.J. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgment 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1948); J. Lawton. Collins, Lightening Joe: An Autobiography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1979); Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top (London: Cassell, 1968). 
28
 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London: Reprint Society, 1954), p. 369. 
29




unreliable to be entrusted with a vital role in operations.’30 John Ellis also attacked the 
fighting qualities of Allied forces in 1990, as he explored the disparity in resources between 
the Allies and Wehrmacht forces. He stated that this very wealth of materiel had ‘robbed 
the troops themselves of any sense that they too must make a contribution’ to victory in 
Normandy.31 This phase of writing should be put into its context. It took place at a time 
when NATO faced an overwhelming Warsaw Pact conventional threat in Western Europe 
and military thinkers had turned to contemplate the determined defence offered by the 
Wehrmacht in the west 1944-45 as a possible model to emulate in the event of hostilities.32 
Indeed, Hans von Luck, the CO of 125 Pz.Gren.Regt, was invited on ‘staff rides’ to explain to 
British officers his successful anti-tank defence in the face of the British Operation 
Goodwood offensive.33 
    The British Army’s performance has been re-examined. In the last twenty years several 
academic authors have reviewed the effectiveness of 21 Army Group, and have used 
archival sources to shape a new view of the British Army’s performance in Normandy. In 
part, this has developed from the revisionism that applied to reassessing the army’s 
capability and leadership during the Great War.34 The link between the Western Front of 
1914-1918 is important to the study of the Normandy campaign. This is because so many of 
the command personalities had fought in the Great War and the high intensity of battle 
there was reminiscent of the earlier conflict. The first publication of Shelford Bidwell and 
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Dominick Graham’s 1982 book Firepower began this process,35 as it ‘inaugurated a new era 
of scholarship.’36 
  A general doctrinal weakness which inhibited the army’s effectiveness has been widely 
discussed by revisionist commentators. Timothy Harrison Place has stated that 21 Army Gp 
was confronted with ‘not merely a matter of bad doctrine; it was also a matter of doctrinal 
indiscipline.’37, while John Buckley has referred to the ‘spotty approach to inculcating 
doctrine through teaching.’38 At the same time a strong case has been presented that due to 
Montgomery’s ‘amalgam of inter-war doctrine, the lessons that the high command drew 
from operations in the field and in exercises at home since 1939, and his own ruthless 
personality’ a firepower heavy doctrine had been created. 39 This was the way conventional 
forces of 21 Army Group (Gp) were to fight in Normandy, upholding morale and 
compensating for a manpower crisis with weight of firepower.40  This shortage of infantry by 
1944 meant that OVERLORD had to be done ‘cheaply’ in terms of infantry losses.41 These 
writers all observed that the British army learned on the job, did well for an essentially 
citizen war-service army and was capable of great tactical skill later in the North-West 
Europe campaign.42 However all the armies of the Second World War were essentially 
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conscript in nature, and this view does not account for all the organisational challenges the 
British Army had to deal with during 1944-45. In 2014, this revisionist examination of British 
fighting power extended to the North African and Italian theatres, with the publication of a 
collection of chapters by different authors dealing with different aspects of Allied 
operational ability. A number of new perspectives were created for future debate, including 
such topics as air power and radio communications.43  
  The research carried out by Timothy Harrison-Place is important for the purposes of 
comparison for this thesis. Harrison-Place picked up on Williamson Murray’s hypothesis 
regarding the British Army’s problematic 1939-45 operational and tactical doctrine: 
The real cause of such a state of affairs lay in the failure of the army leadership to 
enunciate a clearly thought out doctrine and then to institute a thorough training 
program to insure its acceptance throughout the army.44 
 
Harrison-Place’s study pursued this statement by investigating just ‘what the British Army at 
home actually did during the four years between Dunkirk and D-Day.’45 Indeed, Harrison-
Place states he has focussed on armour and infantry, the artillery having been dealt with 
capably by Bidwell and Graham. Harrison-Place closely reviews the doctrine and training of 
infantry and armoured formations. He analysed the War Diaries of 43rd Infantry Division (43 
Inf Div), 11th Armoured Division (11 Armoured Div) and the independent 34th Tank Brigade 
(34 Tank Bde), together with the doctrinal policy documents that were the circulated in 
Home Forces command. He concluded that the army ‘failed to establish and enforce a 
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coherent and effective tactical doctrine’ bearing out Murray’s statement.46 Airborne forces 
however receive only one passing reference, when he uses the example of 12 Devon (12th 
Bn the Devonshire Regiment) to illustrate the dangers of elite formations’ combat training.47 
Harrison-Place’s work will be referred to when the pre-operational effectiveness of 6 
Airborne Div’s training is assessed. While he has made little use of the airborne forces’ 
experience, his research into the training of conventional role forces is valuable when used 
as a comparison to that received by glider and parachute troops. These officers and men 
were recruited from the conventional role infantry, or General Service Corps (GSC) men who 
had received basic infantry training, so this evaluation is very useful.    
Yet some revisionist historians, such as John Peaty, have viewed airborne and commando 
forces contribution to eventual victory with some reservation, focussing on the cost-
effective balance. 48  These views have been based essentially on the supposition that large 
numbers of the best soldiers were monopolised by these formations, and/or that the entire 
airborne concept during the Second World War flawed and an unnecessary distraction.  
   The allocation of high quality infantry manpower invested in the creation of airborne 
forces, and consequently their need for considerable replacements following heavy 
casualties, has been attacked by several authors. Britain’s Second World War airborne and 
commando forces could be seen as ‘private armies,’49 which diverted the best men into 
units where they could not benefit from Britain’s increasing materiel  advantage, or simply 
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performed tasks that any competent infantry battalion could have been trained to do.50 
John Terraine’s comments also diminished the performance of the conventional role 
infantry divisions, along similar lines as Hastings’ views: 
Worst of all the “offenders”, it must be said, were the Airborne Forces, with their 
exacting physical and psychological requirements. There is an awful irony in the 
spectacle of the line infantry divisions in Normandy struggling to perform their 
ordinary duties, while beside them the 6th Airborne, first into battle when June 6 
was only twenty minutes old, and consisting entirely of the type of men that the line 
infantry so palpably lacked, fought on as line infantry [author’s own emphasis] for 82 
days.51 
 
However, Terraine downplayed the specialised role that 6 Airborne performed, while 
dismissing the very fact that the division did remain on the line for 82 days, thereby 
releasing more heavily-armed conventional role infantry for offensive operations.  
John Buckley’s Monty’s Men was awarded the Templar Medal for military writing in 2014 
and is rightly recognised as a milestone in this revisionist movement. Buckley’s book 
provided a positive analysis of the performance of the British Army in Normandy and 
beyond, showing that as an organisation it learned tactical craft whilst in the field. Yet his 
view of airborne operations is negative. He reviewed the weaknesses of Operation Market 
Garden52  plan before declaiming all airborne operations carried out during the war:  
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The third fundamental conceptual weakness was the estimation of the efficacy of 
airborne operations. All large-scale airborne operations in the Second World War 
ended in brawls, though at times the confusion generated proved to be a 
strategically beneficial by-product, as had been seen with the American drops on D-
Day. Crucially, these airborne never came close to achieving all their specified 
operational objectives. Though much attention has been placed on the bold seizure 
of Pegasus Bridge on 6 June, most of the other airborne operations in support of D-
Day were chaotic, just as most other previous airborne actions had been.53 
 
    This summarising quote points to a key area of criticism regarding airborne operations 
during the Second World War that of a failure to attain ‘specified operational objectives.’ 
This makes no allowance for the experimental nature of air assault warfare during the 
1940s. It also gives airborne forces no credit for being part of a successful combined 
operational approach required to make large-scale amphibious landings possible in the face 
of entrenched opposition. 
The AHB (Royal Air Force Air Historical Branch) historian Sebastian Ritchie carried a close 
analysis of the failings surrounding Market Garden which extended back to show similar 
problems paralysing the success of all Second World War airborne operations. Before 
assessing Market, Ritchie put forward three key weaknesses for all 1940-44 airborne 
operations: the expense of creating airborne forces, operations characterised by high 
casualties with only partial success and damaging dispersed landings.54 The limited ability of 
airborne forces to achieve results without the relief or support of conventional ground 
forces has been cited by John Buckley in his study of the impact of airpower. 55 He does 
however note that the confusion caused by airborne landings, however confused, was a 
‘strategically beneficial by-product’.56 Behind these authors’ comments regarding airborne 
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forces is a suggestion that the resources could have been better deployed elsewhere.  
However the creation of airborne forces was a clear choice taken by the Prime Minister, 
War Office and Chiefs of Staff during the Second World War.  
    Within this revisionist school, some British army historians have provided a more 
anthropological approach to give a different perspective on the army’s construction during 
the war and its organisational characteristics. Reference to these studies has been made in 
this thesis as and when the organisational behaviour and structures have been explored.  
Charles Kirke’s excellent Red Coat, Green Machine is particularly useful for the study of the 
creation of Special Forces as it shows the personnel building bricks of British army – officers, 
senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), junior NCOs and private soldiers.57The social 
fabric of the army, in terms of the regimental system, officer/other ranks (OR) relations and 
recruitment has been addressed by both French and Crang in a series of comprehensive 
volumes that have created a superb base for the study of the British army in the Second 
World War.58These volumes are all important to this study as they show the army’s resource 
and social framework against which airborne forces were created.  
 Two other schools of writing must also be acknowledged. Various battlefield guide books 
have provided detailed and engaging accounts of 6 Airborne, and increasingly have used 
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primary sources to more accurately support their narratives.59 Further, the internet has now 
become a major source for factual information on airborne forces, and Pegasusarchive and 
paradata deserve special mention here.60   
   The contribution of the Parachute Regiment and the history of airborne warfare in general 
had been vigorously promoted by several narrators who are often closely personally tied to 
Britain’s airborne forces. For this reason their objectivity should perhaps be questioned. In 
the case of 6 Airborne Div this began almost the moment it was committed to action, as the 
BBC war correspondent Chester Wilmot landed with 5 Para Bde.61  His reports made from 
the field illuminated the crucial nature of the airborne forces operations on 5/6 June 1944. 
On 13 June 1944 his broadcast included an account of the storming of the Merville Battery, 
which ended: 
At 4.45am, with only a quarter of an hour to spare, the position was ours ... 150 men 
had done the job of a battalion. The colonel fired a success signal and dispatched a 
carrier pigeon off to England with the news. The courage that took that battery is the 
courage that’s held this flank.62 
 
He had only good observations concerning 6 Airborne to make in his later book, calling them 
the ‘torchbearers of liberation.’ who he had landed with by glider while reporting as a war 
correspondent.63 
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  Peter Harclerode64 has written a well-illustrated and clearly laid out operational history of 6 
Airborne Div in 1990, as well as other authoritative books recording airborne warfare as a 
whole and the Parachute Regiment.65 This volume briefly explains the background of the 
division (pp. 18-48) before concentrating heavily on operations. From a 250 page book, only 
thirty-two pages are devoted to formation, order of battle and training.66 Harclerode 
usefully follows the actions of each brigade and the supporting arms through the campaigns 
in which 6 Airborne was committed, supporting the text with photographs.67 Reflection and 
analysis of the influences which shaped the division through formation and training before 
being committed to action is lacking. More general volumes have been written regarding 
the development of airborne warfare during the Second World War by these writers. 
Maurice Tugwell’s 1971 monograph68 showed the development of airborne warfare from 
1918 to the midst of the Cold War, and included some useful insights.69 Napier Crookenden 
produced an accompanying volume to his Normandy memoir account which covered 
German and U.S. operations such as Crete and Corregidor.70  
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  This contribution by ex-Parachute Regiment officers has continued up to the present. 
Robert Kershaw closely analysed the crucial delay and confusion caused by scattered 
airborne landings on D-Day to the deployment and response of German forces and 
therefore their failure to be ready to resist the seaborne invaders.71 His map on page 110 
explains the six-hour detour through Caen forced on 21.Pz. Div and other German units 
attempting to advance from the east, after Howard’s force  captured the canal and river 
bridges at Bénouville inflicted as D-Day began. Later, Kershaw carefully moves through the 
events surrounding the capture of Bréville using both British and German archival sources to 
expose the impact on the Wehrmacht units involved in the battle. In his concluding chapter, 
Kershaw is positive concerning the effectiveness of the Allied landings plan as a whole and 
the role airborne forces played within it. ‘The Allied D-Day plan worked. Deception, surprise 
and concentration of force resulted in the overrunning of a sizeable lodgement area within 
the first 24 hours.’72 Stuart Tootal’s The Manner of Men revisited the narrative of 9 Para Bn’s 
assault on Merville and explored the background to the operation, particularly the reasons 
behind the sacking of Martin Lindsay as CO shortly beforehand.73 
    The memoirs of individuals who took part on the Normandy landings and campaign are 
useful for forming an analytical standpoint on the issues under discussion, as the focus on 
the experience of one individual provides more space for reflection. Seemingly unimportant 
details within the context of wider events can be of importance when 6 Airborne’s 
development and situation are under consideration. For example, Alan Jefferson, a young 
                                                          
71
 Robert Kershaw joined the Parachute Regiment in 1973 and served in Bosnia, N. Ireland and the First Gulf 
War. Robert J. Kershaw, D-Day: Piercing the Atlantic Wall (Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allan Pub., 2008), pp. 117–
40.  
72
 Kershaw, D-Day: Piercing the Atlantic Wall, p. 420. 
73
 Colonel Tootal commanded 3 Para Bn in Afghanistan in 2006 for which he was decorated with the DSO 




platoon commander in A Coy 9 Para Bn, provides a peerless account of the Merville 
operation’s planning and execution.74 Napier Crookenden’s wider study of the airborne 
operations which spearheaded Neptune/Overlord, provides useful insights into the activity 
of 6 Airborne: 
Leslie Hollinghurst was a hard, stocky, red-faced and professional airman with a 
strong character and considerable powers of leadership. He also had a sense of 
humour, an affection for his own air and ground crews and the troops of the division, 
and a low flash point. Airmen or soldiers falling below his standards seldom did so 
twice. He remained a close friend of General Gale and many airborne soldiers until 
the end of his life in 1973.75 
 
As Brigade Major of 6 AL Bde Crookenden would have been familiar with Hollinghurst, the 
AOC of 38 Gp RAF, and therefore qualified to furnish such a pencil-sketch.76 In common with 
the commentators who hold strong links with the Parachute Regiment discussed above, the 
objectivity of such writers must be weighed carefully together with the timings of their 
writing, often at times when post-1945 British airborne forces as a concept were under 
threat of disbandment.  
   For the purposes of this study Richard Gale’s career memoir and account of 6 Airborne 
Division in Normandy form obvious but still extremely useful reference points.77 The first 
book is perhaps more useful for this study as Gale is more candid in his observations and 
presenting his long-held views, perhaps due to the fact that when it was written his career 
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had been crowned by a SHAEF appointment and numerous other accolades.  The second 
book is a useful summary of 6 Airborne’s preparations and efforts in Normandy, but written 
in 1948 Gale continues to create a motivational atmosphere for his ex-soldiers; every effort 
is ‘grand’ and every unit ‘splendid’: 
The landing in Normandy and the subsequent fighting was to them a testing time. It 
was a testing time. It was the first full-scale British divisional airborne operation. 
They intended it to succeed; and thanks to their stalwart qualities, to their élan in 
attack, their courage in defence and their rugged determination in all and any 
circumstances, they did succeed.78 
 
 This warmth is reciprocated by his former subordinates in their writing, though Crookenden 
provides an interesting description, emphasising Gale’s proficiency as a trainer: 
Richard Gale had a forceful, robust personality and a deep understanding of soldiers. 
Steeped in military history, he was a real professional, and these qualities made him 
an excellent trainer of troops. His success in preparing his division for D-Day and in 
leading them through the first days and weeks of fighting made a valuable 
contribution to the campaign by ensuring the security of the Allies’ left flank.79 
 
Brief pencil sketches of Gale appear in other memoirs, typically emphasising Gale’s personal 
impact and appearance, and skill as a trainer: 
I knew Gale well and his red face, with his bushy white moustache, belied his brilliant 
original brain and exceptional qualities of leadership. Fortunately, he was also a first 
class trainer. Before D-Day, every man in the Division was briefed personally and 
knew exactly what to do on landing, even if things went wrong.80 
 
This was the opinion of Sir Brian Horrocks, a veteran of the North African campaign and 
commander of XXX Corps 1944-45, a positive view from an individual who had met the 
majority of divisional and corps commanders who played significant roles in these two 
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important campaigns. The confident professional air Gale presented was an important 
element of his leadership style. 
  Another approach to the history of airborne forces has been seen recently with the 
burgeoning number of monographs based on first-hand accounts. Various veteran 
interviews have been compiled into books, which illuminate the landings’ events with eye-
witness views. These volumes have become more important as the veterans’ numbers sadly 
diminish with each passing year.81 These monographs include Stephen E. Ambrose’s 1985 
Pegasus Bridge, and sits alongside a book based on John Howard’s own diaries.82 This format 
has been fuelled by the use of transcribed versions of the taped interviews available at the 
Imperial War Museum (IWM), and has also covered other conflicts.83 This approach was 
combined with primary sources by Neil Barber into two authoritative and highly detailed 
books on 9 Para Bn’s assault on Merville and the seizure and defence of the entire 6 
Airborne Division bridgehead on D-Day.84 This memoir approach can also be seen in books 
which focus on the actions of single battalions,85 the personal war diary of Geoffrey Pine-
Coffin having been reworked by his son in one case.86 All of these books represent a 
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tremendous amount of work compiling and cross-referencing the accounts of the individuals 
who were there, and concentrate on the action. This genre perhaps culminated in 2014 with 
D-Day: Minute by Minute, in which Jonathan Mayo compiled a blow-by-blow account of the 
critical first twenty-four hours of the landings.87 While this style of narrative history provides 
great drama and interest, it unfortunately leaves little space for analysis of context and the 
wider impact of the division’s cost and operations.  
  This thesis concerns the creation and combat performance of 6 Airborne Div on D-Day and 
during the following Normandy campaign, therefore the sources drawn upon are of British 
origin. However, as chapter six focuses on the combat effectiveness of the division once 
committed to action, the viewpoint of the enemy must be taken into account. Various first-
hand accounts and narratives written by those who were present have been examined, for 
example those written by the Werner Kortenhaus and Hans von Luck being of use for the 
division’s fighting against 21.Pz. Div (21 Panzer Division).88 Primary sources were translated 
to furnish three important sections within the thesis, using the Freiberg military archives, 
which were visited.89 First, Heeresgruppe B correspondence was used to show Rommel’s 
regard for Allied airborne forces in his anti-invasion preparations. This is an important 
element in establishing the value attributed to these new forces by 1944. The training 
undertaken by Rauch’s 192. Gren. Regt (192 Panzer Grenadier Regiment) is used in chapter 
five to show a comparison of mission-specific training alongside that of Gale’s formations. 
This regiment was chosen from the Freiburg archives viewed as it contained comprehensive 
accounts of the preparation and training of an enemy formation that had a similarly 
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aggressive role. Third, an important element of chapter six is the Bréville case study, 
following the fighting between 10-12 June as 346.Gren. Div attempted to puncture 6 
Airborne’s defensive line along the Bois de Bavent. This episode was firstly selected as it was 
critical engagement for 6 Airborne. Second, blow-by-blow primary accounts were available 
for both sides to create as accurate a timeline of true events as possible.  The use of these 
contemporary documents is important as the view expressed in some the German post-war 
accounts are influenced by a desire to express anti-Nazi sentiment90 or to shift all the 
culpability for defeat on to Hitler or OKW.91 
  Three recent theses have analysed the formation of Britain’s airborne forces closely.  
William Buckingham’s work conscientiously reviewed the genesis of British airborne forces 
1940-42, while John Greenacre’s thesis methodically explored the developing military 
effectiveness of airborne forces 1940-1945.92 Timothy Jenkins’ 2013 study assessed the 
scientific viability of the equipment allocated to airborne forces, and whether the 
development of such new technology was worth the investment.93 
Buckingham’s work unearthed important information regarding the very origins of British 
airborne forces and the decision-making process that dictated its early direction. His work 
effectively ends with the creation of 1 Para Bde, Biting (the company-sized raid on the 
German radar station at Bruneval) being footnoted as the successful apogee of airborne 
forces in his time span. Although his concluding thesis chapter summarises the further 
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development and enlargement of British airborne forces 1942-45, the short span of his 
study is a double-edged sword. His tight focus on approximately the first eighteen months 
of the subject engenders a meticulous and thorough focus, but finishing where it does leave 
questions unanswered.  
Greenacre’s research of the entire development of British airborne forces 1940-1945 is of 
great value and broke new ground into their study. He searched all primary sources 
available to create a ‘conceptual progression’ for airborne forces, as the scale of operations 
increased from raids (such as Biting) to the culmination of wartime airborne effort with 
Varsity (6 Airborne and 17 US Airborne Divs operation in support of the March 1945 Rhine 
crossing by 21 Army Gp).94 His stated aim for his thesis was to ‘examine the historical 
process of airborne development, to determine why developmental progress was not 
consistent and explain the wide variance in military effectiveness across the wartime 
period.’95 Greenacre identified his work with the revisionist school, mentioned above, and 
eschewed a narrative approach and followed French’s structure by focussing his chapters on 
‘discrete areas of study’.96 His chapter structure seemingly emulated the MOD 2008 
Doctrine’s three pillars of fighting power approach – moral, physical and conceptual.97 This 
approach did much to distinguish Greenacre’s work from the essentially chronological style 
of the vast majority of airborne monographs. 
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  His erudite conclusion identified three clear ‘broad levels to the development process’, ‘the 
impetus to innovate’, ‘the impulse to change’ and thirdly ‘the drive to develop.’ 98 He viewed 
these trends as vital to the development of the airborne project, and placed them ahead of 
the need for central ‘mavericks’ who might provide the drive needed to translate ideas and 
new technology into doctrine and operational effectiveness. Browning, Down and Gale he 
viewed as anything but unconventional.99 Greenacre concluded a ‘range of individuals with a 
variety of personal characteristics and skills are required during different stages of the 
development process.100 Greenacre began and concluded his thesis with Varsity apart as the 
‘zenith’ of the British airborne project,101 which displayed a ‘remarkable level of military 
effectiveness,’ whereby the whole undertaking must be ‘considered a success.’102 
Greenacre’s study is well structured and thorough, but his altogether positive conclusions 
on British airborne forces during the Second World War must place his work in the school of 
writers who have written in their defence. 
In 2013 Timothy Jenkins completed a thesis which explored the technical viability of British 
glider and parachute forces 1940-1945. His study approached the subject from a novel 
(when compared to previous work) but important direction that of the enormous amount of 
scientific development needed to field Britain’s nascent airborne forces. Jenkins concluded 
that the resource and technological requirements had been difficult to justify when 
compared to operational impact, and that the whole exercise had been essentially politically 
driven.103 This study represents the counter-argument to the whole airborne concept, as 
advocated by Greenacre, proposing that Britain would have been better served by 
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developing its existing weapons systems and conventional role forces rather than expend 
effort and resources in exploring new forms of warfare.  
  However, Jenkins’ hypothesis can be questioned for two reasons. First, the creation of 
airborne forces was a distinct choice made by the Prime Minister and key army figures and 
pursued by the Chiefs of Staff until large scale formations were created. Existing equipment 
was adapted to support the project, through the policy of Bomber Command aircraft being 
co-opted to tow gliders, while later US air assets were borrowed for the Sicilian operations. 
This was until 38 and 46 Groups RAF had been established at such a level to allow at least a 
sixty per cent lift for an airborne division. Second, an inadequacy of vital equipment was by 
no means limited to airborne forces. While Britain had pioneered the use of tanks in battle 
during the First World War, Britain had no coherent armoured doctrine in 1939 or effective 
medium tank.104 In another example, the submachine-gun (SMG) had been dismissed as a 
‘gangster guns’,105 ‘precious’ US made Thompson SMGs having to be hurriedly purchased 
after Dunkirk when their importance was appreciated.106 The Second World War was a 
period of enormous technological invention and innovation and the situation of airborne 
forces was not novel. The War Office had decided airborne forces were an important 
element of the army’s offensive capability and would be developed in tandem with other 
forces.107 
   The factors which engendered the perceived enhanced combat capability of 6 Airborne Div 
have not been thoroughly examined in its existing historiography. Most general histories 
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regarding British airborne forces have proposed that the basis for these troops’ suggested 
outstanding fighting performance lay in an exceptional esprit de corps fostered by gruelling 
training. Summarised in a recent monograph: 
There were two major factors that led to Paras developing a particularly strong 
esprit de corps. Firstly, every man was a volunteer; they were there because they 
chose to be, not because the Army told them to be. Secondly, they had all passed 
the tough training that had tested them both physically and mentally. The training 
had not only tested them as individuals, but also their ability to function as a unit. It 
broke down boundaries, bringing together men from many different backgrounds 
into a cohesive force.108 
 
The object of the training airborne forces received appeared to be to create supermen: 
The aim of such training was to produce troops of such a high calibre that they 
would be capable of taking on superior odds and holding their own against them. 
Each man was to possess a high degree of courage, self-discipline and self-reliance.109 
 
These statements must be must be more fully challenged and explored to answer the 
question as to how such demanding training moulded 6 Airborne Div before D-Day.  
   In conclusion, the existing historiography of 6 Airborne Div fails to answer why the Division 
performed as it did in Normandy. The account of the operational activity of British airborne 
forces during the Second World War has been re-visited many times, much of it being 
reverential or ‘hagiographic’.110 The narrative is therefore research-worn, as two reasons 
have caused writers to be deflected away from deeper analysis for the causes of Gale’s 
success. First, the very drama of their introduction to battle draws interested parties to 
focus on 5/6 June events before any analysis of their genesis or battle preparation is 
attempted. Second, the apparent accomplishment of 6 Airborne in carrying out its D-Day 
missions and the security of 21 Army Gp’s eastern (Orne) flank have pushed analysists on to 
scrutinise more thorny issues, the failure to capture Caen on D-Day for example. Recent 
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revisionist historians have raised questions concerning the efficacy of elite formations while 
other experts on the campaign and airborne forces have explored in close detail the 
narrative using first-hand accounts. Buckingham and Greenacre’s studies have shown the 
sinuous processes of policy and staff work which brought the airborne forces into existence 
and explained organizational characteristics, but no work has yet been done focused sharply 
on the organizational development of 6 Airborne Div, nor to isolate its combat performance 
in the summer of 1944. 
  Primary sources has been the careful cross-referencing of archival sources to obtain as 
clear a contemporary picture of the state of the Division at key points, whether preparing 
for or during Normandy operations. The main source for primary information has been the 
National Archive at Kew (TNA), where the Air Ministry, Cabinet and War Office records from 
the Second World War are kept. To fully balance the cost element of the thesis’ 
investigation the army and RAF order of battle, the Army List, and organisational records 
were cross-referenced to create an accurate understanding of the equipment and 
manpower investment made in the creation and transportation of the Division. In-period 
situation maps have been closely analysed to gain more understanding of the ground fought 
over during the campaign, and in one case an original Wehrmacht map was studied to gain a 
fuller appreciation of the 716. Gren. Div defences. This cross-referencing has been most 
important in attempting to isolate the combat effectiveness of 6 Airborne, especially during 
the landings phase. The challenge here is to measure the intangible. Once committed, the 
Division relied heavily on the shock-surprise effect in the hours before dawn and its 
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consequent effect on the enemy’s command response and morale.111 More tangibly, when 
contact was established with the seaborne conventional role formations, 6 Airborne was 
able to access considerable firepower as it was integrated into 1 Corps’ defensive crust. 
  While primary sources are a critical source of this study’s research, they are not infallible 
bearers of the truth. Paul Winter’s recent monograph explained their limitations, being 
completed by typically only one officer often in difficult operational conditions.112 Unit war 
diaries focus on the unit and its events, there is no time for the individual or to record the 
zeitgeist of the battalion at a particular key moment.113 Indeed, on occasion war diaries can 
be carefully reconstructed away from the action. For example, the diary of 2 Coldstream for 
the testing months of May and June 1940 was lost, a typed replacement being forwarded to 
the WO in March 1941.114 This could only have been completed based on the post-battle 
recollections of the men and officers there, some months after the events. For 1 June the 
diary demurely remarks ‘the Germans now began in earnest to try and prevent our getting 
away.’115 In contrast, the memoir of one of the battalion’s officers recalls a day of ferocious 
battle during which his company commander was killed and he shot a British officer from an 
adjacent infantry battalion who left his post.116 Similarly, such memoirs and the recollections 
of veterans must be cross-referenced, as nothing can be taken as infallible.117 Though 
referring to the First World War, Richard Holmes is succinct in his summing up: 
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Up to my neck in muck and bullets; rats as big as footballs; the sergeant major was a 
right bastard; all my mates got killed.118 
 
Yet by careful checking of all sources available then as close as possible a picture of actual 
events can be reached. 
II. Phraseology and Definitions 
 This introductory chapter will now to move on to outline the structure of the thesis. First 
the phraseology scheme will be outlined and certain key terms to be used will be 
discussed.119 Secondly, the research questions and themes will be justified before finally the 
chapter sequence.  
  Before the organisation of this thesis is explained, the nomenclature of the units and forces 
involved must be quickly outlined.  Various terms regarding airborne warfare will be used, 
their interpretations drawn directly from the War Office 1943 pamphlet. The most 
important definition being airborne role troops, which includes all the airlanding troops (AL) 
which are landed directly into action by either glider or parachute (Para).120 Air transported 
(or air-portable) units are those which were flown into secured airfields or temporary air 
strips, such as 52 (Lowland) Division.121  The contemporaneous WO (War Office) scheme of 
abbreviations as used by Major Jolsen’s orders of battle will be used from this point 
onwards.122 Therefore 9th Battalion the Parachute Regiment and 45 Commando Royal 
Marines will be shortened to 9 Para Bn and No. 45 (RM) Cdo respectively; while 1st 
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Battalion the Gordon Highlanders,  8th Infantry Brigade, 51st (Highland) Division and 
Crocker’s First Corps will become 1 Gordons, 8 Inf Bde, 51 Div and 1 Corps. Britain formed 
the ‘Airborne Division’ in November 1941, later titled 1 Airborne Div, for clarity this 
formation is referred to by the latter from the outset in this study. The standard infantry 
battalions fighting alongside airborne or commando units (for example the Durham Light 
Infantry or the Warwickshire Regiment) will be referred to as the ‘county’ units.123 County 
battalions, artillery and armoured regiments will be stated as ‘conventional’ forces at some 
points, to reflect their more established combat role when compared to airborne units. 
German units will follow the abbreviation scheme laid out in the war diary of the 
Wehrmacht LXXXI A.K. (81st Army Corps) which proved to be 6 Airborne’s main opponent in 
the Orne bridgehead.124 1st SS Panzer Corps, 21st Panzer Division and 3rd Battalion 857th 
Grenadier Regiment, will become I.SS-Pz.Kps, 21.Pz.Div and III/857 G.R. 
     The terms doctrine,125 policy and role126 will be widely used throughout the thesis. The 
last term is straightforward and requires little explanation. Policy can be seen as the 
interface between government and service leadership127 or decisions made by ‘a military 
command on the general way something should be done.’128 The policy analysed in this 
study will be at the highest inter-service level, while the analysis of 6 Airborne in action will 
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be seen at the level of the division and below in organisational terms.129 
  It cannot be emphasised enough that airborne warfare was in its infancy during the Second 
World War, and the UK had no inter-war established airborne doctrine or policy to work 
with. In military terms doctrine can be briefly summed up as the ‘fundamental principles 
and operational concepts by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their action 
in military operations in support of national objectives.’130 A defined doctrine for military 
operations is an invaluable tool for training units, the planning of operations and their 
successful execution. Effective doctrine should not stifle the use of initiative, and ‘does not 
necessarily demand uniform conduct, and it may invite flexibility under the broadest 
guidelines’. 131 Without doctrine ‘an organization that was so large would deform any 
commander’s will,’132 as a general would have to make allowances in his battle plan for his 
formations’ deficiencies.  A force without some common teaching and shared practices 
would soon become operationally ineffective as unexpected events call for shared solutions. 
The WO had no collated doctrinal pamphlet until the summer of 1943, and its widespread 
circulation and absorption by the Airborne Establishment must be questioned.133  
 Combat effectiveness comes at a cost; therefore the equipoise between manpower and 
equipment cost and operational effect is a critical consideration of this study. The question 
must be asked, was the expenditure on creating 6 Airborne Div worth it for what it achieved 
in Normandy? ‘Cost effectiveness’ in the military sense has been described as: 
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A comparative evaluation derived from analyses of alternatives (actions, methods, 
approaches, equipment, weapon systems, support systems, force combinations, 
etc.) in terms of the interrelated factors of cost and effectiveness in accomplishing a 
specific mission.134 
 
 The cost-effectiveness of Special Forces operations has been intensively explored in by 
Andrew Hargreaves, his proposal being centred on some key variables: 
The most central of these variables are: the scale of a formation’s establishment; the 
frequency of its employment; the utility of its actions; and both the operational and 
non-operational costs of its development and use.135 
 
  Earlier lightly armed airborne and commando operations had revealed the balance that 
had to be struck between excessive losses and operational, if not strategic gain (see Figure 
2). Operation Ambassador (July 1940) an unfocussed attempt to kill or capture members of 
the enemy garrison on the newly occupied Guernsey was a complete failure and resulted in 
three captured and one man drowned.136 Operation Biting (February 1942) had yielded 
important information regarding new Wehrmacht radar devices which had begun to 
increase Bomber Command losses, for the cost of three dead and seven wounded, a low 
cost but high effect result.137 Jubilee (August 1942) had been quite the reverse. 4,260 
casualties in a failed landing attempt were a high price to pay to reinforce understanding 
that opposed landings would require enormous fire support from naval units and close 
support from tanks.138 Chariot (St. Nazaire, March 1942) is a more finely poised example of 
the cost-effect balance. 541 combined Royal Navy (RN) and commando (Cdo) casualties 
were incurred, but the Kriegsmarine was effectively prevented from deploying capital ships 
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on the French Atlantic coast for the rest of the war.139 The preparedness of SHAEF to accept 
severe losses to attacking forces in the early hours of D-Day will be discussed in chapter five, 
which points to a pragmatic acceptance of losses for wider gain. 
 Hargreaves’ metrics can be applied to 6 Airborne Div at an operational or NW Europe 
theatre level, while Dupuy’s definition, based on analysing different alternatives, will be 
used to assess tactical choices made by Gale and his subordinates in planning and executing 
operations during the landings phase and later while holding the Orne bridgehead. Such 
choices are not the sole province of airborne forces, but with often only sparse and ill-suited 
resources available, 6 Airborne’s alternatives were all the more limited. 
The Army’s definition of a victory during the Second World War is useful here. Battlefield 
success during the 1940s meant taking the enemy’s position with infantry and holding it. 
The 1935 Field Service Regulations (FSR) Vol. II state:  
Practically all success in war, which is won by the proper co-operation of all arms, 
must in the end be confirmed by infantry, which, by closing with the enemy, compels 
his withdrawal or surrender, and holds the objectives which have been secured or 
the points of importance which have to be protected, as a base for further action.140  
 
While in Vol. III, a successful attack would show ‘the enemy’s gun positions have been 
overrun or his main reserves defeated.’141 A more modern source provides a broadening of 
the definition: 
Defeat-Failure in combat, including one or a combination of the following conditions: 
inability to accomplish an assigned mission; suffering excessive casualties; loss of 
important terrain or resources.142 
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This quotation raises the issue of the avoidance of Pyrrhic victory – victory at any cost. While 
the senior commanders of the Second World War were not casualty averse in the way that 
twenty-first century western commanders can be considered to be so, for 1940-45 airborne 
forces losses were a tactical balance against success. The airborne forces of 1939-45 could 
not afford to gain the objective at pyrrhic cost, as that would only end with rapid defeat by 
enemy reinforcements if there were too few troops to hold the ground.   
     If these interpretations are accepted as the absolute definition of a complete offensive 
battlefield victory, the evidence will be the objective secured and all enemy forces (including 
local reinforcements) eliminated or suppressed.  A defensive success will be proven by 
denying the enemy the above criteria. To be victorious in action relied on being combat 
effective. This has been defined as ‘1) a term used to describe the abilities and fighting 
quality of a unit. 2) the quality of being effective in combat.’143 The measure of success for 6 
Airborne and its units in this study is whether they achieved their operational tasks. This 
definition will be further explored at the beginning of chapter six, before 6 Airborne’s 
combat performance is reviewed.  
     The issue of gauging the Division’s contemporaneous ‘eliteness’ is a challenge for this 
study, and is tied up with the notion or definition of ‘Special Forces’ which was emerging in 
the Second World War. The British Parachute Regiment has been certainly been regarded 
since 1945 as an elite corps, indeed by the 1990s around forty per cent of SAS recruits were 
from that regiment.144 The novelty of entering the battlefield from the air greatly raised the 
profile of airborne forces and they were certainly used as a key propaganda tool (see 
chapter three) but in 1943 its elevated combat reputation was still to be truly formed.  
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   Julian Thompson defined Special Forces during the Second World War by their three 
functions: ‘offensive action; the gathering of intelligence; and operating with indigenous 
resistance groups.’145 These would be small groups of men who performed high value 
operations for little resource investment and at enormous jeopardy. These forces were not 
expected to fight conventional role enemy forces for a sustained period, and certainly used 
unconventional techniques. 6 Airborne Div as a force was different. While it entered the 
battlefield in an unconventional sense was different in that it was expected to prevail 
against more heavily armed enemy conventional role forces before being withdrawn. While 
Operation Tonga’s initial actions were raids in nature, the destruction of enemy installations 
and bridges over the River Dives, the Division was not designed for covert operations but for 
high intensity battle over short periods. 
   The men who volunteered for airborne forces were certainly physically fine specimens. 
Every man was subjected to a testing pre-parachute regime at the Airborne Forces Depot to 
eliminate any unsuitable candidates prior to the challenge of parachute training. Demanding 
training continued once they arrived at their units as the build-up preparation and training 
for D-Day developed. At any time a man could be ‘RTU-ed’ (returned to unit), effectively 
rejected back to a conventional role unit.146 This was a tremendous advantage when 
compared to conventional role units. What the Airborne Establishment and the Division 
itself did to weld these men into effective units, in terms of role and mission-specific 
training, and the results seen in the Normandy Campaign is this study’s focus.   
  Also, this thesis will not attempt to rank various formations’ combat effectiveness and will 
concentrate on how 6 Airborne generated and sustained its own fighting capability. Many 
                                                          
145
 Julian Thompson, The Imperial War Museum Book of War behind Enemy Lines (London: Sidgwick and 
Jackson, 1999), pp. 6-9. 
146
 ‘RTU-ed’ – Return to Unit. Any airborne soldier found lacking by his C.O. could be returned to his parent 
(conventional role) regiment or corps. Gregory, pp. 26–27. 
53 
 
other formations regarded themselves as the finest troops the army possessed; for example 
the veteran Eighth Army divisions who had joined 21 Army Group and the regiments of Foot 
Guards.  By mid-1944 these formations also had very different roles from 6 Airborne, the 
bulk of the Guards were concentrated in the Guards Armoured Division while the county 
infantry were fielded in large conventional role divisions. Therefore any attempt at 
comparative measurement is difficult.  
   There is a danger that a study which attempts to isolate 6 Airborne’s effectiveness in the 
Normandy campaign could stray into the realms of counter-factual history; if a D-Day 
without airborne forces is imagined.  This must be avoided. The Prime Minister called for 
their formation and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, first as C-in-C Home Forces and later as 
CIGS held a strong conviction regarding their value. As the dominant figure on the COS he 
defended the maintenance of formation-level airborne forces,147 when the RAF sought to 
hamstring them in the autumn of 1942. To create airborne forces was a deliberate choice 
made by Britain’s high level leadership like the night bomber offensive on Germany.  
    In the case of a quantitative advantage, if airborne forces had been disbanded in May 
1944, the army would have only gained one and a half conventional role infantry divisions 
from airborne ranks. When set in the context of the cautious conceptual environment that 
the army inhabited in the run-up to D-Day, having these men in conventional role 
formations would not have led to a renaissance of infantry fighting power, while the 
advantages of their role-specific capability would have been lost. The D-Day plan would 
have been completely different without the participation of airborne forces, for example the 
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Band landing beach might well have been used to seize the ground between the Orne and 
the Dives.148  
  In terms of a qualitative benefit for airborne forces disbandment it might be claimed that 
these aggressive fighters could have been used as ‘stiffeners’ to enhance the often plodding 
performance of the infantry.149 However much of the ‘eliteness’ of the division’s airborne 
troops was engendered by its tough training as will be seen in chapters three and five; and 
may not have surfaced if these men had stayed with their parent conventional role units. 
This study will therefore not attempt to imagine an Orne scenario without the effort of 6 
Airborne, but will focus on the decisions made by the division in its actual battles. 
III. Thesis Structure: Thesis Question, Chapter Questions and Themes 
Overall it can be argued that 6 Airborne, a ‘green’ division, performed well in its first 
campaign. What factors exerted an influence on Gale’s division to facilitate the generation 
of this combat performance? This is the thesis question. 
   The research methodology of this thesis relies on the construction various models in each 
chapter to analyse and explore the considerable information gathered from primary sources 
as discussed below. This can be illustrated by two examples. In chapter three, in which the 
specific manpower cost of the division is explored, the 13 Warwicks/8 Para Bn case study 
shows that the dissolution of the first unit did not result in every man volunteering for 
Airborne Forces. The model shows that the non-volunteers were largely posted to 8 
Warwicks in Lincolnshire, some of whom were posted to Tunisia. This shows that the 
                                                          
148
 Charles Messenger, The D-Day Atlas: Anatomy of the Normandy Campaign (London: Thames and Hudson, 
2014), pp. 70–71. 
149
Timothy Harrison-Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day (London: 




conversion of a conventional infantry battalion to the airborne role did not waste any 
trained infantrymen, the lower establishment of the latter freeing up men for duty 
elsewhere. Each chapter contains these study models that move the deductions of the 
thesis forward. The second example of an illustrative model is presented in chapter two in 
diagrammatical form to show the process of success or failure of airborne operations during 
the Second World War. This follows an exploration of the impact Merkur (the German 
airborne invasion of Crete) made on the WO, which powerfully revealed the super in-
theatre mobility of airborne forces and the ferocity of an airborne assault. This tool is then 
used to provide an analytical framework to assess 6 Airborne’s performance in chapter six. 
  The thesis is structured with six chapters and a smaller seventh chapter which forms the 
thesis conclusion. Chapter two contains three sections, its question being what were the 
contextual and forming pressures involved in the creation of 6 Airborne Div? It first explains 
the background to the creation of 6 Airborne Div including the attitudes of Sir Alan Brooke 
and the reaction to German Airborne Forces success 1940-41. Second, the 1940-43 
theoretical basis for British airborne warfare will be reviewed. Third, the development of air 
transport capability before finally the expectations of senior allied commanders before D-
Day. Britain had rejected the concept of airborne forces in the inter-war period and had no 
suitable modern purpose-built transport aircraft. Only through the stubborn support of Sir 
Alan Brooke was the project pursued, even when the Prime Minister himself called for the 
disbandment of 1 Airborne Div. The theoretical base for understanding this new style of 
warfare was initially pursued by studying German operations before HUSKY (the invasion of 
Sicily) yielded hard experience. 
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Chapter three reviews the development of an airborne identity of both individuals and the 
organisation. How was an airborne identity established? Starting with an assessment of why 
men joined airborne and commando units, the chapter then examines the total manpower 
cost of the Division both in terms of quantity and qualitatively. It first examines the role of 
the Airborne Establishment in supporting the creation of the Division Firstly through role-
specific training. This began with the completion of selection through two gruelling weeks of 
pre-parachute ground training at Hardwick Hall, the Airborne Forces Depot; followed by 
parachute training at Ringway. This training was a trial of character and physical capability, 
and will be compared to the infantry training prevalent in the rest if the Army at that time. 
The second part of the chapter will review the influences that ‘moulded’ 6 Airborne Div, 
chiefly the ‘corporate’ effect of the AAC in assisting in developing a strong sense of identity, 
as well as being a supportive framework to operate within, and  the efforts Gale himself 
made to mould the Division into his vision of a high quality formation. 
 Chapter four focuses on leadership.  How was leadership interwoven through the most 
crucial command appointments? Beginning with Gale himself and then turning to the 
appointment of brigade and battalion commanders. This chapter is important in that it 
examines Richard Gale who was such an important activist for the development of Airborne 
Forces and how his influence cascaded down through the Division influencing every nuance.  
A case study involving a junior officer (Nick Archdale, 9 Para Bn) casts light on the attitudes 
and confidence in the Division prior to going into action. Finally, a hypothesis regarding 
Richard Gale’s leadership is set down based on the research completed for this thesis. It is 
positioned her to summarise the conclusions drawn from chapters two and three and 
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highlight the characteristics of Gale and his officers before the more involved preparation 
for D-Day began. 
  Chapter five moves the focus of the thesis on to the task. What was expected of 6 Airborne 
within the overarching Second Army plan is reviewed first, before the tenets of Gale’s 
planning are shown embedded in the divisional plan. How did the Division prepare its self 
for D-Day?  The adaptation and innovation theme comes to the fore here, as the CRA Lt-Col. 
Jack Norris developed fire support plans involving 3 Div and the RN. The value placed on the 
threat posed by Allied airborne forces by Heeresgruppe B will be shown in fixed the anti-
airborne defences. The next part of this chapter provides a comparative case study of 
mission-specific training as 192.Gren.Regt prepared for either all-out attack on D-Day or 
desperate defence.  The third and final part of this chapter will return to a study of training, 
this time mission-specific, as Gale and his commanders prepared the Division for D-Day. 
How Gale planned to deal with the challenges thrown up by the dangers of scattered 
landings and well-armed enemy mechanised forces will be analysed here. 
Chapter Six examines the Division once committed to action, beginning with a discussion on 
the challenge inherent with attempting to isolate formations’ combat effectiveness and 
realistically measuring it. How effective was it?  6 Airborne Div suffered a catastrophe on the 
night of 5/6 June as 3 and 5 Para Bdes’ were badly scattered. How the Division regrouped at 
the very lowest level and then performed on its Tonga missions will be assessed. The battle 
of Bréville (10-12 June 1944) will show 6 Airborne’s distinctive strengths at work with its 
weaknesses. By comparing British and German primary sources (LXXXIV Korps) which 
recorded losses and future intentions, the impact on the enemy in this key engagement will 
58 
 
be shown. The chapter ends with an analysis of 6 Airborne’s need to continue to adapt as it 
held the line for three months before joining the Paddle pursuit as the enemy crumbled.  
Chapter Seven will provide the thesis conclusions by reviewing the research questions and 
thematic pathway. The organisational characteristics of 6 Airborne will be amassed to 
compare how it was supposed to function through planning and training to how it actually 
performed in action. A final discussion on the synergy between leadership and training in 
building unit cohesion as a force multiplier will close the thesis. 
The thesis has three themes, which are strongly linked to the research questions. The first is 
leadership. Leadership has been defined frequently by commentators and established 
military figures. A recent formal definition aptly sums up, as will be seen, how Gale moulded 
the division:  ‘Leadership – The art of influencing and directing people to an assigned goal in 
such a manner as to command their obedience, confidence, respect and loyalty.’ 150 The 
ability to engender confidence in others in one’s own plans and command regime, 
combined with raising each individuals’ personal confidence in their own abilities has been 
seen as key. Jonathan Fennell has written at length to illustrate the crucial importance of 
confidence-building in Montgomery’s rejuvenation of Eighth Army in the Egypt prior to El 
Alamein.151  Montgomery stated that ‘my own definition of leadership is this: “The capacity 
and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character which 
inspires confidence.’152  
    Tactical Airborne Forces leadership required the same closeness of officers to men as 
conventional role forces, but the shared risk of a hazardous role-specific entry to the 
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battlefield required perhaps a closer degree of proximity. One of the important leadership 
figures discussed in this study, Brigadier James Hill, stated ‘If you lead with courage, 
firmness and have compassion for your chaps and their problems, they will do what you tell 
them’.153 It would however be easy to propose that airborne forces leadership was simply a 
case of leading from the front while under fire. But leadership was displayed in the 
formation process of the Airborne Establishment and the division, and in the build-up to D-
Day. It was also important in the reorganisation after the scattered landings and later 
marshalling the division’s resources. 
  The second leitmotif is simply training.  The preparation and training undertaken by the 
men who formed 6 Airborne Div was extremely demanding and hazardous but was of the 
great shaping influence on the combat effectiveness and character of the Divison. Here 
Gale’s contributed much through his focus on leader selection and training, but his own 
vision of what the Division should be was also a distinct influence. Gale had been involved 
with Airborne Forces from the first point of significant expansion with the creation of 1 Para 
Bde and soon after the embodiment of the first complete airborne division. He was 
experienced regular soldier who had been exposed to influential and original leaders 
throughout his career, and had observed different styles of divisional-level leadership in 
action. Gale held essentially conventional soldiering views but with a high receptiveness to 
new ideas and solutions to tactical problems.  He also showed urgency, his rapid and 
ruthless de-selection of unwanted officers revealed his over-riding desire to shape his 
division’s future performance.  
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The third theme is again straightforward, that of the role of adaptation in the Division’s 
preparation for operations and then later in the field. In the first instance, all of the British-
made paratrooper aircraft used were adapted former bombers. Gale adapted a company of 
12 Devons and the 6 AARR (Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment) and other 
elements to create ‘Parkerforce’, a mobile semi-mechanized battle group, which he planned 
would probe beyond the Orne bridgehead perimeter. As mentioned above, the co-opted 
firepower of other forces by the Division was the greatest adjustment of all.   
  6 Airborne Div landed in Normandy on 6 June 1944 and although its strength was seriously 
depleted by scattering was still able to achieve its objectives. It then held the line for three 
months, operating in a conventional infantry role, a capacity it was inadequately equipped 
to carry out. From mid-August it found the means to take part in the Paddle pursuit of 
enemy forces carried out by First Canadian Army of which it was now a part. How did a 
brand new formation manage to achieve these results? No analysis exists to explain how 6 
Airborne secured these accomplishments. This thesis will create a balanced picture of 6 
Airborne’s resource cost on formation, contemporaneous views of perceived value, and 




Chapter Two - Cognizance and Experience: 6th Airborne Division within the 
context of British Airborne Warfare, 1936 – 1943 
 
  The creation and working-up of 6 Airborne before Operation Overlord was only one 
episode in the development of airborne warfare during the Second World War. It is 
important for this study to establish understanding of the airborne milieu into which Gale’s 
new division was launched. An appreciation of this practical and theoretical landscape is 
essential to understand how key individuals were influenced when taking planning and 
training decisions.  Without placing 6 Airborne Div into this context, the shaping pressures 
which influenced planning and training decisions made by Gale and his staff will be difficult 
to appreciate. This in consequence will make analytical conclusions on how the Division 
performed in Normandy more difficult to gauge. In four interlinked sections, this chapter 
will contextualise the formation and training of 6 Airborne Div to support the theses’ later 
analysis. So, what were the shaping influences that framed the formation and development 
of Gale’s Division? 
  The first chapter section will explain why the WO wished to form a second airborne 
division in May 1943. The effect of Germany’s 1940-41 operations had revealed the 
potential of airborne forces, and this will be illustrated by showing the impact on the 
thinking of Alan Brooke and the key qualities of airborne forces as seen in these actions.154 
The characteristics which gave these formations distinct strengths also formed their key 
weaknesses: high air-transported mobility was bought at the price of a lack of heavy 
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equipment, while the absence of lines of communication required rapid reinforcement and 
replenishment by air or relieving ground forces. The second and largest chapter section will 
analyse the doctrinal foundation upon which Gale could rely to create and train his division. 
This will entail a summary of the codification of the experience gained during HUSKY, 
knowledge which was gained during in the first few months of 6 Airborne’s existence. The 
third part of this chapter will review the capability of the air assets available in May 1943, 
and continued their ensuing development in the following twelve months. How fit for 
purpose were the air assets earmarked to carry the airborne forces by May 1944? Without 
enough air assets to carry them into action in complete unit lifts, airborne units and 
formations could not be used in role. How suitable the aircraft were for airborne operations 
will be reviewed here, together with the numbers available. What influences drove their 
development? The glider-building programme planned in 1940 was substantial, and was 
later criticised by Churchill’s personal scientific adviser, Lord Cherwell.155 It will be seen that 
the reduction of the programme still allowed enough gliders to carry out Operations 
Tonga/Mallard and Market. The chief competitor for the aircraft suitable for airborne 
operations was RAF Bomber Command. The correspondence of Air Marshal Sir Arthur 
Harris156 will show that the largely outdated types donated to 38 Group (Gp) RAF were 
considered obsolete by Bomber Command, and in no way hindered the exponential growth 
of the Lancaster force, Harris’ preferred aircraft type for the pursuit of strategic night-time 
bombing campaign. The fourth and final chapter section will sum up the expectations that 
senior Allied commanders held regarding airborne forces and what they could be achieve in 
Overlord/Neptune.  
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I. The Reaction to German Airborne Operations 1940-1941 
 
By 1943 Britain had created and retained airborne forces for three reasons: the highly 
visible success of the German operations 1940-41; the perceived need for such forces to 
support anticipated invasion operations, and the attitude of General Sir Alan Brooke. 
German airborne forces had dramatically spearheaded the Wehrmacht invasion of both 
Norway in April 1940, then the Low Countries one month later. These operations had led 
directly to the Prime Minister issuing his call to the War Office to create ‘5,000’ parachute 
troops on 22 July 1940.157 A further strategic shock was inflicted in the Mediterranean with 
the capture of Crete in May 1941. The strengths and weaknesses of large scale airborne 
operations were displayed during these actions. 
The first great strength of airborne forces was facilitated by its tie to airpower – ‘great 
strategical mobility.’ 158 Airborne operations could be launched from any airfield within 
range of the objective. The first airborne operation of the war was part of Weserübung, the 
German invasion of Denmark and Norway. On 8 April 1940 over 500 Ju 52s carried separate 
I/I F.J.R. companies to drop on the airfields at Aalborg (Denmark) Fornebu and Sola 
(Norway), and also to capture the Vordingborg Bridge in a series of coup de main 
operations.159 Despite poor weather all objectives were seized although 100 Ju 52s were 
lost.160 The airborne troops were reinforced by conventional role infantry landed by the 
Kriegsmarine while the Fornebu bridgehead was reinforced by II/I.R. 324 landed by follow-
on transport aircraft.161 This proved to be highly significant, as the naval landings intended 
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to seize Oslo foundered with the loss of the heavy cruiser Blücher and it was troops from 
the Fornebu landings that captured the city.162 All of the aircraft flew from German airfields 
and their landing was a complete surprise for the defenders, a factor which outweighed 
their small numbers and light arms. 
  The ‘power to effect surprise’ was the second great tactical advantage of airborne forces, 
which in combination with an accurate landing could achieve considerable operational 
results.163 The Scandinavian coup de main was repeated with the capture of Fort Eben-Emael 
and Maas bridges. Here some 414 airborne troops overcame the fort garrison of 750 Belgian 
troops and also captured two out of three bridges. In 1914 it had taken 60,000 German 
troops eleven days to capture the Belgian forts and at the cost of 5,300 casualties,164 while 
in 1940 it had been seized as if ‘in a fairy tale.’165 Surprise can be the greatest force modifier 
in infantry combat, and it is worth briefly reviewing recent analysis of its impact on small 
unit operations by referring to an authoritative recent study.166  
    A 1993/1994 MOD study concluded that the three most powerful factors in the battles 
reviewed were shock/surprise, aggressive reconnaissance and control of the air, of which 
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the first was the most significant.167 This element was divided into two, the effects of shock 
being seen as an outcome of achieving surprise.  Surprise in the attack could be achieved in 
one or more of four ways:  being delivered at an unexpected time, from an unexpected 
direction, using an unexpected method of attack (novel tactics) and finally through an 
unexpected means of attack (new weapons).168 One additional highlighted cause of surprise 
was poor visibility on the battlefield, shielding the approach of the enemy.169At the level of 
the individual the impact of surprise will be physiological arousal, the cessation of ongoing 
activity and ‘attentional blink’ – whereby one is briefly rendered incapable as the brain 
attempts to process the rush of information and stimuli as the enemy suddenly arrives.170 
Airborne operations’ direction of attack, means and method of entering the battlefield was 
still novel during the Second World War; and so certainly capable of achieving the surprise 
factor. 
  In terms of command and control, commanders would lack an understanding of wider 
events, be concerned about their own personal safety if combat had occurred close by, and 
will focus on operational details outside the area of the surprise to reduce his uncertainty.171 
The analysis revealed that shock was the consequence of surprise, and would be manifested 
in unit efficiency suddenly dropping as men are paralysed into inaction, panic and even rout. 
The combination of surprise and shock would increase the number of casualties suffered by 
the defender and reduce the attackers’ losses by as much as 60-65%. The study stated that 
the impact of this sudden assault, named ‘shock action’, could have the same effect 
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equivalent to a force ratio of ten to one.172A mere six companies seized Oslo, the 
headquarters there having fled.173 This surprise/shock aspect was airborne forces’ greatest 
strength. 
The threat of German airborne forces to the UK loomed large. The uncertainty regarding 
their scale is witnessed in the imaginary enemy order of battle for exercise Victor, held four 
months before, a large anti-invasion exercise organised by Brooke as C-in-C Home Forces in 
January 1941. Brooke was determined to exercise all his formations, with Wehrmacht 
‘invasions developing all over the coast from Scotland to Devon’, including several 
amphibious tank battalions and supported by the release of phosgene gas.174  In this 
scenario, the amphibious forces were supported by no less than fifteen parachute regiments 
jumping from hundreds of Ju 52s.175 Brooke was clearly sensitive to the threat posed by 
German airborne forces, their novel role allowing them to potentially outflank the English 
Channel. 
The successful use of German airborne forces for the invasion of Crete (Merkur) gravely 
damaged the fortunes of Britain in the eastern Mediterranean. Student’s airborne invasion 
of Crete in May 1941 was a considerable shock for the War Office, just a month after 
Churchill had been disappointed by a feeble British airborne demonstration on 26 April 
1941.176 Student’s XI. Flieger-Korps had overwhelmed 40,000 defenders including 32,000 
Commonwealth troops defending the island, killed or captured 13,800, and forced the 
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evacuation by sea of the remaining 18,000 men.177 Most shocking of all was the intelligence 
aspect of the Commonwealth defence of Crete, careful interpretation of Ultra decrypts 
having exposed the Luftwaffe’s intentions beforehand. Around the 7 May Freiberg received 
an Ultra summary that approximately 12,000 parachute and 13,000 airborne troops would 
be landed at Maleme/Heraklion/Retimo with a further 10,000 be landed from the sea.178 
Even though the British had known Student’s men were coming, they were still defeated.179 
    A post-action report described the Fallschirmjäger landings, and gave some indication of 
the impact they made on spectators. ‘For the initial dropping of parachutists waves of 9-12 
aircraft (Ju 52) were employed. The aircraft flew in open formation of 3 aircraft and 
disgorged parachutists in a terrifying cloud while still in formation.’180 The operation forced 
the RN from a valuable eastern Mediterranean bases with heavy losses.181 Churchill feared 
that it could be the beginning of a series of Axis airborne invasions: 
When the battle joined we did not know what were the total resources of Germany 
in parachute troops. The 11th Air Corps might have been only one of half a dozen 
such units. It was not until many months afterwards that we were sure it was the 
only one.182 
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His comment reflects again the strength of airborne forces’ strategic mobility, able to stripe 
in a wide area thanks to air transport.  
  Although the British had been ultimately unsuccessful in defeating Merkur, the operation 
had shown revealed two further characteristics of airborne warfare, and both were 
weaknesses. First, airborne forces, due to their light scale of arms, were highly dependent 
on good intelligence regarding the strength of the waiting enemy. The German intelligence 
failure regarding British deployment and strength in advance of the Crete invasion was to 
blame for the first day’s appalling losses. While only 4,300 airborne troops could be 
delivered before an airfield could be seized, the German intelligence estimate of 
Commonwealth/Greek forces on the island was a daunting 12,000 men. In fact close to 
50,000 British and Dominion troops were in position.183  
A fourth feature, and the second highlighted by Merkur, involved the proximity of landing 
zones for airborne troops. These were Drop Zones for parachutists (DZ) and landing Zones 
for gliderborne forces (LZ).Once an operation was under way, reinforcement/ resupply 
DZ/LZ which were not adjacent to the objective (and therefore in the defensive perimeter) 
would need to be held against enemy action. During Merkur, Once Maleme airfield had 
been secured as a LZ, Luftwaffe air superiority was fully exploited as a continuous 
reinforcement of the German bridgehead with Ringel’s fresh troops and supplies. This was 
the catalyst for German victory. The experience in Scandinavia and Student’s reckless 
landing of reinforcements by effectively crash landing Ju52s on Maleme airfield reinforced 
the ‘red herring’ that the early capture of an airfield was important.184 Yet if Student had 
failed to capture the airfield the weak survivors of the first drops would almost certainly not 
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have survived. Yet DZ/LZ too close to objectives might well incur severe casualties. During 
the invasion of Crete the landings took place in broad daylight and very close to, if not on 
top of, the objectives.  The value of daylight held the clear advantage of assisting the 
transport pilots to find the DZ/LZ, but inhibited the element of surprise and once alerted the 
British had brought heavy fire to bear on dense formations of aircraft and descending 
paratroopers.  
The fifth factor surrounded the light scale of airborne forces’ arms and equipment. Airborne 
forces were typically lightly armed and this highlighted two requirements for a successful 
operation: some redundancy of force and relief by conventional role troops. Simply having 
enough men once assembled after the landing phase to perform the tasks required was 
vital.  Von Sponeck’s 22. Luftlande. Div’s attempt to capture installations around The Hague 
in 1940 had failed essentially because a single reinforced battalion had been allocated the 
task of seizing three airfields.185 While the allocation of forces at both Rotterdam and Crete 
were caused by overconfident planning, the principle of maintaining some redundancy was 
established. Airborne troops would always be short of ammunition, rations and supplies of 
all types as every item had to be loaded into either a parachute container or glider or 
carried by the men themselves. Once landed, airborne troops were essentially immobile due 
to their lack of vehicles; the limited numbers landed being needed to pull light guns or 
perhaps reconnaissance. Therefore the necessity for relief by heavily-equipped ground units 
was the second important consideration of airborne warfare.  The units which had captured 
the Belgian Maas bridges and neutralised Fort Eben-Emael had been landed only twelve 
miles from the border and were relieved by first an engineer and then an infantry regiment 
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less than twenty-four hours later.186 The absence of heavy weapons made airborne troops 
vulnerable to enemy mechanized forces, as witnessed by the impact of ‘half a dozen tanks 
and sixteen Bren carriers’ at Maleme, where II/1.FJ. Regt was slaughtered both in the air 
and on the ground by 2 Black Watch.187 The diversion of the remaining seaborne 
reinforcements to Maleme and funnelling all of Ringel’s airlanded mountain troops there 
lifted the pressure off 7.Flieger.Div. What was clear was that relief by conventional role 
infantry and armour would be needed rapidly by airborne forces once they were 
committed. The firepower provided by conventional role forces would also be of great use 
in the support of airborne operations. Bombardment by field and medium artillery would 
outstrip the range and weight of the light artillery airborne forces were typically provided 
with, while the assistance provided by tactical air power added a further dimension to the 
strategic mobility strength. All of the German 1940-41 airborne operations were well 
supported by dive bomber and strafing fighters. Ten minutes after Koch had landed on the 
roof of Eben-Emael the Luftwaffe attacked airfields, communications and troop 
concentrations across Belgium, France and Holland in support of the airborne missions to 
capture bridge and canal crossings.188 While these air operations flew in support of the 
general offensive of conventional role Wehrmacht troops, the coup de main was timetabled 
into the air plan to its benefit. 
 In summary, the German operations had therefore exhibited five characteristics of airborne 
operations, two obvious strengths, and three possible weaknesses. Great strategic mobility 
and surprise were airborne forces strong suite. Thanks to air power airborne forces could 
strike anywhere within the effective range of their transport aircraft; while the operations in 
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the Low Countries had shown that comparatively small forces could achieve startling results 
and paralyse the response of the enemy. Third, on the other side of the coin, intelligence 
had to be accurate regarding the number and position of defending troops. Next, DZ/LZ had 
to be close enough to objectives to maintain surprise and be defended as part of an 
airborne perimeter if needed. However, a landing zone too close to an objective could result 
in a slaughter. The fifth and final characteristic concerned solutions to alleviate the issue of 
airborne forces’ light scale of arms and lack of vehicles. Landings had to be concentrated to 
allow troops to quickly form into cohesive fighting units able to move on foot to the 
objective and defend themselves; while direct early relief by conventional role troops 
and/or the indirect firepower support of air or gunfire was needed to offset their lack of 
heavy weapons. All of these factors had been present in the German operations and 
remained relevant throughout the war. 
At this time a German invasion of the UK was still a distinct possibility. The loss of Crete to 
an ultimately overwhelming enemy airborne invasion contributed to a highly practical 
document, Military Training Pamphlet No. 50 Defence against Airborne troops, in August 
1941.189 The speed of production of this pamphlet is significant, and shows the concern that 
the airborne Crete invasion created. Operations on Crete had ended on 28 May and the 
pamphlet was issued only three months later. The general infantry pamphlet Part VII (Field 
craft, Battle Drill, Section and Platoon Tactics) had been begun in April 1942, was not 
completed until October 1943 and not issued until March 1944. This is a useful brief as it 
shows WO understanding of airborne operations from the defenders point of view and 
some cognizance regarding how to deal with their threat. The shock of the enemy airborne 
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attack is captured in the somewhat incredulous introductory note of the pamphlet: 
It must be realised that, in the transport of men and equipment by air, what is only a 
possibility to-day may be the accepted method to-morrow. All ranks must therefore 
be constantly alert to defeat any new machinations of the enemy.190 
 
The key weaknesses of airborne troops are identified in its sixteen pages, and the 
importance of taking risks in crushing airborne landings were worth taking which ‘would not 
be justified once the situation has become firm’ is emphasized.191 The loss of Maleme 
airfield haunts the pamphlet, ‘the first area to be attacked has hitherto always been an 
aerodrome or landing ground, the capture of which will give base in which troop carrying 
aircraft can land.’ It later recommends ‘suitable sub-units’ to rapidly counter landings – 
perhaps use of the carrier platoon and a company of lorry-borne infantry, future portent of 
the Wehrmacht quick reaction mobile ‘alarm companies’ of 1944. The booklet was swiftly 
produced and reveals that the British Army is aware of the methods needed to defeat 
airborne landings, and thereby its own Airborne Establishment would have been able to 
reverse engineer the pamphlet when making its own plans. The whole Crete episode was 
carefully studied by all three services and a comprehensive report produced around 28 
August 1941.192 It echoed Pamphlet 50. In ‘Army Lessons’ the report states that an 
immediate counter-attack was needed within fifteen minutes of enemy airborne troops 
landing, while light tanks should be quickly employed before the enemy had time to 
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emplace his anti-tank weapons.193 There were also noted guidelines for Britain’s own 
airborne troops. It was advised that paratroopers be dropped from around 500 ft in waves 
of close formation aircraft to allow them to form up quickly, while glider troops already 
enjoyed that advantage.194 
   Any defenders being subjected to an airborne attack needed to exploit the five 
characteristics of glider and parachute troops to obtain a victory. If troops were entrenched 
and had an understanding of the airborne threat, a set of planned drills could well overturn 
the shock/surprise effect. Fast moving motorised units were needed to reconnoitre any 
landings and rapidly counter attack as yet unformed airborne formations. DZ/LZ were to be 
ideally overrun or at least identified and subjected to bombardment, and at all costs the 
relief of airborne forces by conventional role troops could not be allowed. 
Following Merkur Brooke was keen to update his personal understanding of how airborne 
forces worked, lunching with Brigadier Lindsay Inglis recently returned from Crete. Brooke 
appreciated the offensive possibilities of airborne forces, as the meeting ‘was useful in 
providing many details of the German methods of air attack’.195  
  Brooke remained firmly convinced that airborne troops could assist greatly in the launching 
of the Second Front.196 Once appointed the professional head of the British Army, the CIGS, 
he was therefore the individual charged with overturning the defeats of 1940-41 through a 
strenuous overhaul of the army. Both John Greenacre and William Buckingham have 
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discussed the counterfactual alternative of a ‘figurehead’ personality who could have 
championed the airborne project. A precedent can be seen in the chiefs appointed to lead 
Combined Operations Command (COC). First Sir Roger Keyes (a Great War combined 
operations pioneer) and then Lord Louis Mountbatten, the latter having a clear task set out 
by Churchill to develop amphibious warfare techniques and a seat at COS meetings.197 This 
role had previously been charged with the task of developing the equipment and techniques 
needed to facilitate amphibious landings, uniting all three services in the effort to secure 
invasion bridgeheads.198 As the airborne project was similarly a new field this contention 
appears to have some merit. Yet airborne warfare was essentially a choice while seaborne 
warfare was woven into the culture and history of British expeditionary warfare.199 Also 
there was no alternative for the massive forces required to invade mainland Europe from 
their UK island base but sea transport.200 Then in the face of a hostile coast amphibious 
assault warfare techniques would be needed to overcome any defences. 
Buckingham suggested Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India, while Greenacre 
believed that a neutral line could perhaps have been followed with the appointment of a 
senior naval officer.201 He went on to suggest that as no one was appointed, perhaps there 
was actually no suitable candidate available. But was one needed? This study asserts that 
airborne forces did in actual fact have a champion, in the form of the CIGS himself. Brooke 
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frequently recorded his commitment to this new force,202 on 31 October 1941 he visited 
Gale’s parachute units and ‘left very impressed by the possibilities of airborne forces’.203 On 
8 January 1942 Brooke instructed the Vice CIGS that the Airborne Division 'be pushed to the 
utmost and given preferential treatment’.204 This led to his defiance of Churchill’ decision to 
disband 1 Airborne Div after 18 November 1942, stating that he would see such a valuable 
formation used for long range motorized strikes rather than disassemble it.205 When 6 
Airborne Div was formed it represented Brooke’s successful defence of the concept of 
airborne forces used en masse in the face of determined RAF opposition. Sir Arthur Harris 
had attempted to eliminate the possibility of Bomber Command aircraft types being 
diverted to airborne forces, and Sir Charles Portal attempted to have 1 Airborne Div 
disbanded. 
   This challenge arose as an air transport capability for airborne formations ‘on the cheap.’ 
Here the theme of adaption can be seen but with deleterious effect. From the outset it was 
decided that aircraft from Bomber Command would carry paratroopers and tow gliders, 
with front line bomber squadrons being withdrawn and quickly trained in air transport 
methods.206 This policy confirmed in November 1941 as 1 Para Bde and 1 AL Bdes were 
created. ‘All heavy bombers at home will be modified to allow ‘rapid conversion to troop 
transports’. With enough aircraft to carry 5,000 men, and with enough planes to drop 2,500 
paras ‘at one time’.207 
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In addition to the numbers of aircraft that would be required, the RAF was also concerned 
that in terms of technique and pilot skill it started with a completely blank page. As one 
senior RAF officer stated in 1940:  
There are very real difficulties in this parachute business. We are trying to do what 
we have never been able to hitherto, namely top introduce a completely new arm 
into the Service at about five minutes’ notice and with totally inadequate resources 
and personnel. Little-if any- practical experience is possessed in England of any of 
these problems and it will be necessary to cover in six months the ground that the 
Germans have covered in six years.208 
 
In terms of doctrine the RAF as a service was committed to the night bomber offensive, and 
saw the development of airborne transport assets as an unnecessary diversion, the early 
war concept being that Bomber Command’s aircraft would be used in the airborne role 
when needed.209At times they showed a ‘frankly resentful’ attitude.210 In February 1942, the 
company carrying out operation Biting was carried by 51 Squadron of Bomber Command, as 
the Air Ministry had determined the newly formed 38 Wing211 would be non-operational.212A 
proposed airborne element in support of Rutter would have required two squadrons, the 
first variation of what would become Jubilee, while later exercise featuring both brigades 
would have needed 360 aircraft. Harris became vehemently opposed to such a diversion of 
effort, which would have effectively curtailed his command’s bombing effort.213 The Air 
Ministry and RAF saw the pilots required to fly the gliders needed to carry the complete 1st 
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Airborne Division as a huge potential drain on Bomber Command operations214, while the 
creation of a separate RAF transport Group would be ‘fantastic’215. The production of the 
gliders had caused further concern at Air Ministry and Ministry of Aircraft Production. Early 
construction schedules were ambitious but rapidly fell behind schedule, while Lord Cherwell 
pointed out the large number produced so far would need the complete diversion of 
Bomber Command to provide the 850 bombers needed to lift the airborne division.216 
Meanwhile on the other side of the argument Major-General ‘Boy’ Browning petitioned 
Brooke that the build-up of air assets to support the airborne forces was ‘disastrously 
slow.’217 The cost of airborne forces was also being discussed in the wider political sphere, 
Clement Atlee, the Deputy Prime Minister, questioned the Prime Minister by letter why 
airborne forces were assembled as a division and the vast number of gliders they needed.218  
  By autumn 1942 Brooke and Portal’s views were completely divergent219 regarding the 
future of the airborne division and any further growth in airborne forces,220 and the matter 
was set before Churchill. The Prime Minister sided with the Air Ministry, wishing to see a 
consolidation of airborne forces and a halt on Horsa glider production221, and further air 
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asset commitment was halted in October. However Brooke would not countenance 1 
Airborne Div being broken up and after the Casablanca conference even called for an 
additional division for Western European operations. The situation was resolved in April 
1943 when the ‘misunderstanding’ concerning a 23 October discussion paper. This had been 
produced to assist Churchill in making his decision on airborne forces. It had included an 
organizational chart which had clearly shown four battalions; therefore an airborne division 
would have needed 730 rather than 630 gliders to lift it, with the consequent cost of the 
extra glider pilots needed.222 Brooke manoeuvred around the difficult glider pilot issue by 
stating that only two airlanding battalions would be in each brigade.  
No other champion could have done more, and possibly no other candidate could have 
been resilient enough in that situation. Greenacre rightly points out that as the RAF grew in 
resources airborne forces remained under-resourced,223 but at key points of development 
(1941-2) the aircraft to all intents and purposes did not exist.  
  Yet Brooke was not a natural proponent of ‘special forces’, and was no supporter of the 
Commando concept. On 28 August 1941 he met with Roger Keyes and stated his wish as C-
in-C Home Forces to ‘dispense with commandos and to carry out raids with my own 
formations’.224 Indeed, when the Royal Marine (RM) Division was reorganised Brooke even 
suggested that the considerable number of Army Special Service Commandos be absorbed 
into the Royal Marines, an act which would have severed the Army’s investment in 
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Commandos all together.225 It is unlikely that the Commandos could have survived with 
Brooke as the CIGS if he had not been content with their role being consolidated as light 
amphibious assault troops. Yet in the case of airborne forces from his appointment as C-in-C 
Home Forces Brooke shielded and drove forward their development. 
II. The Theoretical Basis for British Airborne Operations and Hard-earned Experience 
1940-43: Husky and its Aftermath 
This, the largest chapter section will outline the doctrinal development of British airborne 
forces from early 1941 to late 1943. It will show the learning path from Bruneval’s success 
was as primarily a propaganda coup through to the gaining of hard-won experience of large 
scale operations with the problems which affected Ladbroke and Fustian, the two 
operations which supported the invasion of Sicily. 
 Airborne forces had been dismissed by the British army prior to the Second World War. The 
then Lieutenant-General Archibald Wavell (GOC 2 Div)226 had observed the September 1936 
Kiev manoeuvres by the Soviet army during which 1,500 paratroopers were dropped.227 
Wavell’s final report focussed on Soviet mechanized capability, and judging from his scanty 
comments he clearly viewed the airborne operation as a side show. He reported ‘its tactical 
value may be doubtful’, having noted the length of time it took the parachutists to regroup 
after the drop and the vulnerability of their close formation low-flying aircraft.228 The 
general shortage of aircraft at this time also barred a foray into the field of airborne 
warfare. On 25 November 1936, J.M. Speight of the Air Ministry wrote a four page letter to 
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the Under-Secretary of State for War summarising the conditions the Ministry considered 
were needed for a successful parachute drop of troops. He closed by stating that the Air 
Council considered the provision of aircraft to carry paratroopers  ‘would be difficult to 
justify’ as the aircraft industry  was struggling to meet the minimum requirements of the 
RAF at home.229 Before 1940 the UK had no interest in the possibilities of airborne forces, no 
suitable aircraft and therefore no doctrine. 
From their earliest creation airborne forces had been viewed as a key element in the 
eventual invasion of NW Europe that would herald the final defeat of Nazi Germany. As 
early as January 1941 an airborne component was planned to support each of the ‘invasion 
corps’ which would land to secure victory once the economic strategy forced upon the 
British Empire by the fall of France had taken effect.230 Later, the policy of November 1941 
proposed forces larger than a standard three brigade division.231 This planned for four 
brigade groups (two parachute and two airlanding/glider) to be used to support a rapier-like 
mechanized invasion.232 Their role was perceived as the capture of limited key locations, 
such as enemy aerodromes, ahead of the advancing conventional role forces.233  A second 
airborne division had been actively in discussion between the AM and WO since July 1942. 
During this period the VCIGS, General Archibald Nye and the Air Vice-Marshal John Slessor 
(Head of RAF Policy) had been discussing the possible needs Roundup might require.234 
Brooke’s October 1942 statement to the COS made clear the value of an airborne 
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contribution in support of amphibious invasion operations, even as the dispute over the 
provision of aircraft for airborne forces raged on.235    
  During this period Britain’s new airborne troops, like the commandos added value as a 
propaganda tool by carrying out the Biting raid on a German radar station in northern 
France. This was a useful source of good news at a point when the British Army’s fortunes 
were at their lowest. Between 1 January and 15 July 1942 Commonwealth forces had lost 
around 180,000 men, almost three times as many as the number lost during the fighting in 
France and the Low Countries during 1940. Churchill faced considerable personal political 
pressure during the first six months of 1942 due to the succession of defeats.236 He invited a 
Vote of Confidence from the Commons, the debate beginning on 27 January 1942 as 
General Percival retired onto Singapore Island.237 When the island fell, even Brooke 
despaired:  
Burma news now bad. Cannot work out why the troops are not fighting better. If the 
army cannot fight better than it is doing at present we shall deserve to lose our 
Empire!238 
 
The depth of concern regarding the performance of the army at the highest level can be 
seen in two letters written in July 1942. These letters show the esteem the new Special 
Forces were held in. The Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee wrote to Churchill on 10 July 
privately airing his concerns about various decisions made by the armed forces.239 Churchill’s 
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answer to the question whether commandos are ‘still regarded as aberrations from the 
norm’ revealed his annoyance with the ‘orthodox school’, but cautioned Attlee not to be too 
hard on the Army: 
I agree with you about Commandos, and I have myself rescued them from the 
orthodox school. Most British authorities hold that it is bad for an Army to 
differentiate between Storm troops and the rest. Certainly the Germans have 
profited by it. One must take care, however, not to rot the Army by making out that 
only Commandos can fight.240  
 
   Throughout the first eight months of 1942 Churchill urgently needed good news about the 
progress of the war, especially situations where the army had confronted the Wehrmacht 
and gained even the smallest victory. Clement Attlee believed that ‘he was always looking 
around for “finest hours”, and if one was not immediately available his impulse was to 
manufacture one.’241 The success of the Bruneval raid was positive news in every 
newspaper.242  The Times included two articles on 2 March 1942 celebrating the raid. The 
first stated that the paratroopers had faced ‘strong opposition’ but excellent planning had 
won the day; while the second emphasised how Frost’s men had stalked and overwhelmed 
the enemy, included a quote from the Major, and pointed out that the actual attack on the 
radar station building was led by a former Fleet Street man, Lieutenant Peter Young.243 
Importantly the USA reported it favourably, the New York Times reviewing the importance 
of the technology seized as well as the daring of the raid.244 Like the commando raids, the 
value of Biting had shown allies and enemies alike that British soldiers could face the 
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Wehrmacht and if only on a small scale, secure victory.  However, Biting had been a very 
diminutive operation, just one company had been used to surprise a small objective and 
then extraction had been by sea. While the success of the operation was lauded, it by no 
means validated the concept of large-scale, formation-seized British airborne operations 
against a prepared and numerous enemy.  
A comprehensive airborne doctrine pamphlet was not issued by the War Office until May 
1943, and until Sicily all British airborne operations had been on a small scale. 245 In the 
wider context the British Army struggled to promulgate consistent doctrine amongst its 
formations during the War,246 though an accepted battle-winning approach had been 
adopted by the time 21 Army Group took part in the 1944-45 North-Western European 
campaign. The nature of airborne warfare made its practice contrary from Montgomery’s 
‘Colossal Cracks’ approach.247 The style of battle he had adopted since the battle of Alam 
Halfa emphasised careful planning, the use of massive artillery and airpower preparation, 
and the restriction of casualties as a means of preserving morale. With few heavy weapons 
and landing in close proximity to their objectives, the reality of airborne assault meant this 
policy could not be applied. Airborne forces were therefore divergent when compared to 
how the rest of Second Army would fight on D-Day, where the Combined Fire Plan would be 
substituted for the ‘Colossal Cracks’ massive RA preparation. Some kind of nascent airborne 
doctrine was required.  
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   A close reading of this pamphlet reveals that the lessons emphasised are typically the 
issues more apparent to an opponent, for example the effect of shock and surprise, the 
importance of beginning an operation with a strong first lift and the value of close air 
support. Factors invisible to an army that has not yet staged but only witnessed large scale 
airborne operations them, such as planning and combined training, will be seen later when 
the digestion of the lessons learned from Operation Husky will be assessed. The pamphlet is 
workmanlike and speaks for its self, but it is important to review its treatment of the five 
characteristics highlighted by the German experience. It is important for this study as it 
provided Gale and 6 Airborne Div with doctrine to plan for D-Day. 
  The pamphlet highlighted from the outset the strategic mobility of airborne troops, being 
able to strike up to 500 miles from their bases ‘given adequate and suitable airfields.’248 The 
power to surprise the enemy is also highlighted. ‘The use of airborne forces behind enemy 
forward troops may cause the latter to think some disaster has occurred and thus reduce 
their powers of resistance. It creates alarm on the lines of communication and may force 
commanders of reserves into unsound action.’249 The opportunity provided by the hours of 
darkness for landings, to increase the shock-surprise effect and reduce casualties, is 
explored. Frost’s C Coy of 2 Para Bn successfully seized crucial German radar components in 
the Bruneval raid (Biting). Apart from capturing German radar technology and boosting 
home morale, this raid also showed that a successful night drop could be performed if the 
operation was well planned.250 However, a night drop was fraught with the risk of a 
scattered landing, which could inflict enormous losses on a parachute unit before even a 
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shot was fired.251 Also the preference for landings from the sea to be carried out at first light 
effectively dictated airborne forces to develop a night time capability.  The 1943 pamphlet 
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of night landings under three different 
headings. Notably the section on ‘time of attack’ advocating seizing objectives by night and 
later reinforcing in daylight, the method that would be used on D-Day as Mallard doubled 
the number of men in the bridgehead.252 
   On the subject of intelligence, the pamphlet lacks any firm statement as to the importance 
of accurately gauging the strength of the enemy’s defending forces. Pages 33-35 are 
highlighted in the contents as the section dealing with ‘Intelligence’, but deal with the issues 
of maintaining secrecy around planned operations, communications on approach to a 
landing and once landed, and ‘wireless layout.’253 
  In terms of the positioning of DZ/LZ, the 1943 pamphlet proposing that one zone be 
maintained for every brigade in action.254 A second important consideration here was the 
difference in characteristics between airlanding and parachute troops. Paratroopers could 
be dropped onto almost any terrain if the force commander was prepared to accept 
increased landing casualties. Airlanding troops required at least a roughly flat landing area 
for each glider to make a reasonably controlled landing. While paratroopers offered 
flexibility in DZ choice, airlanding soldiers could be delivered as readily concentrated sub-
units ready to fight – in 1944 typically a platoon in each Horsa glider.255  The ‘Choice of 
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dropping zones and landing zones’ section details the approximate space needed to land 
units in a concentrated fashion, and the importance of close consultation with the RAF.256     
   Much is given over to the issue of alleviating airborne forces’ lack of heavy weapons: 
Differences between the tactics of airborne and other troops are due to the 
relatively weak strength of airborne forces, their lack of heavy supporting weapons, 
shortage of mechanical vehicles and to the fact that airborne troops have to fight the 
entire battle exposed to enemy attacks from every direction. 
It is important that they should be used for tasks where:- 
(a) The enemy defences are weak. 
(b) Heavy air support can be given. 
(c) Motorised mobility is not needed.257 
 
The 1943 pamphlet called for ‘an additional 25 per cent’ to be added to account for 
scattered landings, and ‘in order to take the fullest advantage of surprise, the first wave 
should be as strong as possible.’258 Under ‘rules for employment’ the pamphlet also gave 
some idea for balancing forces for airborne planners by pointing out that a landed 
parachute battalion was the equivalent of ‘two German rifle companies.’259 Surprise was a 
great force-multiplier, but a practical number of troops were needed to complete the 
airborne tasks set. Also, the vulnerability of airborne forces to an armoured attack was 
outlined, ‘airborne forces possess few anti-tank weapons. Except in good tank-hunting 
country, they should not be ordered to operate near enemy armoured reserves.’260 
  The pamphlet’s passage on ‘liaison with the main forces’ emphasises the importance of the 
link-up between airborne and ground forces. ‘Nothing which would add to the liaison 
between the forces must be neglected.’261 Assuming that the airborne units have sufficient 
heavy weapons and uninterrupted air reinforcements and resupply, the pamphlet 
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maintained that landed troops would ‘not normally be required’ to operate unsupported for 
up to four-six days.262 Given the probable intensity of enemy resistance to invasion 
operations this was optimistic, and again perhaps reflected the German success on Crete in 
which airborne forces had seemingly proved unstoppable.  
Other important considerations surrounded the need for effective communications and air 
power: resupply and close air support. The pamphlet details the organisation of how signals 
should be organised, linking in conventional role forces and the RAF. The pamphlet clearly 
explains how the RAF should be ‘consulted’ at each stage and at one point makes their role 
clear, paragraph 8. ‘Dependence on the RAF:’ 
Since the RAF carry, protect and support the airborne troops, no airborne operation 
can be a success unless the soldier and airman plan, prepare and train for every 
stage together. There must be complete identity of purpose. The two services must 
not be thought of as two bodies acting in harmony but as a force with one object 
and one commander.263 
 
This paragraph has nothing else to say about how one commander should be appointed, nor 
who will maintain control once the airborne troops have landed. This lack of clarity reflects 
the tension between the army and the RAF regarding airborne forces and possibly a lack of 
experience in formation level operations. 
   The 1943 booklet may have been available to contribute to the planning of Operations 
Ladbroke and Fustian,264  but as 1 Airborne Div arrived in N. Africa in early May 1943 it is 
unlikely that it was issued to all units in time for operations.265  The pamphlet represented 
the consolidation of British airborne doctrinal thinking at the midpoint in the war and before 
major offensive operations began. Richard Gale would have played a role in its development 
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as Director of Staff Duties for Air at the War Office, which retained ‘final decisions and 
dissemination of tactical doctrine’ after consultation with the Airborne Forces Depot.266  
  It will be of use to compare the May 1943 pamphlet’s provisions to some of the aspects of 
the Ladbroke operation.  This operation was imperilled by a lack of combined air-airborne 
rehearsal preparation, poor intelligence and inexperienced air crews, but saved by the 
surprise/shock effect and an early relief by conventional role troops advancing from the sea. 
Brigadier G.F. ‘Hoppy’ Hopkinson had been an early member of the Airborne Establishment 
and must have contributed to the ideas that formed the spine of the May 1943 pamphlet.267  
Seemingly in his haste for 1 Airborne to wins its spurs he chose to discard tenets of the 1943 
pamphlet. 
  Ladbroke and Fustian were both brigade-sized operations and suffered from the same 
three damaging characteristics. Through poor briefing and pilot training both were 
effectively paralysed by the wide scattering of the landings; the two bridges were seized 
through the determination of  the few men who landed close to the objectives; later the 
beleaguered defenders were relieved by conventional seaborne forces in the nick of time. 
The losses in both operations were very high, as the US 82 Airborne Division also suffered.  
On its second operation to Gela on the night of 10 -11 July twenty-three aircraft and 410 
men were lost to Allied round/naval fire, when they were mistaken for enemy bombers. 
Churchill got wind of the heavy Husky airborne losses and extracted the information from 
Portal. As of 11 August the losses amounted to 1,100 officers and men missing from 3,637, 
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approximately thirty per cent of the total men involved. In case of 1 AL Bde (Ladbroke 9-10 
July) many men were drowned when the tug pilots of XII US Troop Carrier Command cast off 
their gliders over the sea, sixty out of 140 crashing into the water. 1 Para Bde (Fustian 13-14 
July) was scattered widely due to poor aircraft routing and navigation errors, twenty-seven 
C-47s even returned to their African bases with their passengers after becoming completely 
lost or deterred by Flak. Considering both forces were relieved by ground forces in under 
twenty-four hours and faced what turned out to be unenthusiastic opposition this was a 
terrible cost. 268 
  The first factor regarded realistic planning intertwined with the maintenance of a cohesive 
and common approach shared by the relevant generals. In the case of the Husky operations 
and 1 Airborne Div this was not so.  The influence of personalities was also at work here. 
Hopkinson was the division’s new commander and was an enthusiastic exponent of the use 
of the glider in airborne operations. This can be seen in his post-action report concerning 
Ladbroke/Fustian in which he points out the advantages of the glider over the parachute, 
even to the point of suggesting an alternative divisional structure in an appendix at the 
end.269 During the build-up to the invasion of Sicily he presented a plan to Montgomery 
concerning how the 1 AL Bde could help Eighth Army’s advance by seizing the Ponte Grande 
Bridge as it pushed from the beaches at Cassibile to Syracuse. As operations developed 
later, 2 Para Bde would be dropped to mask off the town of Augusta while 1 Para Bde would 
capture the Primasole Bridge to allow the advance on the coast road.270 Montgomery 
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accepted the plan as it provided a solution to an obstacle that would have hindered his 
advance.271  
    Rivalry at the top of the airborne chain of command damaged the formulation of an 
effective plan at this point. Hopkinson had managed to avoid Browning, who was now his 
rank equal, during his discussions with Montgomery to maintain his ownership of the 
operation. This extended to disappearing from his HQ when Browning visited to discuss 
future operations.272 Such was the ambitious Hopkinson’s determination to get his previous 
command, 1 AL Bde, into action that he threatened Lieutenant-Colonel Chatterton of the 
Glider Pilot Regiment with the sack when the latter pointed out that the landing zones were 
‘pretty stiff’, being rock strewn and edged with stone walls.273  Why would Hopkinson not 
involve his former divisional commander in the planning process? Hopkinson had won 
considerable personal acclaim as the commander of a GHQ Recce unit during the disaster in 
France and won fame as managing to save his unit’s transport.274 He had joined 1 Airborne 
Div in November 1941 with the conversion of 31 Indep Inf Bde as one of Browning’s original 
two brigadiers, Gale being the other with 1 Para Bde.  He would have worked closely with 
Boy on the development of 1 Airborne Div and airborne planning generally. The detachment 
between the two men points to either Hopkinson being determined to gain personal 
recognition for a Ladbroke/Fustian success, rather than allow Browning to claim credit, or a 
break-down in their personal relationship.  In either case it does not reflect well on 
Browning’s style of leadership that this situation had been allowed to develop. 
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   In terms of intelligence, Hopkinson had a clear picture of the enemy forces awaiting his 
units, if not an entirely clear one as to their location. Hopkinson’s plan also made 
considerable assumptions regarding the enemy’s likely response, counting on the shock 
effect of his operation would bowl over considerable nearby enemy forces. Four enemy 
battalions would oppose 1 Border and 2 S Staffords very quickly, so much depended on a 
concentrated landing, as scattered glider troops could be easily overwhelmed if these forces 
reacted vigorously. 275 If 5 Div was delayed then the estimate of enemy dispositions stated 
that three more Italian battalions and a unit of 50 tanks could reinforce the enemy in the 
area in eight hours.276 With the landings beginning at 2200 hrs this meant the glider troops 
could be under attack by 0700 hrs with no relief for five hours. Even if the Italian troops 
were believed to be second rate (over-age men or raw recruits) they would be defending 
Italian soil, and the planners were also aware that strong elements of the German Hermann 
Goering Panzer Division were just forty miles away from the Ladbroke area and could be 
deployed by 1200 hours on D-Day. In short, Hopkinson’s plan assumed the landings would 
go like clockwork, the sea borne landings would be completely unhindered and the enemy 
would be inert. 
   The most serious threat to Fustian and Ladbroke, and new learning for British airborne 
forces, concerned the importance of combined rehearsals and training with air crews and 
the use of any devices which could improve navigation and identifying the landing zones. If 
all the men could land on the same DZ/LZ on time this would allow the concentration of 
force needed to then accomplish their ground mission. The foundations of the air operation 
for Ladbroke were on shaky ground from the very outset. Due to the shortfall in British 
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glider production and geography, 1 AL Bde would have to use US Waco gliders that had 
been delivered to the Mascara base in crates.277  The training of the pilots of XII US Troop 
Carrier Command had been sketchy; many of the men were simply commercial pilots who 
had been enlisted. For the 9 July operations the US pilots had been trained to fly in ‘V’ 
formations following a lead plane, which was the only one to contain a navigator, and the 
landing zones would be identified by pilots using aerial photographs, crucially no Pathfinders 
would be used.278  In his August action report Hopkinson stated that Ladbroke proceeded 
without the benefit of navigational aids while enemy flak was also able to disconcert the 
inexperienced air crews.279 A high wind rose during the afternoon of 9 July which affected 
their navigation, and they were unaccustomed to night operations. Consequently many of 
the Ladbroke tug aircraft cast off their gliders early, while the Fustian aircraft dropped their 
troops well wide of the objectives. For Fustian there was an attempt to make use of 
Pathfinders. 21 Indep Para Coy formed three parties to be dropped ahead of the main 
landings. But a combination of problems frustrated their efforts:  their Eureka wireless sets 
failed to work, 280 the area they were to mark out was a mass of flames, they were dropped 
late or their aircraft turned back without dropping its troops.281 Hopkinson goes on to state 
that even if they had been laid out they would have been of no use as ‘there were too many 
other lights and fires in the landing area’.282 The result of this confusion scattered the units 
and would have resulted in their annihilation if the relief had not been so swift. Dropping 
airborne forces as night offered the obvious advantage of increased surprise and the 
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minimisation of aircraft casualties while over the objective, but at the risk of confusion 
resulting in scattering and thereby the loss of concentration of force. Day drops could only 
be considered if total air superiority was in place, such as in the case of operations Market 
and Varsity.283  
 In the end surprise saved Ladbroke. Tactical surprise had become a vital element in 
airborne and commando operations, especially when coup de main parties are needed to 
seize key objectives are concerned. Of the six 2/S. Staffordshire Horsas which set off for the 
bridge, only one landed near enough to go into action. Lieutenant Withers and his No. 15 
Platoon surprised and drove off the enemy and removed any demolition charges, and then 
held the position for nearly five hours before any other assistance arrived.284 The darkness 
and numerous skirmishes which began with other airborne troops further confused the 
enemy but the shock effect of even such a small group secured the objective. 
   Beyond the 1943 Pamphlet another document was created to guide future airborne 
operations which incorporated the learning gained from Husky.  A joint War Office/Air 
Ministry ten-page memorandum captured the lessons of Husky and set down some basic 
guidelines for future airborne operations in all theatres. The two-part ‘Employment of 
Airborne Forces’ paper was issued on 18 October 1943 and originated in the Air Directorate 
department of the War Office.285  ‘Part A’ detailed the actual lessons of the Sicilian 
operations. The importance of combined planning and rehearsal training between the army 
and RAF is emphasized; the briefing of friendly naval forces to prevent ‘friendly fire’ 
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incidents and the value of a concentrated landing is discussed.286 The more instructive ‘Part 
B’ provides four pages of guidelines for air and ground commanders alike. Responsibility for 
launching air operations lies with the Air Force, who can cancel an operation should the 
weather or other considerations make it hazardous. However, they may be overruled by the 
‘Supreme Commander’ if he might ‘consider that the situation justifies abnormal risks’. This 
important section makes the staging of airborne operations the responsibility of air 
commanders but allowed for theatre commanders – Alexander and Eisenhower- the final 
say as to whether they were carried out.287 The great surprise impact of airborne troops was 
stressed: 
Energetic and determined action by airborne troops can cause widespread alarm and 
confusion among the enemy. Even comparatively small parties, dropped many miles 
from the main objectives, can achieve a diversionary result out of all proportion to 
their numbers.288 
 
This aspect had been previously highlighted in the British Army training notes from Sicily 
specifically highlighted this point: 
The moral effect and the confusion caused by the landing of gliders and parachute 
troops in the enemy’s rear areas undoubtedly assisted the ops of our ground 
troops.289 
 
Indeed, when interviewed General Student maintained that the interference caused by the 
scattered airborne drops had deflected the Herman Goering Panzer Division from making a 
critical attack on the landing beaches.290  
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The paper goes on to stress the importance of concentrated landings and that operational 
planning ‘should be done by the appropriate technical experts of all three services’.291 The 
document also requests the expansion of 38 Wing to a 180 aircraft Group, the addition of a 
third battalion to the airlanding brigades and the wisdom behind concentrating both 
airborne divisions in one theatre (to ease maintenance issues).292 While the October 1943 
memorandum something of a ‘what not to do’ negative document rather than a positive 
guide for future airborne operations, as a joint Air Ministry and War Office document it 
represented sensible collaboration and careful thinking.  
From the primary sources discussed in this chapter, the 1951 Pamphlet 50, the inter-service 
August 1941 Crete Report, the 1943 Airborne Operations Pamphlet and the ten-page 
memorandum discussed above, it can be clearly seen that a theoretical basis had been 
established for British airborne operations by the end of 1943, and ideas as to how a waiting 
enemy could attempt to crush them. This is important for this study as it gave Gale the 
‘how’ to plan his Normandy operations, knowledge available within the Airborne 
Establishment as his new division was forming.  
 From these four sources a success/failure process chart can be established as a 
methodological tool to serve this thesis (see Figure 1). This flow chart shows the key criteria 
needed for the execution of a successful airborne operation during the Second World War, 
and also the process of how one could be defeated. The chart is self-explanatory when 
viewed in the light of the Crete and Sicily operations, but three key points need to be 
highlighted, which appear on the chart in small boxes. During the pre-operation period 
intelligence is vital (see point [1]), the airborne attacker must have as complete a picture of 
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the waiting defending forces as possible while the defender must have carried out an 
appreciation of likely objectives for airborne forces. Then vigorous training and preparation 
is important for both sides. The local shock-surprise effect of the landing [2] must be quickly 
translated into momentum for the airborne attackers to maintain the defenders’ confusion 
as the vital assault action takes place. Both sides need to be prepared to respond quickly to 
the new situation. Airborne troops must orientate themselves and rally from scattering and 
the defenders must assess the threat and draw in mobile reinforcements. Critically, will the 
airborne forces be promptly relieved by more heavily armed formations? This is absolutely 
essential. Due to their light scale of weaponry the airborne troops will become more and 
more vulnerable as the shock-surprise effect dissipates, but if they are joined by 
conventional role units they will be able to maximise their aggressive stance replenished 
with ammunition and supported by co-opted firepower. If the original goal has not been 
obtained, with the additional support of conventional role troops another attack could be 
made (point [3], see the dotted line). This flow diagram may seem reliant on long distance 
hindsight, but the 1943 pamphlet shows that much of its content was known and 
understood, and then reinforced by the Husky airborne operations. This chart will be used 
to review Gale’s orders for 6 Airborne for the Normandy assault, to assess the robustness of 
his plans, and later to follow how successful the division was in pursuing the successful path 
once in action. 
III. The Development of Airborne Air Transport Capability 
The third section concerns resources, in this case taking stock of key issues that affected 
role-specific transport assets - gliders and aircraft.  Two questions must be considered. First, 
how fit for purpose were the air assets earmarked to carry the airborne forces in May 1943 
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– May 1944, and what influences drove their development? Second what was the cost of 
those air assets allocated to airborne forces? This must be weighed against their operational 
effect in the Normandy campaign. The suitability of aircraft and gliders allocated to Britain’s 
airborne forces has recently been studied by Timothy Jenkins. His thesis concluded that 
Britain was technologically unable to sustain this effort and the military benefit was 
compromised by the political will which had demanded airborne formations to be 
created.293 The practical air transport challenges facing the UK in 1940-1943 are explored 
below. 
   For Britain’s airborne forces the dominating issue was the lack of viable modern transport 
aircraft for use either towing gliders or for dropping parachutists. The US-built C-47/DC-3 
(‘Dakota’) was clearly the best solution, even though it lacked any defensive armament or 
self-sealing fuel tanks, but was unavailable through Lease-Lend until mid-1943.294 A possible 
alternative to the Dakota would have been the conversion of Lancaster bombers into 
transports. Portal gained approval from Churchill to convert 200 of these aircraft for 
transporting RAF personnel, but in his memorandum he states that they could be used to 
carry thirty paratroopers. These aircraft (named the York transport) would be ready by 
March 1944, possibly too late for their crews and passengers to be ready for an invasion 
that was planned for May, but they could have replaced the Dakotas of 46 Group RAF if the 
USA had not been forthcoming.295   As an aside, a study of the RAF price books shows that if 
York aircraft had replaced the 150 C-47s of 46 Group, then the Exchequer would have saved 
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around thirty-three per cent of the cost, or £2,077,750.296 The cost of the lack of the 
development of a simple transport aircraft design therefore not only added fuel to the 
Army/RAF dispute but also in the end was a false economy.297  
    The number and type of aircraft allocated to the airborne forces left much to be desired, 
owing much to the flawed decision taken in 1940 to draw on the strength of Bomber 
Command when the need arose for an operation. Starting with six obsolete Whitley 
bombers298, the growth of 38 Wing can be seen in three distinct phases. By the January 1942 
two Squadrons existed (296 Glider Exercise and 297 Parachute Exercise);299  in May the Air 
Ministry agreed the Wing could be expanded to four Whitley squadrons by August 1942 
(295, 296, 297, 298 squadrons).300  
  The RAF’s development of an air transport capability fell far behind the build-up of the 
units which they were to carry. To drop a full battalion of five hundred men would have 
required sixty two Whitley aircraft301, far beyond the Central Landing Establishment’s 
allocation of aircraft until October 1942.  This remained an inadequate provision, and by the 
summer of 1943 when 6 Airborne was formed, 38 Wing was still incapable of carrying a 
complete brigade of British parachute troops into battle. The three existing squadrons of 
Whitleys302 would only have been able to carry 1,080 men (ninety aircraft each carrying 
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twelve men each) in a maximum effort – barely two battalions. The final period of steady 
expansion occurred through the latter half of 1943 as 93 Group (Training) Command Stirling 
squadrons were converted and Albemarle aircraft finished replacing the Whitleys in the four 
original squadrons.303 By the end of January 1944 38 Group was complete (Table 6), but 
what was the practical cost of the 248 bombers allocated? 
  The Second World War was funded by utilising financial institutions and systems to allocate 
resources from private hands into war production.304 Raw materials and manufacturing 
labour were funnelled into war production with little regard for the final cost. This renders 
generating monetary values for the aircraft in question at face value somewhat pointless 
exercise. However, it does have an effective purpose as a simple methodological tool to 
show the relative worth of various aircraft, and the Treasury still used Sterling to illustrate 
its complaints about the scale of the glider programme (see below).The investment in the 
aircraft allocated to airborne forces can be assessed in comparative financial terms, and also 
in the value set upon them by Bomber Command, who were competing for the use of this 
resource. In the first case by June 1944 Bomber Command fielded 1,320 heavy (four engine) 
bombers in sixty-six squadrons (Table 8). These aircraft had cost the Exchequer 
approximately £25,836,940, the individual cost of each Lancaster was reduced by 
economies of scale in 1943, which reduced unit price.305 The aircraft of 38 Group cost 
£6,224,416. This amount is so high due to the anomalous nature of the Albemarle, with only 
one order for this type existing on file with each aircraft costing £31,470. Meanwhile 46 
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Group’s cost is skewed by the considerable cost of lend lease C-47s. The 150 Dakotas 
purchased in 1943 cost $25 million, which must then be divided by four to obtain the 
relative sterling value.306 The eventual unit cost can be calculated as £41,666 which seems 
high and perhaps represents the USA giving Britain no reduction for mass production. Yet it 
must be remembered that 46 Group RAF formed part of a wider pool of transport 
squadrons capable of general supply/transport tasks and was not devoted solely to lifting 
airborne forces.307 This financial paradigm reveals that the aircraft when bought new were 
not simply the cast-offs of Bomber Command and were not without value, the aircraft for 
Britain’s airborne effort had just less than half of that for the machines fielded by Bomber 
Command in 1944 (Table 5). 
What operational value did the RAF attach to the aircraft passed to 38 Wing/Group when it 
was expanded in the second half of 1943?  Had the Royal Air Force been stripped of its 
finest aircraft, which could have been used more profitably elsewhere? The aircraft that 
supported airborne forces between 1940 and 1943 were largely obsolete bomber types. 
After the disappointing airborne forces demonstration of April 1942, Portal had informed 
Churchill that no bomber could be correctly described as ‘discarded’, as they could still be 
used for Operational Training Units (OTUs).308  
The Whitley had been the work horse of parachute training as airborne forces had begun to 
be built up. The initial RAF resources assembled at Ringway in the summer of June 1940 
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consisted of six ‘decrepit’309 Whitley bombers310 which were thought to be the most suitable 
aircraft for parachute training and later operations. They were crudely adapted, with the 
men dropping from a hatchway set in the middle of the fuselage floor. These aircraft were 
considered obsolete as heavy bombers in 1939311, and were being rapidly phased out by 
Bomber Command during the winter months of 1941/1942.312 A revealing letter from the 
RAF Director of Operations of 17 September 1943 discussed the problem of finding 180 
aircraft to fill out the planned squadrons of 38 Group, including replacing the Whitley 
aircraft, which were on their ‘last legs’:313 
We have recently recommended to the Chiefs of Staff that the Wing should be 
increased from 90 to 180 U/E aircraft. It looks like this might be approved, in which 
case we shall be faced immediately with the problem of finding 90 aircraft (or 130 
aircraft if the Whitleys are to be replaced) to fill the new establishment.314 
 
He adds the ‘possibility of chiselling out yet another 100 Albemarles from the Russian 
allotment’ and finishes by stating he understood that Bomber Command wanted no more 
Stirlings, and he wonders ‘what it is proposed to do with these aircraft and whether they 
could be earmarked for 38 Wing’. The Albemarle, like the gliders, had been built by a variety 
of sub-contractors and by the time it left the drawing board did not fit into the RAF’s 
operational requirements. It had been built from mostly steel and wood, in case Britain’s 
alloy supplies were lost or aircraft factories devastated by enemy action, and was 
underpowered as a bomber315. In the Stirling’s case, as early as January 1942 Bomber 
Command had decided that it was so disappointing as a heavy bomber that it would be 
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unwise to send any overseas as so many spares would be needed.316 By December of that 
year Harris and his AOC 4 Group RAF were considering taking their complaints direct to the 
manufacturers – Austins, Shorts and Harland.317 Harris had doubts about the Halifax by 
October 1942, their crews suffering from ‘shaky’ morale, and by December 1943 he is 
emphatic, ‘I still state categorically that one Lancaster it to be preferred to four Halifaxes. 
The Halifaxes are an embarrassment now and will be useless for the bomber offensive 
within 6 months if not before.’ 318 Airborne Forces and 38 Wing/Group were not being 
allocated Bomber Command’s finest aircraft. 
   By the end of 1943 the Lancaster was the one aircraft that Harris had settled on to achieve 
Bomber Command’s aims and dismissed all other types. He stated that with just over forty 
squadrons of this type he expected to drop 13,850 tons of bombs per month, enough to 
destroy forty to fifty per cent of the main German towns, and concluded, ‘From this it 
appears that the Lancaster force alone should be sufficient but only just sufficient to 
produce in Germany by 1 April 1944 a state of devastation in which surrender is 
inevitable.’319 Indeed, by the end of 1943 Bomber Command was becoming a ‘Lancaster 
force’. Of the 20,224 sorties flown during the thirty-five raids of the ‘Battle of Berlin’, 14,652 
were carried out by Lancasters, over seventy-two per cent of the total.320 The proportion of 
Lancaster squadrons continued to increase as Bomber Command continued to expand, and 
at a faster rate (Table 8). Harris’ comments show that the aircraft transferred to 38 Group 
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were no great sacrifice to the core offensive strategy of the RAF,  as the Stirlings were 
considered poor months before and the Halifax a growing ‘embarrassment’ at the time 38 
Group was being expanded. The allocation of these bombers to 38 Wing/Group had no 
impact on Bomber Command operations and the RAF’s war plan aims. 
The lack of a bespoke transport aeroplane and the plan to co-opt Bomber Command’s 
aircraft hindered parachute operations, and therefore increased the importance of the 
glider programme. The theory of the ‘airfield capture group’ had centred on the concept of 
a small a parachute force seizing an enemy airfield in advance of air-transported troops 
being flown in, which in turn would be supported by further troops plus detachments of 
light tanks and artillery, all brought in by glider.321 Four different types were designed and 
ordered by 1941. The Hotspur was a seven seat training glider, the Horsa and Hengist the 
operational gliders carrying twenty-five and fifteen men respectively; while the Hamilicar 
would be the heavy lift glider capable of carrying 17,500 pounds of equipment, vehicles, or 
forty troops.322 The Treasury soon complained about the estimated cost of 400 Hengist, 800 
Horsa and eighteen Hamilicar gliders - £8,400,000.323 As this was approximately a third of 
the number of gliders used by 6th Airborne on 6 June, a rough estimation of the D-Day 
glider cost could be at most £3,500,000.324 Glider assembly began in earnest in October 
1941 but production quickly fell behind schedule. The Ministry anticipated that by February 
1942, 390 Hotspurs, twenty-five Horsas and eighteen Hamilicars (‘the tank carrying glider’) 
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would have been delivered to the Central Landing Establishment.325 However, in reality by 
this point only 225 Hotspurs had been delivered, plus two prototypes of the Horsa, while a 
first prototype of the Hamilicar was still being assembled.326 A 1 January 1942 meeting 
stipulated that by December 1942, 650 Horsas and 28 Hamilicar gliders would be needed; 
the requirement rising to 1,775 Horsas and 79 Hamilicars by March 1943.327 Yet by the end 
of October 1942 only 388 Horsas had been delivered to Bomber Command Maintenance 
units. The companies building the Horsa were certainly working flat-out to catch up the 
shortfall, the Production Committee agreeing that the full swing programme could only be 
halted at 1,100 when the 18 November 1942 Air Ministry stop order was received.328 
   The cause of the failure to meet Horsa production targets can be found in the complicated 
manufacturing arrangements.  Of the 3,655 Horsa ‘sets’ ordered during the war, 695 would 
be built entirely by Airspeed at their Christchurch factory with 2,960 sub-contracted out.329 
The Air Ministry view of the companies selected to take part in the glider programme was 
that they were of the ‘furniture trade’, and not directly critical to existing aircraft 
manufacturing.330 However, the companies shown on a schematic which lists main and sub-
contractors of 22 October 1941 include Austin and Wolsey Motor and two factories of the 
London North Eastern Railway (Derby and York). The experience these companies had 
building railway carriages and civilian vehicles would have been directly transferable to the 
construction of wooden gliders. The minutes show regular meetings being held by the 
Committee, but the involvement of twenty-six different contractors and the need to create 
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solutions for unexpected problems goes some way to explain how production fell behind 
plan. Also the sub-contracted Horsas were built in ‘sets’ of thirty different components and 
delivered in kit form to the RAF for assembly and testing, any discrepancy or variation at one 
or more firms would have caused the glider to be rejected. 331 The 22 January 1943 meeting 
agreed a steady monthly production rate that would run until the end of 1944, and fulfil the 
needs of 6 Airborne Div on 6 June 1944 (see Tables 6 and 7).  
 Even with the creation of 46 Group RAF the aircraft available to Gale were inadequate to 
transport the Division in a single lift to Normandy. Table 6 reveals that with a maximum 
personnel load, and thereby carrying no vehicles or heavy equipment (such as anti-tank 
guns) of any sort, and using solely Horsa gliders, still only two thirds of 6 Airborne could 
have been carried into action. But the scope did exist by May 1944 to deliver the bulk of the 
division in two lifts. 
  In conclusion, the WO formed a second airborne division as its leading figure and the head 
of the professional army, Alan Brooke was convinced of their future value in offensive 
operations. While a doctrinal pamphlet existed in May 1943, many practical lessons 
concerning this new type of warfare would only be learnt during the operations in support 
of Husky. In regard to air assets, the total financial cost of 38 Wing/Group was greatly 
increased by the use of the anomalous Albemarle, and failed to benefit from economies of 
scale savings made on the massive orders placed for aircraft for Bomber Command. 
Regardless of the financial cost of the aircraft set aside for air transport, it has been seen 
that Sir Arthur Harris was dismissive of the capabilities of the Halifax and Stirling as bombers 
by 1943.  
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IV. The Expectations of Senior Allied Commanders regarding airborne forces before 
D-Day 
An important reason alongside Brooke’s ferocious championing of the airborne cause was 
the positive view held of such forces by Allied senior commanders. Despite the chaos and 
serious losses suffered during the airborne landings phase of Husky, senior army figures 
retained their faith in airborne warfare. Studied in isolation, these operations’ losses 
damned airborne warfare as profligate in both precious air transport assets and high quality 
manpower. Brooke would have been able to cling onto his airborne division if Eisenhower 
and the US Army had abandoned the airborne concept, but it would have been difficult for 
him to stop their de-emphasization in the Operation Overlord plan. Indeed, Eisenhower 
created an inquiry committee on 24 July 1943 to assess what lessons could be drawn from 
the disaster.332 But the key generals on the ground – Alexander, Montgomery, Patton and 
Bradley all believed that even the dispersed impact of the landings had greatly assisted their 
progress in advancing through Sicily. A report written by Alexander was circulated by 
Churchill amongst the COS for their views. The report was glowing in its endorsement of 
airborne forces:  
Personally, I believe that it is the best solution to the invasion of Europe across the 
Channel – airborne troops in large numbers in conjunction with the attack on the 
coast from the sea. I look at the problem like this: - Tactics are continually changing 
with the introduction of new weapons and new equipment. The side which can take 
advantage of this and develop its tactics accordingly before its enemy, will keep the 
initiative and produce the surprises – both battle winning factors. The land defences 
have few, if any open flanks to get around and turn – but there is one flank (if you 
can term it) – the flank, or open door over the top which is always there. It is there 
wide open for the side which has the air superiority. What an opportunity for us, if 
we can only see it and seize it.333 
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 Ridgeway recalled this enthusiasm amongst generals: ‘The drop into Sicily, dispersed as it 
was, had stirred the imagination of every higher commander, and all up the line corps and 
army commanders were dreaming up grandiose schemes for our employment.’334 This 
enthusiasm was carried forward as planning for the Second Front gathered pace.  A paper 
for a ‘Minimum Force for a Bridgehead Operation’ written on 8 April 1943, proposed using 
large numbers of airborne troops to facilitate a landing in Northern France while landing 
craft numbers were still short.335   Operation Skyscraper, the last plan considered by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff before COSSAC took over the planning process, included the use of two 
airborne divisions as part of a force of ten divisions to land in the Pas de Calais area of 
France.336 With 1 Airborne Div fighting in the Mediterranean, 6 Airborne’s creation now 
appeared to be a necessity. 
  However, faith in the capability of massed airborne operations had been shaken after the 
heavy losses incurred in Sicily. This became an issue for the Supreme Allied Commander, 
and was put to the question. Eisenhower created an inquiry committee on 24 July 1943 to 
assess what lessons could be drawn from the disaster.337 The conclusions of this board were 
signed off by Major-General Beddell-Smith, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, on 31 July. 338 The 
report included a draft training memorandum and a report from Browning.  Its 
recommendations focused on ensuring that airborne troops were used for operations for 
which they were suited; ‘realistic and thorough combined training’ between air and airborne 
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forces; ensuring that ‘operational details’ were incorporated into the plan – pathfinders, 
airborne corridors for aircraft and the briefing of surrounding land and sea units.339 
Browning’s report castigated the ability of the US pilots, ‘navigation was generally bad’ and 
maintained that both British operations had been well conceived. 340  
   As an aside, while career politics will be seen at the unit CO rank level in chapter three 
with the Lindsay incident, here can be seen a similar manipulation at the corps level.  There 
is a whiff of political self interest in one of his final points in which he proposes that 
‘centralised planning and control of all airborne matters’ had been ‘abundantly proved’.341 If 
this recommendation had been formalized, 1 Airborne and US 82 Airborne Divs would 
effectively have become a corps; as the existing Airborne Forces Adviser to Eisenhower 
Browning would be promoted by a fait accompli.  
   Later, Browning would convince Brooke that the large-scale Husky airborne venture had 
been satisfactorily handled.342 However Eisenhower remained unconvinced. He wrote to 
General Marshall on 20 September that he ‘did not believe in the airborne division’ and that 
airborne troops should be reorganized into self-contained brigade sized formations.343 He 
argued: 
To employ at any one time and place a whole division would require a dropping over 
such and extended area that I seriously doubt that a divisional commander could 
regain control and operate the scattered forces as one unit.344 
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General Marshall demanded a full test of the airborne division. The US 11 Airborne 
Division345 demonstrated in December during the Knollwood exercise that it was viable, the 
manoeuvres observed by General Lesley J. McNair (commanding US Army Ground Forces 
and responsible for training) and Eisenhower sanctioned their retention.346  This episode 
shows that while a great investment had been made in the airborne project by the end of 
1943, its progress and utility was still under scrutiny.   
Yet the man who would lead British forces into France was convinced by that value could be 
added to his operations by airborne forces. Miles Dempsey347 placed great reliance in the 
potential of airborne forces to ensure his Army’s success in the forthcoming campaign. 
Indeed, Dempsey was open-minded towards the idea of Special Forces generally.348 He 
issued a memorandum of 21 March 1944 to all Corps commanders, including Browning, 
which made clear his view on the use of airborne forces in the coming invasion. 349 He 
pointed out that after the landings at Anzio earlier in the year, the front had ‘congealed’ 
rapidly and it took a hard slog to finally breakout of the deadlock. During the Sicily 
operations the open flank of the enemy had been the sea, and Allied forces had been able 
to land behind enemy blocking positions, but in Normandy this avenue would not be 
available; ‘in FRANCE there will be no sea flank to help the advance of Second Army. We will 
use airborne forces instead.’350 To this end the cover note to this memorandum stated that 
Browning was now working on plans for the use of both airborne divisions and the Polish 
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Para Bde to execute further airborne operations once the bridgehead was secure. In 
addition, this paper also clearly showed Dempsey’s wish to see airborne troops used en 
masse: 
‘Under no circumstances will a smaller force than one para bde be used at a time 
and the greatest effect will be got by employing a whole division. Used in this way, 
the airborne reserve should be of the utmost help in keeping the operation fluid.’  351 
 
This paper reveals Dempsey understood the tremendous potential of airborne forces to 
unlock the enemy’s defensive schemes. Also, the possibility of using them as a highly mobile 
defensive reserve, with 5 Para Bde being nominated for ‘emergency defensive use’ until D 
+3 (as actual events unfolded, this would have been 9 June), should the enemy achieve a 
breakthrough.352  
In conclusion, it can be seen that the formation and later combat performance of 6 Airborne 
Division has to be set within the context of the wider British experience of airborne warfare 
1940-1943. 6 Airborne was not created in isolation and certainly not as the result of a 
carefully created plan for British airborne forces that had been developed in 1940 at their 
inception. Brooke’s relentless championing of the project had saved the project in the face 
of RAF opposition; running as it did against the RAF’s deeply-held commitment to the night 
bomber offensive which forestalled any diversion of significant two and four-engine aircraft 
to other efforts.  
  A doctrinal base had been established by the end of 1943, through observation of German 
operations and the bitter experience of Husky, which Gale could use as he developed his 
ideas as to how 6 Airborne would operate on 6 June 1944. Strategic mobility, the 
surprise/shock effect, intelligence, the location of DZ/LZ and ways of compensating for the 
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light scale of heavy weapons carried by airborne forces were the five vital aspects for any 
operation. The last factor, probably made worse by scattering, was airborne forces’ greatest 
weakness. Only by an early relief by conventional role forces or the co-opting of their 
considerable firepower could glider and parachute troops be saved from annihilation once 
the surprise effect/ initiative had been lost.  
  By May 1944 the two RAF Groups available (38 and 46) were capable of transporting two 
brigades into action in a single lift, but a second complete lift would be required to move the 
entire 6 Airborne Div.  As will be seen in chapter five, this was sufficient for Gale’s plan. 
However, apart from the Dakota the aircraft used where mainly Bomber Command rejects 




Chapter Three - Identity: 6th Airborne Division – The Development of 
Individual and Organisational self 
 
Chapter Three will demonstrate the key elements which facilitated the development 
of 6 Airborne Div’s airborne identity. The Airborne Forces Establishment was shaped by 
Browning, but it was Richard Gale’s straightforward style of command that would dominate 
the formation of 6 Airborne, its planning and execution of operations in Normandy. This 
chapter will provide the context in which Gale’s simple style disguised a deep understanding 
of the nature of airborne warfare and that of British airborne forces which would ultimately 
lead to the creation of battle-winning airborne identity. Evidence will be provided that men 
came from far and wide, for various reasons, and why they came together to serve in 6 
Airborne Division.  This evidence is a precursor to establishing that, irrespective of from 
where the men originated, airborne identity would be developed through Gale’s leadership 
and become the bedrock upon which their later victories in battle would be built. 
  The process of creating airborne identity involved both the development of the men and 
the organisation. First, the reasons why men volunteered for ‘Special Service,’ either with 
the commandos or airborne forces will be explored using an over view created using a 
sample based on the records held by the Second World War Experience Centre.353 The 
mood of the Army at home 1940-43 was characterised by boredom and airborne and 
commando recruitment offered an outlet for frustrated men.  This discussion feeds into the 
following section which asses the actual process of sourcing the manpower needed for 6 
Airborne Div – through the volunteer and unit conversion methods. Third, the importance of 
role-specific training is explained as a cohesion building element for the Division. The fourth 
and final chapter section shows the growth of the Army Air Corps as a distinct military 





organisation, under the meticulous care of Major-General Frederick Browning. ‘Boy’ 
Browning added his Guards attention to appearance and above all ferocious standards of 
appearance, conduct and skill at arms. The chapter ends with a case study showing the use 
of Airborne Forces to boost civilian morale on a regional level. 
I. ‘Browned off’ - Personal Value - the Army at Home, 1940-43 – why men 
Volunteered 
 
Did a frustration at being unable to confront the enemy form a key reason for joining 
airborne forces, and thereby reveals a monopolisation of aggressive men?  For this study all 
the files lodged at the Second World War Experience Centre (SWWEC) of men with airborne 
and commando service, together with four Glider Pilot Regiment members were reviewed. 
As other Special Forces volunteers, the commando files were included to broaden the 
sample base. Of a sample of forty-seven interviews of transferees to airborne and 
commando units during the war, twenty-eight offered explanations as to how and why they 
joined.354 These reasons were categorised as boredom (thirty-two per cent), accepting their 
posting (twenty-one per cent), a desire for action against the enemy (eighteen per cent), 
professional (fourteen per cent) and personal reasons (fourteen per cent).355 None of the 
men stated that they joined these units because they perceived them as being elite, or 
having a higher attached status. Boredom, being ‘browned off’ with performing mundane 
and repetitive duties with conventional role units was the most common reason for 
volunteering.356J. Paley, who had wished to join the infantry, served on heavy anti-aircraft 
guns defending Birmingham: 
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We didn’t know even if we hit the damn things as they came over you know and 
then we thought that was a kind of slow sort of a job for a soldier who wanted to get 
overseas. So fortunately they came asking for volunteers for the airborne.357 
 
For some men volunteering for almost anything was the route to escape their humdrum 
surroundings and tasks. This was often combined with frustration when it appeared that 
their CO was refusing requests for transfer: 
But I joined because I was fed up. A lot of them of them was bored, you know, them 
that had been in Iceland and I'd put in then to do something that were different 
things that were going up. Rear gunners, gunners on ships. Well, people were 
volunteering for them in our unit at the time, and I joined anything and I think, well 
the major said, the major, our senior CO said he was fed up with me putting in  these 
requests  he said he was going to let me go.358 
 
His view perhaps summed up that of many volunteers who had suffered ‘four years of 
inactivity’.359 Wally Parr of 2 Oxf Bucks, ‘putting up barbed wire, taking it down the next day, 
moving it ... Never fired a rifle, never did a thing.’360 J. Cramer, a police constable since 1935, 
was so keen to join the Army at the outbreak of war that he resigned from his reserved 
occupation and was initially posted to the Guards. After finding he was not compatible with 
officer training at Sandhurst he was ‘dreading a return to boredom in Windsor’, and 
transferred to the Northumberland Fusiliers as a Vickers machine gunner. He was then 
posted to 59 Div’s machine gun battalion based at Warrenpoint in Northern Ireland.  He was 
soon bored again, and when an airborne recruiting mission arrived in 1942 he and 
‘hundreds volunteered’.361 He found the action he craved with 1 RUR and 6 Airborne Div, 
but only a month sooner than if he had stayed with 59 Div.362  
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  While boredom was common in Home Forces Command, and the wish for a more active 
role in the war caused men to volunteer for different corps and services, it does not 
correlate that the best soldiers were necessarily funnelled in the airborne and commando 
forces.  The loss of impatient men due to recruitment drives by airborne/commando forces 
and the RAF, may have created the impression that the best were being drawn away, but 
these men‘s possibly disruptive attitudes would have left with them. Also, many of those 
sent to Hardwick Hall depot did not pass selection and would have been returned to 
conventional role units. These ‘RTU-ed’ men are likely to have returned to their parent units 
with little fanfare, and could well have been posted to other battalions and though lost to 
their original unit were returned to the conventional role infantry pool.  
II. Selection - Manpower and Leadership Resources – Cost, the Conversion and 
Volunteer processes 
 
Commentators both past and present have criticised the formation of Britain’s Second 
World War airborne and commando forces as ‘private armies,’363 which diverted the best 
men into units where they could not benefit from Britain’s increasing materiel  advantage, 
or simply performed tasks that any competent infantry battalion could have been trained to 
do.364 John Terraine’s comments also diminished the performance of the conventional role 
infantry divisions, along similar lines as Hastings’ views (as discussed in chapter one): 
Worst of all the “offenders”, it must be said, were the Airborne Forces, with their 
exacting physical and psychological requirements. There is an awful irony in the 
spectacle of the line infantry divisions in Normandy struggling to perform their 
ordinary duties, while beside them the 6th Airborne, first into battle when June 6 
was only twenty minutes old, and consisting entirely of the type of men that the line 
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infantry so palpably lacked, fought on as line infantry [author’s own emphasis] for 82 
days.365 
Terraine down played the specialised role that 6 Airborne performed, while dismissing the 
very fact that the division did remain on the line for 82 days, thereby releasing more heavily-
armed conventional role infantry for offensive operations. But the issue of manpower cost 
must be addressed as part of a balanced evaluation to compare to the contribution these 
troops made in Normandy, in terms of leaders, extraordinary physical requirements and 
total head count. 
The manpower cost question will be broken down into two halves. First, how many men 
were diverted into these units from the rest of the army? Second, to what extent did they 
extract an unreasonable number of the best men? The three War Office systems used to 
create these units (volunteers, conversion and direct posting); the numbers involved, the 
quality of the men extracted from the point of view of officers and non-commissioned 
officers, and finally provide illustration with two case studies, the original battalions of 3 
Para Bde and a unit specific focus on 8 Para Bn.366 
  The volunteer system was the approach first adopted when the Special Service 
commandos were formed in 1940.367 For parachute units the wave of volunteering following 
the August 1941 notice for men to complete the 1 Para Bde eventually furnished enough for 
four battalions (1-4), but the requirement to rapidly build further airborne units called for 
more structured action. Before the brigade was formed the conversion and volunteer routes 
had been analysed and the advantages and disadvantages weighed up in a War Office paper 
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of 17 July 1941.368The volunteer method was perceived as being the most effective way to 
obtain good men, but some units might be ‘robbed of their best’ while others ‘will not be 
allowed to volunteer’ by their parent regiments, and overall the method would be time-
consuming. To save units being asset stripped of their best soldiers a limit of ten other ranks 
(ORs) per unit was imposed when 1 Para Bde was formed.369 
The same paper of 17 July also weighed the merits of the conversion of complete infantry 
battalions, the clear possible advantage being the retention of the old unit’s ‘esprit de 
corps’. Also no cadre would be needed from 11 SAS (Special Air Service, the existing 
experimental airborne battalion) and it appeared to be ‘the most speedy method of creating 
new parachute units’. The obvious disadvantages would be the presence of unsuitable men 
or men who simply did not volunteer. The paper suggested that they could be concentrated 
into the parts of the conventional role infantry battalion that would not be needed in the 
new establishment (such as Bren/Universal carrier platoons) and then the whole element 
posted to another unit as a group. While this particular idea was not used the ‘speedy’ 
conversion method won out, supported by the continuing call for volunteers.370 
  A memorandum generated by a 28 May 1942 meeting finally set down that conversion was 
the best method for the creation of new parachute battalions. Along with the existing 4 Para 
Bn, two battalions were converted soon after to create a new 2 Para Bde.371 This paper also 
stated that six further battalions had been ‘ear-marked’ by Home Forces for conversion 
should a second division be created. It was also agreed that no ‘Regular’ battalions would be 
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converted.372 The battalions to be converted into 3 Para Bde were concentrated in 223 Bde 
during September 1942.373 The performance of the battalions selected for conversion had 
been closely followed. As part of Eastern Command, 223 Bde had performed well as a 
‘break-in’ attack force during Exercise Barratt Two on 14-15 October; while on 20-22 
October A Coy 10 Somerset Light Infantry (10 Som LI) had carried out a river assault using 
small boats during Exercise Check.374Coincidentally, during this exercise fifty ORs led by Lt. 
Taylor mounted in trucks impersonated two Ju 52 loads of German Fallschirmjäger to draw 
away enemy troops.375 
The third method to obtain the manpower needed was direct posting of individuals, as used 
in the rest of the Army, which was the case with the airlanding battalions. 31 (Ind) Bde Gp 
which was converted into 1 AL Bde and later formed two thirds of 6 AL Bde, was a regular 
formation that had returned from India.  
The four battalions comprising the brigade were therefore fit and hard, used to 
soldiering on light scales of equipment and, as regular battalions with a high 
percentage of long-service officers and men, well disciplined.376 
 
It had trained for mountain warfare and was well suited in its new role as a counter attack 
reserve for Western Command, defending the upland Gower peninsular. The airlanding 
units, while being members of the AAC,377 remained tied to their parent county regiments, 
with officers and other ranks posted in as needed. The change of role came as a great shock 
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to some, and peer pressure played a role in at least one case:  
All Airborne troops were volunteers, receiving additional pay as danger money, and 
we three were therefore very surprised to find ourselves drafted! However, a tough-
looking sergeant-major made all technically correct at our first parade when he 
barked out in his most intimidatory manner that he understood that we had all 
volunteered but that, if anyone had not done so, he only had to take apace forward. 
He stopped shouting and glared at us. Needless to say, nobody moved. So now we 
were all volunteers, but that is how it happened that some were more volunteers 
than others.378 
 
Converted units under went considerable changes in personnel while undergoing training 
for their new specialised roles, and all personnel had to voluntarily re-role. However, any 
who had previously volunteered but then decided to drop out, could have engineered their 
exit by simply underperforming during parachute training and failing the course.379 
The head-count cost of these units, and any disruption caused by their creation, must be set 
in the context of the army’s personnel situation in the summer/autumn of 1942 when a 
second airborne division was being considered. At this time there was no infantry 
manpower crisis and the Adjutant-General was dealing with a shortage of men for 
supporting arms and a glut of formed infantry battalions, and five parachute battalions were 
created from this milieu:  
‘During the late summer and autumn of 1942, selection procedure has been applied 
to 19 Young Soldiers’, 26 Home Defence and 6 Field Force Bns which were being 
disbanded in order to provide more men for such other arms as R.A., R.E., R. Sigs, 
R.A.S.C. and R.E.M.E. The method used was a modified form of the selection 
procedure given to General Service Corps recruits, full attention being paid to a 
man’s military record.380 
(a) The disbandment of surplus infantry battalions at Home between August and 
December made available some 33,000 personnel for transfer to other arms, 
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according to their age, category and suitability based on selection and aptitude 
tests.(b) During the year, 15 surplus infantry battalions were converted to R.A.C. 
regiments, 22 to Royal Artillery regiments and 5 to Parachute battalions. In addition, 
2 Yeomanry regiments were converted to R. Signals units and 1 to motorised 
infantry’.381 
 
These surplus infantry units had resulted from the sudden doubling in size of the TA in 
March 1939 and the sudden addition of war service battalions. In 1939 the army had 
possessed 140 regular battalions (seventy-nine of which were abroad) while the enlarged TA 
fielded 232. The crisis of 1940 had brought about the creation of 140 war service battalions, 
based on cadres of fifteen officers and 150 men drawn from ITCs and holding battalions and 
then filled with 800 conscripts.382 The result was that the experience base of infantry as a 
whole had been diluted.383 The regular battalions had been ‘milked’ to spread regular 
soldiers around which left many units ‘off balance’, with both existing and new units missing 
key experienced men.384 Another problem was an abundance of young soldiers. In 1939 
men aged seventeen to nineteen years had been allowed to volunteer to avoid waiting for 
their militia (national) service.385 However shortly afterwards it was decided that while the 
nineteen-year-olds could serve overseas, young soldiers would need to be twenty to be sent 
to an operational theatre. This resulted in around 40,000 ‘immature’ soldiers being shuffled 
around when their unit went overseas, often into ADGB (Air Defence Great Britain – anti-
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aircraft artillery units)386 or into the Young Soldier battalions.387 By mid-1944 the entire 
airborne and commando establishments represented less than one and a half per cent of 
the army’s total manpower and five and a half per cent of its infantry strength (See Tables 1 
and 2). 388Of the eighteen assault brigades landed on the 21 Army Gp beaches by nightfall 6 
June, the airborne and commando formations comprised over a quarter of them – five 
brigades. Less than half of the existing airborne and commando formations were used for 
Neptune, but were twenty-seven per cent of the ‘teeth’ of the most critical British offensive 
undertaken by the western allies in the Second World War.389 In short, the Army’s 
manpower position in 1942 (when a second airborne division was under consideration) was 
in a state of some turmoil, and the extraction of the small number of men for airborne (and 
commando) forces was therefore not considerable.  
  The next question to be answered regards quality – to what extent did these units take a 
significant proportion of the Army’s best ORs? A contemporaneous definition of ‘best’ being 
summed up by characteristics set out in the calls for the men to form 1 Para Bde, 
‘volunteers must be first class fighting soldiers and show keenness, intelligence and initiative 
and must be men of first class character only’, with any NCO applicants ‘recommended for 
the next higher rank.’390 Similarly, the first commando officers required in 1940 needed to 
have ‘personality, tactical ability and imagination.’391 The physical specification was also 
demanding. A joining instruction document of December 1943 reinforced clear physical 
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standards for potential parachutists - ‘Age 19-40; Height not over 6 ft 2 ins; weight not over 
182 pounds’, and visual acuity 6/ 12 without glasses and ‘Hearing Standard 2.392 
  A large complement of NCOs was crucial for 6 Airborne. Due to the need for more 
leadership in the case of a dispersed landing, parachute battalions’ ten-man sections were 
led by sergeants rather than the corporals as found in conventional role units.393 The 
diversion of much of the army’s most able existing and potential NCOs would have badly 
damaged units’ junior leadership in action, training capacity and ability to uphold 
discipline.394 If the airborne and commando forces had inexorably drawn all the best soldiers 
from the rest of the army, particularly the infantry, that would have been too high a price to 
pay for the special battlefield role they could perform. 
   Three important factors prevented the best men being monopolised by airborne (and also 
commando forces) – the actual numbers involved, the ten man volunteer limit, and the 
attitude of other units and the ability of converted battalions to retain many of their NCOs 
and officers. As shown above, the total numbers of airborne and commando troops were 
small when compared with the main body of the conventional role units of the Army and 
the limitation of ten men at a time being allowed to volunteer appears to have been 
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adhered to.395 When these considerations are set alongside the organisational structure of 
an infantry battalion in 1944, it can be seen that even in the extraordinary event of all ten 
soldiers released by a donor unit being at least a corporal this would still only comprise ten 
per cent of the total number of men at this rank or above.396 Once the new airborne units 
were formed, the promotion of NCOs from the ranks became the responsibility of the CO 
and would be sourced from the unit itself.397 The second factor which inhibited the mass 
migration of the ‘best’ soldiers to airborne and commando forces was the attitude and 
behaviour of other units, who sometimes saw these calls for volunteers as the chance to 
offload undesirables and could always just not circulate the army council instructions.398 
One challenge to this proposition was put forward by Nick Archdale, in 1943/44 the Mortar 
Platoon commander of 7 Para Bn, who did believe that airborne forces had monopolised the 
best infantry soldiers available.399 He may have formed this impression thanks to the efforts 
of Major Johnson (as discussed above) who had written to all the other Som LI battalions 
asking for volunteers. In this case 7 Para Bn may have received a better standard of recruit 
than the battalions as its ‘parent’ regiment came to its aid. On 16 April 1942 Browning400 
complained to the War Office that his recruiting efforts were being stymied across the 
Home Commands: 
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In spite of Army Council instructions requiring units to forward names of volunteers 
for the Airborne Division, the response has been extremely disappointing. This is not 
because volunteers do not exist; it is because the terms of the ACI have not been 
circulated widely as directed, and it is know for certain there are thousands of 
volunteers whose names have not been forwarded401. 
 
  In regard to the newly converted units that would form the parachute battalions of 6 
Airborne Div, many NCOs were retained from the donor unit on conversion. James Hill402 
stated that around ‘150’ men stayed on with each of the new battalions when 223 Brigade 
was converted, including many NCOs.403 
  In any army the effectiveness of the officer cadre is the key determinant of combat 
performance, and any experienced regular officers that the new airborne and commando 
units attracted would be a loss to their donor regiments.  It is important therefore to 
measure this cost. Two years before the war began the Army was already short of 
officers,404 and with the sudden doubling of the Territorial Army in March 1939405 the 
situation became severe. The Army began the war with approximately 15,000 regular 
officers, but by February 1941 this number had increased to 54,000.406 However, this great 
increase masked the loss of experience that had occurred in the first twelve months of the 
war. Up to this point 3,354 officers had been lost,407 the majority of which would have been 
trained regular and first line territorial officers. Meanwhile, the many recalled AOER408 
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officers were older men (including Great War veterans) and therefore not of peak military 
age, and due to a lack of funds only ‘isolated’ refresher training could take place.409 
Therefore by 1944 any experienced regular infantry officers, who had been able to learn 
their profession in peacetime, were very valuable indeed.  
A study of the Officer Field Strength Returns of the original units in 3 Para Bde for 20 and 27 
May 1944 on the eve of operation Overlord, when matched with the April 1944 Army List 
reveals the regular Army officers (Table 4).410 The three 27 May 1944 field strength returns 
show 109 officers. By assessing the substantive and temporary/war rank status and listed 
regiment of each individual, and then comparing the information to the Army List, the 
number of pre-war trained officers can be ascertained - ten officers. These men include 
Otway and Pine-Coffin, the commanders of 7 and 9 Para Bns respectively; six are Majors 
(four temporary); the remaining four are three captains (two acting) and one lieutenant. 
Every war service officer would have been ‘re-badged’ as AAC when he passed his parachute 
training, but regular officers were listed by their parent infantry regiment as a distinction.411 
Therefore the officers with county regiment entries rather than just AAC are not listed 
amongst the twenty-one pre-1939 commissioned regular, regular supplemental reserve or 
TA names in the Army List Parachute Regiment pages; but are listed with their parent 
regiments. Consequently just over nine per cent of 3 Para Bde’s officers were regular and 
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had pre-war experience.412 By 1944 the Army contained 167,926 officers;413 assuming 
10,000 remained of the 15,000 regular serving officers of 1939,414 they would form only six 
per cent of the existing officer corps. This shows the regular officer allocation of the new 
AAC units was well above average, though the time many of these men had to settle into 
their new battalions was limited, with around forty-eight per cent of the officers of the 
original 3 Para Bde joining in October 1943 or later. As a comparison, the proportion of pre-
war regulars in 9 and 185 Bdes are displayed on the same chart (Table 4). These brigades of 
3 Div were selected for comparison as they had a key assault role in the landings and were 
also part of 1 Corps. While these brigades were classed as regular, their regiments had by 
this point been considerably diluted by experienced officers being posted away due to the 
Army’s wartime expansion.415 This analysis shows that the airborne units had not taken up a 
disproportionate share of regular officers. The number of TA officers is significant, showing 
TA officers who have been attracted to the Army Air Corps challenge.416None more so than 
Alistair Pearson, the CO of 8 Para Bn. 
Yet is it possible the airborne and commando forces may have monopolised the most 
aggressive and capable men? The statement made by Lt.-Col. Lionel Wigram (5 RWK) as part 
of the review of operations in Sicily points to the qualitative difference of individuals at 
platoon level. In ‘whatever regiment – whether good or bad’, he states of a typical under 
strength platoon of twenty-two men, six will ‘go anywhere and do anything’, twelve will be 
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‘sheep’ and four to six unable to make the grade.417 It could be argued that many of the men 
who belonged in the first group were those drawn to the airborne and commando forces, 
and thereby weakening their old units. However, this assumption dismisses the additional 
infantry training and hardening practised by their new units as the key to turning them into 
the ‘super infantrymen’418 that took to the field in June 1944 and presupposes that these 
men would have done just as well in their old units.   
  An attempt to grade aggression, or aptitude for battle, had been made by the time 6 
Airborne Div was formed.  With the creation of the General Service Corps (GSC) in January 
1942, men would now undertake six weeks basic training while their capabilities were 
assessed before posting to suitable units. Once selected for the infantry, for example, the 
recruit would then be posted to one of twenty-five infantry training centres (ITCs) for 
further instruction. The General Service Corps system allowed the rapid creation or re-
manning of weak units with appropriate skill sets, but combined with the ceiling imposed on 
the size of the Army it damaged the regional character of many infantry county battalions. 
As part of his reforms regarding the appropriate selection of men for each role, the 
Adjutant-General Sir Ronald Adam classified men by ‘combat temperament’ (CT). Those 
graded as best suited to a combat role were classed as CT1 formed around 5 per cent of 
troops, while CT3 – the least suited, 3 per cent.419 When recruiting volunteers directly from 
the GSC, airborne forces did take many of the CT1 graded men, along with the commandos, 
Reconnaissance and Armoured Corps.420 
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   This section now turns to specific case studies to show the conversion cost and process. 
The first case study dealing with the manpower cost issue centres on an overview of the 
original (7, 8, 9 Bns) of 3 Para Bde, Table 2 showing their numbers at various stages of the 
conversion process. 10 Som LI, 13 Warwick and 10 Essex together formed 223 Bde which on 
5 November 1942 was converted en masse into 3 Para Bde (becoming 7-9 Battalions 
respectively). 223 Bde had been under the direct command of 9 Corps421 (on the east coast) 
and contained war service units all formed in 1940. The conversion of this formation meant 
that no brigade was extracted from an established infantry division based in the UK, all of 
which by late 1942 were being readied for either imminent overseas operations or still held 
in case of an enemy invasion.  As discussed above in the section regarding the general 
situation of the army in 1942, the excess of infantry units had to be absorbed by other 
corps.  This was reflected in the letter Adam sent to 10 Som. LI on conversion where he 
discusses the main reason behind their change in role, ‘the needs of modern (war) have 
necessitated changing your battalion from infantry to parachutists’, the alternative being 
their disbandment.422 This letter does its best to ‘sell’ the conversion to the battalion with 
some flattery, but makes it clear that the alternative will certainly be dispersal. There is a 
clear appeal for the spirit of the existing battalion to be transferred into the new role and 10 
Som LI responded well, as seen in column V (Table 3). All five of the battalions (including 12 
and 13 Bns raised later for 5 Bde) showed roughly the same level of volunteering with 
between a third and half of the ORs and approximately two thirds of the officers stepping 
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forward, in the case of 10 Som LI all of the officers volunteered.423 This number of officers 
and possibly the bulk of the NCOs meant the leadership spine of the units remained 
intact.424 It must be remembered that all the men who failed to become parachutists were 
not lost; they were still trained infantrymen and were posted to another battalion. The final 
column (Z) shows that while sixty-five per cent of the officers were on the battalions’ 
strength; only thirty-five per cent of ORs were in place, the balance to be made good by 
volunteers from the rest of the Army. 
8 Para Bn provides a good battalion example of role conversion. 13 Warwick was informed 
by Lt.-Col. Lathbury on 6 November 1942 that they would be converted, and twelve officers 
and 130 ORs stepped forward respectively for the parachute volunteer group (Table 3 
COLUMN V).425 The 1942 war establishment strength of an infantry battalion was thirty-
three officers and 773 ORs426; therefore if 13 Warwick were at full strength the volunteer 
group would represent just under thirty-seven per cent of officers and only seventeen per 
cent of ORs. Once the initial detachments of parachute training candidates had been send 
off to the Airborne Forces depot at Hardwick Hall, the posting of all those who had not 
volunteered began, the three new battalions sending men to other battalions of their 
regiment or nearby regional neighbours. In 8 Para Bn’s case 175 men who had failed the 
parachute medical or did not wish to volunteer were posted to 8 Warwick (143 Bde, 48 Div) 
in Lincolnshire where they were formed into a special additional ‘E’ Company at Chapel St. 
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Leonards.427 All the men who turned down the opportunity to join the AAC were still 
valuable trained infantrymen and would be needed for ongoing operations. Indeed, after 
just two months E Company 8 Warwick had sent ‘large drafts’ to serve overseas, while the 
13 Warwick parachute converts would not see action for another sixteen months.428  
  Like the other units in 3 Para Bde, 8 Para Bn exploited the Young Soldier units as a source 
of potential volunteers. Many of these soldiers would have been too young for parachute 
training, needing to be nineteen years old, but this was revised to eighteen and a half in July 
1943 as 6th Airborne began to fill its ranks.136 ORs in two groups from 70 Warwick429 were 
sent directly to Hardwick to do the initial parachute course on 7 and 14 June 1943 without 
spending time with 8 Para Bn first; with another sixty-six from 70 Northamptons on 30 June 
– a total of 202 potential paratroopers in June 1943 alone.430 In another example, 9 Para 
accepted ninety-five young soldiers from 70 Norfolks, 70 Hamps, 70 Mx on 3 July 1943. 431 
Much of the leadership spine of the battalion appeared to have been in place by early 1943, 
as fifteen officers and fifty Warrant Officers (WOs) and NCOs of 8 Para Bn attended the 
advanced parachute cadre at Netheravon, 29 January 1943.432  Given that the battalion had 
only 209 ORs seven months later, many of these NCOs must have come from 13 Warwick 
(Table 3 Column Y). This situation was shaken up by the appointment as CO of Alistair 
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Pearson to replace Hildersley, who had been sacked by Gale on 2 December 1943. On arrival 
Pearson overhauled the leadership cadre of the battalion. He apparently questioned each 
officer about his men, and those unfamiliar with their soldiers were promptly returned to 
unit (‘RTU-ed’).433 With a battalion composed of volunteers who arrived as strangers 
Pearson clearly believed that the only effective leaders were those that knew and therefore 
understood their men. By D-Day the number of pre-war regular officers in 8 Para Bn just 
before Overlord was low, only two.434 However, the Territorial Army was well represented 
with five officers including the CO, who had joined 6 Highland Light Infantry (HLI) before the 
war and had fought with the second BEF in 1940.435 These TA officers formed the leadership 
core of the battalion, with three acting majors commanding the rifle companies – 
Hewetson, Payne and Terrell. To have been made company commanders under such an 
exacting CO as Pearson reflects well on their skill and leadership ability. 
  There is evidence of men with operational experience in the battalion with the 
presentation of decorations for the recent campaign in N. Africa. The award on 7 December 
1943 of the Africa Star to Pearson and two other officers (one being Major Terrell), and then 
to thirty-two ORs on the 8 December points to these men being either posted from 1 Para 
Bde as Tunisia veterans or men who had fought with other units in North Africa before 
volunteering for the Parachute Regiment.436 By 26 February 1944, 8 Para Bn was over 
establishment strength but short of the additional twenty per cent of personnel required to 
achieve the replacements level required for Overlord. 
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     The formation of the division proceeded through the summer and autumn of 1943. By 6 
August 1943 the selection and parachute training of all the men who had volunteered from 
the converted battalions, the five British parachute battalions still required thirty-five per 
cent of its officer establishment and sixty-five per cent of their ORs (Table 3 Column Z ).437 
Volunteers from across the army would complete the units’ war establishments. While the 
two existing battalions of 6 AL Bde were at full strength, the brigade was not completed 
until 12 Devon was converted to the airlanding role on 30 July 1943, the WE being 
completed with men posted in from 14 ITC and other battalions through the autumn.438 
The supporting elements of the division were assembled quickly by their parent arm – RE, 
RAC, Signals or RA. The most matter of fact formation was carried out by the Royal 
Engineers. On 1 May 1943 three field companies (249, 286 and 591) together with a 
Headquarters had been assembled at Framlingham under the command of Major Lowman. 
On 21 May the companies assumed their airborne identities and had moved to Bulford by 6 
June.439 6 Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (6 AARR) was the culmination of an 
idea to provide light tank support for Special Service troops, originating with the creation of 
C Special Service Squadron on 31 July 1941. By July 1942 it had been attached to 1 Airborne 
Div as the Airborne Light Tank Squadron, and was passed to 6 Airborne when the former 
division was sent out to the Mediterranean.440 The men for the original squadron had been 
drafted from tank crews from 1 Armd Div regiments, formerly the regular ‘Mobile 
Division’.441 The squadron strength growing from a total strength of 138 to 306 officers and 
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ORs when the unit became a regiment, volunteers being drawn from the RAC Depot and 
other armoured units.442 
The core of the manpower for 6 Airborne Signals was some five officers and 100 ORs left 
behind by 1 Airborne Div Signals when it departed for the Mediterranean late in April 
1943.443 6 Airborne Signals came into being on 10 May at Bulford, and throughout the late 
summer and autumn ‘all signal units throughout the country were combed to find the type 
of man who makes the good parachutist.’444 Smallman-Tew’s command lagged behind in 
regard to qualified parachutists; on 31 December 1943 only six of officers and 245 of 467 
ORs had gained their wings.445 The reason behind the conversion of 53 Worcs Yeo. has been 
discussed above, but once transformed Gale makes use of the most of the gunners’ former 
skill base, with three subalterns posted to 3 and 4 Anti-tank (A.Tk) Btys in exchange for field 
gunner lieutenants.446 As regards to the gunners unwilling to convert to the airlanding role 
eight-five men are posted to 94 A.Tk Regt RA on 29 November; while ’88 specialists’ are 
posted in on 9 November 1943.  With considerable manpower available to draw volunteers 
from, the RA, RAC, RE and Royal Signals were well able to furnish the tradesmen needed for 
6 Airborne Div.447 
  Richard Gale’s straightforward style of command would dominate the formation of 6 
Airborne and its planning and execution of operations in Normandy. His simple style 
disguised a deep understanding of the nature of airborne warfare and that of British 
                                                          
442
 1 Armd Div was a regular formation, the regiments being the Queen’s Bays, 9th Queen’s Royal Lancers, 10th 
Royal Hussars, 1st and 2nd RTR. Harclerode, p. 21. 
443
 (AA) Gale Folder 4H6-2.21.17, ‘6 Airborne Divisional Signal Regiment – History’, p. 1. 
444
 Ibid. TNA WO 166/10506 6 Airborne Signals 1943 WD, 10 May 1943. 
445
 TNA WO 166/10506 6 Airborne Signals 1943 WD, 31 December 1943. 
446
 TNA WO 166/11333 53 Regt RA 1943 WD, December. 
447
 TNA WO 73/160 General Strength Return of the British Army 31 March 1944. Troops based in the UK: RA – 
22,755 officers and 379,575 ORs (all types); RAC – 4,663 officers and 69,798 ORs; RE – 9.347 officers and 
41,740 ORs; Signals – 3,325 officers and 65,009 ORs. 
134 
 
airborne forces thanks to his involvement at their inception as OC 1 Para Bde and then as 
Director of Air at the WO. The brutal replacement of unit commanders upon conversion 
points to his clear-cut approach and requirement for leaders who maintained the standards 
of regular service and enthusiasm for the airborne challenge.  
    Airborne numbers were few in comparison to the rest of the army. The War Office ‘ten 
man rule’ did not allow an unreasonable number of volunteers to be drawn from any one 
unit, and the samples analysed showing that excessive numbers of regular officers with 
peacetime experience were not absorbed in comparison to conventional role brigades. Men 
unwilling to join airborne forces were posted to conventional role battalions and so trained 
infantry were not lost to the army.  
III. Toughening - Role-specific Training – Pre-role selection/Hardwick Hall, glider, and 
parachute 
 
  After 1942 a wartime recruit would have received six weeks basic infantry training at a 
Primary Training Centre (PTC) as a member of the General Service Corps after July 1942, 
where he would also have been assessed by a ‘personnel selection board’ to determine 
which arm of service would best suit the candidate’s character and skills.448 A regular 
soldier, who had joined the army before the war, or an early war recruit, would have 
completed his basic training at his regimental depot.449 Therefore all the volunteers for 
airborne forces would have at the very least understood how to drill, understood army 
structure and have basic weapon handling skills. Harrison-Place has explored the lack of 
challenge and realism in the training of conventional role infantry, where a ‘reality gap’ 
existed, ‘troops enjoying the sound of birdsong in the trees might well be asked to believe 
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that they were under heavy artillery attack. Enemy action was often a matter of umpire 
fiction-making.’450 The training a volunteer received from the moment he joined airborne 
forces was quite different. 
   On passing the initial medical criteria to volunteer for parachute training, the new recruit 
would be sent to Hardwick Hall, the Airborne Forces Depot, in Derbyshire, for pre-parachute 
selection. ‘The methods used at Hardwick Hall were harsh by any infantry standards.’451 The 
two to three week training focussed on hardening, and included elements such as a seven 
mile march in full equipment, carrying a man in full equipment one hundred yards in a 
minute, three rounds of boxing with a man of the same height. Bill Kershaw, later of 4 Para 
Bn, stated it was ‘like a concentration camp – everything was done at the double.’452 Guy 
Radmore, who would command 5 Para Bde Signals recalled ‘After two days you were sore 
everywhere, after two weeks you could knock anything over.’453 This ensured that only the 
most determined men would progress onto parachute training at Ringway. The troops who 
belonged to the glider units were not sent to Hardwick Hall, unless they opted to complete 
parachute training, but their training was equally intensive.454 Two of the glider battalions, 2 
Oxf Bucks and 1 RUR, had previously belonged to 31 Ind Inf Bde before conversion to 1 AL 
Bde in October 1941. This early conversion ensured that it was an ‘unmilked’455 brigade and 
the battalions contained many ‘five to six year regulars’ and so was already at a high pitch of 
ability.456 ‘To visit the 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, the old 
52nd Foot, as late as 1943 in Bulford was to find oneself transplanted back in the piping 
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days of peace. They were a well-disciplined, experienced formation with a wealth of 
professional skill amongst officers, NCOs and men.’ 457 When 12 Devons joined 6 AL Bde in 
July 1943, it was swiftly orientated to its new role. The whole unit had been glider trained at 
Netheravon and Brize Norton within two months, and had been involved in the divisional 
exercise Frigate.458 To qualify as a parachutist, eight drops were required, two from balloon 
and six from aircraft, the volunteers being processed in two week courses.459 To simply gain 
membership of airborne forces the initial training both on the ground and in the air was 
extremely tough.  
     This demanding physical training continued once the soldier had been posted to his unit 
within 6 Airborne Div. As the division prepared for D-Day, it took part in numerous large-
scale exercises (see below) to ready the all the formations for their tasks. The possibility of 
scattering and the division’s lack of motor transport would mean that troops would have to 
rapidly cover considerable distances on foot. Terence Otway, the CO of 9 Para Bn recorded 
how these marches scaled up before June 1944: 
It did not take long to evolve standards of physical fitness and before the invasion of 
North-West Europe airborne troops were regularly carrying out marching tests which 
stood them in good stead later – five miles in one hour, ten miles in two hours, 15 
miles in three hours, 20 miles in four hours, some in battle order and some in games 
kit but wearing marching boots, and finally 50 miles in 24 hours in full fighting order, 
carrying all personal and light automatic weapons and ammunition.460 
James Hill, ‘an outstanding and harsh trainer’,461 the commander of 3 Para Bde aimed to 
‘obtain 250% fitness to build up the capacity to see the Germans off.’462 He pushed his men 
hard, his watch words in training being ‘speed, control, simplicity and fire effect’, spending 
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weeks at a time exercising his men at night, encamped on Cranbourne Chase on Salisbury 
Plain.463 This gruelling training based mainly on stretching marching tasks is significant, as 
recent research has shown that ‘the use of forced marches to test overall toughness and 
willpower is the most reliable indicator of combat performance hitherto invented, as the 
selection procedures for Special Forces indicates.’464 Indeed, SAS selection during the 1970s 
included ‘sickeners’, fifteen or twenty mile marches at the end of which the waiting trucks 
at the RV would drive off.465 If this is the case, 6 Airborne was continuously testing its men 
under stressful conditions as close to battle as possible.  
  David French’s article on morale in the British army in Normandy explored possible causes 
of individual soldiers suffering from battle ‘exhaustion,’ the 1944 term for the Great War’s 
‘shell-shock.’ He pointed out that the veteran 51 Div and new 6 Airborne were fighting in 
the same area of the bridgehead but the former suffered more cases than Gale’s 
formations. While malaria taking a toll of the Highlanders’ ranks and a general war-
weariness might be explanations, 6 Airborne’s all-consuming emphasis on physical fitness 
may have helped stave off a proportion of psychological casualty cases.466 
   The smallest building block of soldiers’ social grouping, and in turn their morale, has been 
seen to be ‘the primary group.’ A term introduced in 1909 to describe ‘the smallest, most 
motivated groups in an organization.’467 What this meant in more simple terms was that the 
individual would fight for his closest colleagues in his section or platoon, ‘for the 
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companionship of staunch mates.’468  In 1948 Janowitz and Shils highlighted the strength 
that the primary group could give to the individual soldier, and demonstrated how units 
with a ‘high degree of primary group integrity’ suffered less desertions and surrenders.469 
Simon King has discussed the importance of primary groups in boosting the cohesion of a 
unit, but has made the point that primary group strength could boost solidarity, but not 
necessarily combat motivation.470Jonathan Fennell has put forward the case that other 
factors (such as having to fight with weapons the operator considered poor) have militated 
against the central position that the primary group has held as the fulcrum of sub unit 
morale, but also stated that Montgomery’s boost to primary group leadership through 
training was a major battle winning factor at El Alamein.471 One widely published former 
paratrooper has indeed identified this factor, although important for all troops, as 
particularly key in the performance of airborne forces: 
The ability to identify closely with comrades in battle is the essence of small unit 
combat durability, which means that, if properly led, such men can produce those 
defining impacts in conflict that enable battles to be won.472 
 
  This study proposes that a key element in the cohesion of 6 Airborne Div was this shared 
experience of ‘hardening’ at Hardwick Hall, the challenge of glider and parachute training 
and then the continued physical demands imposed by airborne exercises and training once 
officers and men had been posted to their units.  
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Indeed, Dupuy’s definition of cohesion echoes many of the points above: 
Cohesion – The quality or characteristic of a unit whereby its members work well 
together and demonstrate loyalty to each other and to their unit in all 
circumstances. Cohesion is achieved by training together, living together and strong 
leadership. 473 
 
  An extended primary group was created amongst 6 Airborne Div by the shared trials of 
training. A significant element within airborne training that further boosted airborne 
cohesion in action was the commonality of this tough training, both officers and ORs 
endured it, and the former were seen to do so by the latter. This wider identity allowed the 
division’s units to perform with greater synergy together in battle, and more importantly 
went some way to counter-acting the disruption caused by scattering on the night of 5/6 
June 1944. The building of the troops’ personal fighting power and physical fitness also had 
a fortifying effect on their morale, as Hew Strachan has explained ‘the value of training is 
therefore in large part psychological: it is an enabling process, a form of empowerment, 
which creates self-confidence.’474 This extraordinary development of personal prowess was 
accomplished within the British Airborne Establishment as routine training. 
   Still within the scope of role-specific training, Gale continued to develop the division’s 
officer cadre. Despite the rush to complete the division during the summer of 1943, Gale 
was already beginning the preparation for likely operations thereafter. With Exercise 
Pegasus (8-17 June) he organised a first exercise for his brigadiers to analyse the problems 
inherent with a landing in support of an amphibious assault on the coast of north-western 
Europe.  Each wrote an appreciation of methods to firstly capture an enemy battery, then 
operations to deny the enemy ground from where he could overlook a beachhead area, and 
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finally ways of delaying the movement of enemy reserves to the battle front. ‘The 
Appreciation’ carefully reviewed factors such as own troops; the nature of the terrain; the 
operations of surrounding friendly forces; the likely reactions of the enemy before making 
deductions which could form the basis of plans.475 The Pegasus plans were discussed, and 
then Gale took the group to view the Avon estuary at Christchurch, terrain very similar to 
that of the Orne.476 Gale’s activity was perceptive, as he appreciated that his division might 
well be committed as individual brigades in an invasion. It also established a useful planning 
frame work that was repeated for each brigadier’s actual tasks as part of Tonga/Mallard.477 
Further examples of Gale’s officer development included a post-exercise meeting following 
exercise Bizz, and culminated in the final divisional co-ordinating conference of all 
commanding officers on 25 May.478 Gale’s focus on developing his subordinates was 
obviously not unique, but it is important to recognise the space he made for it during the 
critical build-up period before Overlord; a time in which his units were familiarising 
themselves with aircraft that had not been used before and pursuing task-specific training. 
IV. Organisational Culture - the Army Air Corps - developing distinctiveness 
 
In addition to the tough role-specific training which his new division was subjected to, five 
additional moulding influences supported Gale in working up his formations. These were the 
influence of the Guards as introduced to the Airborne Establishment by ‘Boy’ Browning; the 
nature of the British regimental system which allowed the Parachute Regiment to form as 
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readily as it did; the AAC’s more corporate nature by 1943-44; the advantage imparted by 
‘RTU-ing’, and finally the leadership focus that was apparent across the Division. 
  A characteristic of airborne forces during the Second World War were high standards of 
discipline and turn-out. These principles were sharply focussed on with the appointment of 
Frederick ‘Boy’ Browning as the GOC of 1 Airborne Div, a regular Grenadier Guardsman. He 
had won the DSO during the First World War and had become the adjutant of Sandhurst in 
1924. ‘He was the personification of what an adjutant should be: a splendid figure on 
parade, with an immaculate turn-out in dress, and a fierce and hawk-like eye for any 
shortcomings in dress or drill.’479 The original staff group for 1 Airborne created in late 1941 
was known as the ‘Dungeon Party.’ This headquarters started life two floors below ground 
level at the Air Ministry and had a strong Guards flavour, with Colonels Johnny Gorschen 
(Logistics) and Gordon Walch (GSO1 Operations), and later Major Richard des Voeux (GSO2 
Operations) all being Grenadiers like Browning.480 These men were constant throughout 
1941-44, while Browning also employed many Guards NCOs, to instil their parent regiments’ 
high standards throughout the airborne establishment.481 Browning, for whom ‘perfection 
in all things was a fetish’482 firmly codified the behavioural atmosphere for British Airborne 
Forces with a June 1943 pamphlet.483 He clearly listed nine factors which would facilitate 
victory over ‘the best drilled, disciplined and trained armies in the world, the German and 
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Japanese.’484 First and foremost is drill, which ‘does not cramp initiative,’ but enabled 
effective behaviour in action, drill ‘allows the soldier to give all his thoughts to dealing with 
the actual situation he is faced with, without having to worry his head about routine.’ Above 
all, Browning wanted high standards in all things, which he set out with zeal in his 1943 
pamphlet: 
First, a standard for which to aim. There is only one standard which any man, calling 
himself a man, can aim for, and that is the highest. For years, inefficiency and low 
standards have been tolerated in this country. They can be tolerated no longer if we 
are to be victorious. Every man will be judged by results.485 
 
   By placing Browning’s Guards standards at the heart of Airborne Forces the issues with the 
louche behaviour of any ‘Caffy gangsters’ which had niggled the early days of the special 
service commandos were prevented.486 High standards of turn-out as a divisional philosophy 
had been used elsewhere to ultimately boost morale if not soldiers’ fighting power. When 
the WO called for handing in of kilts, the GCO of 51 (Highland) Div, Douglas Wimberley, had 
refused and taken his complaint directly to the King. ‘Tartan Tam’ believed that ‘turn-out 
was very important in the maintenance of unit discipline and morale.’487 
  A figure symbolic of this Guards input running through the Airborne Establishment was 
RSM J.C. Lord. Who in many ways personified the Guards input which Browning 
engendered. Lord had joined the Grenadier Guards in 1933, attained the rank of Lance-
Sergeant in 1937, but then left to pursue a career with the Brighton Police Force. A recalled 
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reservist on the outbreak of war, after a period as a CSM at the Royal Military College Lord 
opted to join Airborne Forces when a vacancy for an RSM (3 Para Bn) was posted. His first 
encounter with his new unit had considerable impact: 
There was a lot of banter and chattering going on but suddenly from the back of the 
hall a voice ordered “Quiet” and then the new RSM of the Third Battalion J.C. Lord 
walked onto the platform. Very tall and straight with a dark moustache and bristling 
eyebrows one could suddenly hear a pin drop. He soon handed over to the 
Commanding Officer but everyone to a man realised how things were going to 
be...488 
 
  The next important factor which worked greatly to Gale’s advantage in the shaping of the 
division is linked closely to the above example of Guards standards. This was the 
transferable nature of roles within the regimental system of the British Army, with its 
consequent familiarity and understanding. J.C. Lord looked and acted the part of a capable 
RSM, he had the choice of waiting for RSM vacancy with a Guards battalion or remaining at 
the Royal Staff College but as described above opted for airborne forces. But he could have 
equally become the RSM of a conventional role infantry battalion or commando unit. 
Charles Kirke has discussed the consistent role shapes within the army in his book Red Coat, 
Green Machine.489 He closely analyses and discusses the social structures which exist within 
the army, and have always existed,490 going to the lengths at one point of explaining which 
cross rank friendships would be acceptable and which would not.491 In the newly converted 
parachute battalions filing with volunteers everyone would have known where they stood in 
terms of military culture, regardless of the very recent creation of the Parachute Regiment, 
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because all the rank roles remained the same. When RSM J.C. Lord began to shout, an 
obvious senior NCO, the men were conditioned by the army to accept his authority. 
   The Army Air Corps (AAC) had been created in 1942 and as the umbrella organisation for 
all airborne forces, set them apart from the conventional role elements within the British 
Army. The AAC provided distinction on a personal level for an airborne soldier in different 
ways.  First, the pay was better, airborne ORs being paid a significantly better day rate for 
enlisted soldiers over that of others. The pay of soldiers during the war was low when 
compared to munitions workers, being seventeen shillings and sixpence per week (two 
shillings and sixpence a day) in 1942, and five or six pounds for the latter.492 Pay was a wider 
morale issue. Professor John Hilton, who compiled statistics for War Office morale reports, 
collated the complaints contained in soldiers’ letters received by the News of the World and 
the BBC.  Between December 1942 and April 1943, thirty-nine per cent of complaints were 
about pay.493 The creation of 1 Para Bde had brought into being ‘parachute pay’ of four 
shillings a day for officers and two shillings for other ranks (increasing daily pay from two 
shillings and sixpence to four shillings and six pence). Glider troops were paid an extra one 
shilling a day,494 but could at any time volunteer to join the Parachute Regiment as they 
were still technically county infantrymen.495 The precedent of paying more to Special Forces 
soldiers had been established with the terms of special service offered to volunteers for 
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commando service in 1940. 496 WO concerns that 11 SAS battalion’s morale would be 
dented by the loss of commando benefits had prompted the extra pay for airborne troops. 
The excitement surrounding selection for a new role, extra pay and distinctive head dress is 
seen in combination motivating one airborne gunner: 
 I was called up in November 1941 and went to Norwich and got 6 weeks infantry 
training after that I was sent to Connaught Barracks Dover to a anti tank Bty (204 
Oban A/Tk Bty). In 1942 we were in Scotland and then ordered to move down to 
Bulford near Salisbury where we found we were to join the 1st Airborne Div 4th Para 
Bde which was being formed at that time. We were told that anyone who did not 
want to be in this could opt out but I did not know of anyone who did after all we 
were going to get another 2/- a day and a red beret. After a while we got new 
equipment new 6 Pounder anti tank guns and jeeps. We did a lot of training which 
entailed loading Horsa gliders and flying which was all new and exciting497. 
 
 
6 Airborne’s soldiers belonged to a distinctive corps, with specialised and striking uniform 
features, extra pay and possessed growing self-confidence.  
 Airborne Forces always retained the prerogative to ‘Return to Unit’ any man who was 
perceived as not suitable for their new role as the selection and training processes went on. 
This mechanism was of considerable advantage, and could be used to remove any individual 
who proved to be less than ‘mad keen’ or was unable to meet the exacting physical 
requirements.498 Only one in three of all volunteers 1941-45 would be finally accepted into 
the Parachute Regiment. 499Any reject would in turn be replaced by another volunteer, 
while the unfortunate soldier would be returned to a conventional role unit. This gave 
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Airborne Forces a considerable advantage over conventional role formations, which while 
they could post unwanted men away, would have them almost immediately replaced with 
good quality substitutes.   
    As D-Day approached, 6 Airborne benefitted from different styles of leadership. At the 
operational planning level, as has been seen Gale and the brigade commanders were 
planning to make the best use of their resources through simple plans built around the 
advantages of airborne warfare.  The GSO 1, ‘Bobby’ Bray and the three Brigade Majors, 
were responsible for overseeing the division’s training.500 These men worked to bring the 
division up to the pitch required to achieve the D-Day goals. ‘Working out the training, 
working out the techniques, tactics, physical fitness, shooting, all the ways you build up a 
fighting formation into a high degree of efficiency.’ As the vast majority of junior officers 
and NCOs had no combat experience, the constants demands of realistic training created 
situations for ORs to gain confidence in their leaders, who in turn would gain self-assurance. 
Gale spent a lot of time training the NCOs,501 and it will be remembered from chapter three 
that the airborne division WE allowed for a sergeant per section, in addition to a corporal. 
This additional leadership at the lowest level, when combined with cohesion-building 
training, would have alleviated the contentious ‘Marshall effect’ once in combat.502  
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   Britain’s new Airborne Forces’ distinct identity was of considerable use as a domestic 
propaganda tool, and after 6 June 1944 an evocative representative of the success of D-Day. 
The following case study shows 13 Para Bn’s presentation in the Manchester Guardian 
(MG), combining with an increased emphasis on the army in the months before 
OVERLORD.503  The Manchester Guardian printed an evocative picture of an Operation Biting 
rehearsal which featured both paratroopers and landing craft, not knowing that the North-
West would have its very own parachute battalion in time for D-Day. 504 Even on the eve of 
D-Day for one civilian the idea of airborne forces was highly novel: 
Of greater national importance is that we are presently under the shadow of the so-
called ‘Second Front’ … and how the invasion will be preceded both by a massive air-
bombardment and an attack by air-borne gliders. I find this incredible, even though 
gliders have been employed by the Germans. Much of it is rumour but at least it has 
given the office old soldiers a great deal to talk about.505 
 
A scrutiny of the paper’s editions between 1 January 1944 and 1 July also reveals the 
presentation of the army in the print press and how its profile was boosted in the build up 
to the Second Front. The Battalion began 1944 with a high profile visit to Manchester. On 
the front pages the MG year began with both the promotion of Montgomery as the 
Commander of 21 AG and Eisenhower’s arrival at SHAEF, both appointments heralding the 
Second Front to come.506 On 27 January a photograph was featured of US Airborne troops 
on exercise in Britain,507 clearly building up to Battalion’s visit to Manchester the following 
weekend. For 13 Para Bn this was Exercise Demon, and moved by train from Amesbury to 
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Manchester on Friday 28 January.508 Their War Diary contains photographs (with the MG 
stamp on the reverse) of their parade the following day watched by Lord Derby, the Lord 
Mayor of Manchester, the Borders District Commander and a large crowd. During the 
morning of Sunday 30 January they gave weapon demonstrations to the Home Guard, a 
company visiting their centres at Preston, Manchester, Liverpool and Warrington 
respectively509. 
     The visit coincided with newspaper’s steady build-up towards the National Savings Week 
in May, which began with an advert and poem which lionized soldiers on 2 February 1944.510 
This campaign was entitled ‘Salute to the Soldier’, the 1943 push being ‘Wings for Victory’ 
and focused on the RAF.511 The campaign built up through February and March with an 
advert at least once a week, latterly including a message from General Montgomery. The 
frequency of adverts shifted to one every two days at the beginning of April, and the event 
opened with a march past of troops in Piccadilly, Manchester, as ‘Salute the Soldier’ Week 
opened with a target of £12,000,000 for the city.512 The campaign was extended up to 6 
June including on the 5 and 8 May an advert with a drawing of paratroopers leaping from an 
aircraft. The campaign was a success as Manchester exceeded its target of £12,000,000 by 
£2,500, 000.513 ‘Salute the Soldier Week’ for Manchester had been a six month campaign, 13 
Para Bn’s parade on 29 January having been used to spectacularly begin the effort. The 
campaign also achieved the steady elevation of the Army through poetic adverts and 
articles, while an effort was made to build confidence in the forthcoming landings: 
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General Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief of the British Invasion Forces, told 
troops at a south-east town yesterday: “I want you men to know that I never put an 
army into battle until I am quite certain it is going to be a good show. Never. We 
won’t have any question of any failure. If there is any question we won’t start. It is a 
great thing for you to know this.514 
    From 6 June onwards the newspaper is dominated by events in Normandy, and slowly the 
role of the 13 Para Bn was revealed. The multitude of articles on 7 June included ‘AIRBORNE 
UNITS. The last days of Preparation’515 showing a picture of paratroopers pulling on their 
parachutes. Three other articles regarding airborne forces were included by 9 June with 6 
Airborne Division being named on 12 June. On 9 June war correspondent Leonard Mosley 
wrote from France and revealed he had spent time with paratroopers who were 
Northumbrians, Yorkshiremen and Lancastrians516; 13 Para Bn was finally named on 14 
June– ‘LANCASHIRE PARATROOPERS IN ACTION Splendid Job Well Done’.517  
   5 Para Bde had been accompanied into action by four war correspondents: 
The Brigade was lucky to have with it Guy Byam of the BBC, Leonard Mosley of Allied 
Newspapers who came by parachute and Chester Wilmot of the BBC and David 
Woodward of the Manchester Guardian who travelled by glider. These four 
correspondents were most generous in the recognition they gave to the work of the 
Brigade through their dispatches. The news of personal interest they were able to 
bring to the families of all ranks was much appreciated.518 
 
Since the January parade airborne forces had been steadily woven into the propaganda 
campaign building the army’s profile as Overlord approached, the local link with 13 Para Bn 
being fully exploited.  
   On a national and indeed global level British airborne forces, led by 6 Airborne in 
Normandy, were used as a propaganda tool. Chester Wilmot broadcast for the BBC while he 
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accompanied 6 Airborne into France. On 13 June 1944 he reported on the assault on the 
Merville battery. Obviously no unit titles or locations were mentioned by name, but his 
account of one of Otway’s coup de main gliders is quite accurate:  
As it landed the Germans turned their machine guns on to it ...Some men were 
wounded, the glider caught on fire ...but the rest, rallied by a warrant officer, went 
straight into action to deal with the German reinforcements. For over an hour they 
held them off, while the main party mopped up the Germans in the battery its self. 
At 4.45am, with only a quarter of an hour to spare, the position was ours ... 150 men 
had done the job of a battalion. The colonel fired a success signal and dispatched a 
carrier pigeon off to England with the news. The courage that took that battery is the 
courage that held this flank.519 
 
    This use of 6 Airborne as a propaganda tool at the time of the campaign began the 
interpretation of its exploits which the Historiographical survey discussed in chapter one. 
When combined with articles concerning the Second Front, the presentation of airborne 
forces restored the Army’s image after the bad news of 1940-42 and boosted public 
confidence going forward. The consolidation of home morale in is important in any conflict 
and the examples of the MG and the BBC show the added value gifted by 6 Airborne to the 
wartime government to this end. 
In conclusion, it be seen that Gale benefitted greatly from the creation of a strong airborne 
identity. 6th Airborne Division’s own character would be part and parcel of this as they 
prepared for D-Day. While the selection of good manpower for the AAC was important, the 
role-specific training and culture of the wider establishment exploited the enthusiasm of the 
men who wished to find action. Glider and parachute training, often carried out en bloc as 
complete units, provided a shared rite of passage that assisted in the forging of unit 
cohesion. This bond also crossed rank boundaries and supported the credibility of new 
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officers before their men. In its final state the Airborne identity was used to boost civilian 





Chapter Four - Leadership: 6th Airborne Division - How the Division worked 
 
Leadership, as with any organisation, was critical to 6 Airborne Div, it was how it 
worked. How was leadership interwoven through the most crucial command appointments? 
This will be examined through the personal command characteristics of Gale and how his 
formation and unit leaders were selected. First, the career and leadership qualities of the 
General Officer Commanding, Major-General Richard Nelson Gale, will be examined. The 
influence of his experience of senior officers during the First World War and inter-war 
period will be shown. Second, the underlying criteria by which Airborne Forces and Gale 
selected brigade and battalion commanders will be established. The third chapter section 
will illustrate the impact and style of Gale’s leadership culture through a case study based 
on the experience of Lieutenant Nick Archdale, the twenty-year-old mortar platoon 
commander of 7 Para Bn. The fourth and final section will establish a theory of Gale’s 
leadership, supported by a diagram which will exemplify its accelerating impact on good 
military practice (the conceptual, moral and physical components). 
I. Gale 
This first chapter section addresses the attitudes of the central figure within the study, 
whose direction forms one of the themes of this thesis - leadership. He exhibited three 
characteristics which remained present throughout the process of the creation of the 
division (the course of which involved leader selection process, planning, training), and his 
command in the field. These were first his power as a communicator at all levels; second his 
value-added authority gained as a leading authority of airborne forces due to his familiarity 
with the background of UK airborne forces; and thirdly his focus on simplicity in planning.  
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 To understand Gale’s command style it is important to begin with a brief overview of his 
career prior to his appointment as commander of the new 1 Para Bde in the autumn of 
1941. Gale received a regular commission and joined the Worcestershire Regiment (Worcs 
R) on 22 December 1915, and then fought on the Western Front until the armistice of 
November 1918. Like many of the 1940-45 airborne volunteers, Gale became bored with his 
role as a junior officer with the regimental holding battalion and volunteered for something 
new. A machine gun course led to his transfer to the Machine Gun Corps (MGC), a recently 
created force charged with exploiting the use of machine guns in the challenging conditions 
of trench warfare on the Western Front.520  Gale was awarded the Military Cross (MC) for 
distinguishing himself in action during the German Spring 1918 offensive battles: 
 For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in covering the retirement of the 
infantry with his section of machine guns, holding up the attack and causing the 
enemy heavy casualties. Later, when a shell landed in the centre of the gun limbers, 
he went out under heavy fire and unhitched the killed and wounded horses, so 
enabling the transport to move to cover.521 
 
From his Great War experience Gale drew some conclusions regarding the need for well-
trained infantry in the attack: 
If the Allies can be criticised for their strategy, what of the generals’ tactical 
concepts? The only answer that seemed to exist to barbed wire, continuous deep 
trenches and unlocated machine guns was an overwhelming weight of artillery fire. 
The gun became the dominant weapon and the gun decided tactics. Ludendorff 
exploded this thesis in 1918. Whilst not ignoring the role of artillery in the softening-
up process, he appreciated the vital part that well-trained infantry could play if 
properly taught and led.522 
 
Writing in 1968, Gale obviously had the benefit of great hindsight when looking back with 
the experience of both world wars, and his subsequent observation of the development of 
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the post-war individual infantryman’s personal fire power. Yet his reference to the initial 
success of Ludendorff’s storm trooper tactics in 1918 must have formed his view regarding 
the power of vigorous attacks launched by highly motivated and well-armed infantry. As an 
officer of the MGC fighting in the defensive battles of spring 1918 he had been well-placed 
to gauge their value.  
     Gale’s time in India in the inter-war period clearly had an impact on his views on training 
and also the use of infantry to achieve greater tactical offensive mobility on the battle field. 
At the end of the Great War he volunteered to go with 12 MGC and sailed in September 
1919.523 In the spring of 1920 he was moved up to the frontier ‘where war with Afghanistan 
was in progress.’524  Gale suffered as the Army contracted due to financial constraints. First 
In 1921 the MGC was disbanded, and he was posted to 3 Worc R; then with the 
disbandment of this regiment’s third and fourth battalions after a year he had to move on 
again. Gale’s close involvement with delivering training began at this point when he joined 
the Machine Gun School in India at Ahmednagar in the Deccan.525  After six years he was 
posted to 1 Worcs R where he ‘attended two good tactical studies which were carried out 
under the imaginative direction of Brigadier John Kennedy, later Major-General Sir John 
Kennedy.’526 Gale attended the Staff College 1928-1929, where he was ‘appalled to find that 
artillery plans still ruled the field and that the unlocated machine gun was still the queen of 
the battle.’ His views on the power of the infantry as ‘the key to mobility’ on the battlefield 
were further confirmed.527 After a few weeks with the DCLI at Bareilly he was posted as a 
staff officer to the Military Training Directorate at the Indian Army HQ at Simla. His 
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responsibilities included ‘all the army schools’ which he defended from more drives for 
economy and their consequent cut-backs. He also encountered ‘Tiny’ Ironside, then the 
commander of the Meerut District, who presented his ideas of vigorous infantry assaults 
with reserves ready to throw in to exploit breakthroughs and press forward attacks.528 From 
1934-36 he was Brigade Major for the Ferozapore Bde in the Punjab. In this role he would 
have been responsible for the organisation of brigade training for a formation spread over a 
large geographical area with the assistance of only one staff captain and another ‘young 
officer’ attached for part of the year.529In January 1936 Gale left India after fifteen years and 
viewed his time there as critical to his development as a commander: 
I have called this period the formative years and so they were. The grim experience 
of the Great War had left their mark and while in India I had learned to equate that 
experience to the military problems of the day. My two years at Staff College had 
given me an insight into the higher aspects of the art of war; I had also learned to 
respect the brains of others and to make use of their co-operative effort. 
 
During his time in India Gale had encountered more senior officers who would be influential 
army figures in the future – Ironside and Kennedy, and also briefly Gort who took over as 
India C-in-C just as Gale was leaving for the UK. He had run training schools and as Brigade 
Major of a field formation and been exposed to innovative thinking. 
  On his return to the UK Gale was posted to the 2 DCLI in 1936 in Archibald Wavell’s 2 Div, 
and would have been aware of Wavell’s visit to observe the Soviet Kiev airborne 
demonstration in September 1936.530 Wavell would later serve as both the General-Officer-
Commanding (GOC) Middle and East and Commander-in-Chief India. 
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  Gale then moved into a staff role at the War Office (WO) responsible for the production of 
WO training pamphlets 1937-1938.531 During this time he worked alongside Brooke, while 
the latter was Director of Military Training, who was challenged by Gale over the absence of 
an infantryman on the committee charged with the re-writing of artillery training. Gale 
convinced Brooke to include Ironside (then OC 1 Guards Bde) as ‘guns did not exist just for 
themselves.’ Based on the views of others regarding Brooke’s brusque and no-nonsense 
manner If Gale had not made a good impression on the future commander of Home Forces 
and CIGS with his arguments then he would not have been persuaded.532 
On the outbreak of the Second World War Gale remained in a staff position at the WO. In 
1938 he moved to the planning section of the Imperial General Staff and worked on the War 
Plan, where he remained when the war began in September 1939. Again, Gale encountered 
and made a positive impression on important figures, including the CIGS at the time, Sir 
Edmund Ironside and Churchill’s Chief of Staff as Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Sir 
Hastings ‘Pug’ Ismay  ‘ I had first met him when he was a Staff Captain in India, and 
incidentally Master of the Delhi Fox Hounds. In the early days of the war he used to attend 
occasional meetings of the Chiefs of Staff as one of the advisers of the CIGS ...’533 He was 
made the CO of 2/5 Leicesters in January 1941, a TA battalion which was then part of 46 Div, 
which had been evacuated from Dunkirk in 1940.534 Richard Gale was appointed the first 
Brigadier of 1 Para Bde in September 1941. Gale had been one of at least three candidates, 
including another county regiment soldier and a guardsman.535 He was apparently given the 
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choice of accepting or declining the role, but accepted; ‘as those who had suggested him 
had known he would’. His great interest in airborne warfare had not gone unnoticed while 
serving with the Directorate of Plans at the War Office.’536 Gale remained in command of 
the brigade until he reluctantly handed over command to E.W.C. ‘Ted’ Flavell to return to 
the WO.537 As the first commander of 1 Para Bde and an early standard-bearer for airborne 
forces, Gale had a considerable personal influence over the new airborne division in 
addition to the authority associated with his rank and his personal leadership skill. 
   In spring 1942 Gale was made Deputy Director, and later the Director, of Staff Duties for 
Air at the War Office; working closely with Hollinghurst, his opposite number at the Air 
Ministry.538 On 3 May 1943, in the same month the first airborne doctrinal pamphlet 
received its issue date, Gale was made GOC of the new 6 Airborne Div.539  Gale was 
intimately involved with the decisions and planning surrounding the creation of a second 
airborne division; and after having successfully led 1 Para Bde and solved inter-service issues 
regarding the development of airborne forces, he was an obvious choice.540 
Gale’s leadership style was first and fundamentally that of an assured and energising 
communicator. In one of the first copies of Divisional Routine Orders he introduced the 
Divisional motto: 
GO TO IT.  
This motto will be adopted by the 6th Airborne Division and as such should be 
remembered by all ranks in action against the enemy, in training, and during the day 
to day routine duties.541 
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This call for enthusiastic and vigorous action characterised his approach to every facet of 6 
Airborne’s activity and character.542 He made decisions and created plans quickly, and then 
communicated them exhaustively. He demanded high levels of initiative and self-reliance 
from all of his commanders, and engendered a strong sense of task focus and vigour. He 
used what John Keegan has described as a ’prescriptive’ approach by creating an idea of his 
background and ideals in the minds of his men which allowed him to build a bond with them 
through sharing the risks they took.543 Gale’s ideas regarding what made an effective senior 
commander had been influenced by his experience on the Western Front. Gale had 
‘disliked’ aloof ‘red tabs’; but had similarly been impressed by the way his two divisional 
commanders, Major-Generals Solly-Flood of 42 Div and Jeudwine of 55 Div had not been ‘far 
removed’ from junior officers like himself.544 His account of first encounter with Solly-Flood, 
just before the German 1918 March offensive, appears to have created a template for Gale: 
I did not think we looked all that smart, and said as much to another subaltern. We 
both thought we would get the usual strafing. Solly-Flood rode round our ranks and 
at the conclusion, mounted on his charger with his orderly, his pennant and his staff 
officer behind, he addressed us. ‘Never have I seen a better body of men,’ he said. 
He congratulated us on our steadiness on parade and our bearing. One could have 
heard a pin drop; here was no slanging and no gibe for being Territorials, which I 
later heard they were used to; here in place of criticism was simple praise. From that 
moment every man put his back into it.545 
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He ends this recollection, ‘nevertheless, his staff officer was taking notes and these reached 
the commanding officers later; if heads were to fall they were to be the right ones.’546 While 
Solly-Flood motivated the ORs and junior officers, the ‘right ones’ heads’ would roll - those 
of the officers’ responsible. 42 Div had been suffering from a morale problem and the lesson 
was not lost on him that a change of commander could provide the impetus to refresh a 
unit, demonstrated by the sacking of Hildesley from 8 Para Bn in December 1943.  
  Although he later played down the need for high standards of turn-out, ‘spit and polish had 
its uses, but I believe it could be and often was overdone’, Gale pursued high standards at 
all times. He personally maintained ‘a soldierly figure in riding breeches and polished field 
boots of the lace up kind.’547He placed great importance on ‘physical robustness, stamina’; 
with reference to a post-war visit to the French army his view on the relationship between 
athleticism and task focus was described: 
Here was a sight to gladden the heart; everywhere I saw keenness, physical fitness of 
a very high order and a determination coupled with objective and purposeful 
training.548 
 
Indeed, Gale applied his demand for physical fitness no more vigorously than with the new 6 
Airborne staff.549 Gale wielded a close control over the appointments within his division, and 
was only interested in ‘thrusting’ officers; as ready as he to drive their men hard and act on 
their own initiative, at all levels. Victor Dover was a regular Royal West Kent (RWK) soldier 
who served with 2 Para Bn in Sicily, Italy and Arnhem: 
He also insisted on approving those officers who were to command the companies 
within the battalions. He believed that the most important characteristic which an 
airborne soldier would expect and look for in his officers was ‘initiative’ – the ability 
to make decisions, the confidence to act upon them and a firm resistance to 
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anything that looked like ‘passing the buck.’ He would often ask an officer, “What 
would you do if your right flank came under heavy attack and your defence line was 
broken?” if the answer were not something similar to “Counter-attack with my 
reserve,” he would probably fail the interview and be returned to his unit. Richard 
Gale had no time for a commander, at whatever level, who could only think to ask 
his next senior formation what he should do when things got a little tough.550 
 
When he introduced himself to his first brigade he began immediately build the image his 
men held of him: 
My name is Richard Nelson Gale. I have been a soldier (note the use of the word 
‘soldier’ and not ‘officer’) for twenty-eight years and I am master of my 
profession.551 
 
  Alan Jefferson, a young platoon commander in 9 Para Bn, described the impression Gale 
made on him: 
A real ‘soldier’s general’, he was well able to converse with and be easily understood 
by all ranks. His bluff, slightly ‘blimpish’ appearance concealed a quick mind, a clear 
brain and an immediate grasp of a military problem or a man’s character. He inspired 
trust and confidence in a moment, and had no difficulty in establishing himself as a 
tough, though compassionate father-figure of the Division. He could be sharp, very 
earthy, aggressive and stubborn. His flashes of anger were frightening, but they did 
not occur very often, thanks to the tactful and accomplished handling which he 
enjoyed from his ADC, Captain Tommy Houghton.552 
 
This image was crowned by his early arrival into the Normandy battle, landing at 0320hrs as 
part of Operation Tonga.553 Gale could have landed far more safely as part of Operation 
Mallard later on D-Day, but chose to land in the early hours of 6 June to take charge of his 
formations and deal with any unexpected challenges. As Keegan stated ‘the first and 
greatest imperative of command is to be present in person.’554 Gale’s clear and simple plans 
were explained by Gale directly or more usually cascaded down by his officers. The close 
bond he formed with RAF officers indicated his collaborative manner and ability to find 
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mutual solutions.  His creation of a divisional daily news sheet, ‘Pegasus Goes to It’, while his 
men endured the monotony and strain of holding the Orne bridgehead, points to his high 
awareness of the need to further fortify the divisional identity and spirit.555  He needed to 
emphasise formation cohesion as the division was spread out along a disjointed line, 
interspersed with Special Service units and later Belgian/Dutch formations, as well as 
absorbing replacements direct from ITCs. 
Gale’s second leadership characteristic was his key authority status within the corps and his 
familiarity with its background and officer personnel. Gale’s leading light influence within 
Airborne Forces can be seen in his visit 1 Para Bn during April 1944. At the beginning of the 
year, the battalion had returned from operations in the Mediterranean and was based in 
Lincolnshire. On 3 April its CO, Lt.-Col. P. Cleasby-Thompson was replaced by Major K.T. 
Darling, who delivered a ‘straight from the shoulder’ talk on how he expected the battalion 
to approach discipline and training matters. A vigorous programme of company training was 
then pursued until Exercise Tony on 11 April. The entry for this day shows the timetable for 
the exercise, then a line that reads ‘the above timings were put back nearly an hour’, before 
three blacked out lines of text. Tony went well, but on 13 April ‘Coy Cmds speak to the men.’ 
On 15 April ‘Gen. Gale, ex Brig of this Bde, visits Bn HQ, and speaks to older members of the 
Bn.’ By 19 April Darling had left the battalion (Major Stark taking temporary command) and 
Lt.-Col. D.T. Dobie assumed command on 26 April.556 In a similar vein to Hildesley’s sacking, 
Darling was moved on to ensure a battalion being worked up for operations had no 
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challenges to its morale.557 Gale had made the visit rather than 1 Airborne Div’s own 
commander, Major-General R. E. ‘Roy’ Urquhart, as the latter suffered a three-week attack 
of malaria from mid-April.558 Gale was clearly still held in great esteem by 1 Para Bn, even 
though he had not been their brigade commander for two years. 
By 1943 Gale had gathered considerable authority within the British airborne establishment 
when he was appointed GOC of 6 Airborne, both as the key authority status discussed above 
and through familiarity. This was a consequence of being the first senior airborne officer, 
and thereby having the advantage of either knowing each officer, if not directly, then 
through his superior. He had appointed all the original 1 Para Bde battalion commanders 
(Down, Flavell and Lathbury) and by mid-1943 they were all brigadiers. While at 1 Para Bde 
he had also laid the tactical training focus of Airborne Forces for the remainder of the war 
with his first exercise, focussing on the exploitation of the element of surprise, 
communications and flexibility.559  He had also guided a large part of the logistical and 
technical development of Airborne Forces while he had been Director of Air at the WO, and 
would have been a highly visible figure to COs in both 1 Airborne Div and the Airborne 
Establishment.560 
This familiarity gave Gale a considerable head-start for the purposes of imposing his ideas, 
standards and patronage on the new division before he had even arrived. This factor 
extended to the appointment of replacement leaders when losses were incurred in 
Normandy. ‘Ted’ Flavell had been known to Gale since 1916 when the former had been his 
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company commander in the Machine Gun Corps.561Flavell had been Gale’s OC of 3 Para Bn 
in 1941, and later commanded 1 Para Bde in Tunisia. When Kindersley was badly wounded 
during the Bréville  episode, Flavell (who at that time commanded Airborne Establishments) 
was selected by Gale to take charge of his most numerous and well-equipped brigade, 6 AL 
Bde.562 
On 5 April 1945 Gale (as OC 1 British Airborne Corps) wrote to ‘Boy’ Browning who was by 
then Mountbatten’s Chief-of-Staff (COS). The four page letter runs through UK/SHAEF 
airborne affairs from Montgomery’s role of Colonel Commandant of the Parachute 
Regiment to routine training news. It also reveals Gale’s authority and skill in the defence of 
1 Airborne Div’s existence after Operation Market Garden: 
The idea, of course, was to get the 6th Division into the line and to wipe out the first 
by making the 6th a four brigade division and putting the Airlanding elements of the 
1st back into the Army Group pool. That failed. The next attack came rather subtly, 
by a request for the Airlanding Field Regiment of the 1st Division to be sent over to 
21 Army Group. That failed.563 
 
 The letter reflected the complete authority Gale held over Airborne Forces by the end of 
the war, demonstrating the political skill which would serve him so well as his post-war 
career moved on to greater things. 
 The third leadership characteristic of his command style was simplicity. Gale always 
approached each task by forming straightforward plans which had the minimum of moving 
parts. 
The lesson I deduced from this exercise was that the average man and unit can do 
one thing in one night. If they are asked to do one thing and that one thing only is a 
straightforward thing they will do it. If you ask them to do two things in a 
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roundabout way they will probably fail in both. We must have simple plans and we 
must have one task.564 
 
 Yet his uncomplicated, bluff personal style should not be interpreted as simplistic. His 
decisions were based on having obtained a thorough understanding of the challenges which 
affected airborne operations and the limitations of the equipment to hand. This had been 
formed during his time with 1 Para Bde and at the Director of Air at the WO.565  
  However Gale’s command style can be criticised as some weaknesses are apparent at 
various phases of 6 Airborne Div’s activity during the period under scrutiny. Gale did have 
gaps in his understanding regarding the capabilities of elements of this command which 
operated outside the archetypal airborne and infantry fields. His plans for ‘Parkerforce’, 
once landed, were optimistic in the extreme and expose a lack of understanding of the state 
of the armoured warfare art.566 His involvement in the appointment of every company 
commander, as described by Victor Dover, could be seen as micro-management. Also, as 
will described below, it was surely within his gift as a major airborne figure to have 
intervened in the removal of Lindsay from the command of 9 Para Bn. The loss of this 
accomplished and experienced CO shortly before D-Day must have caused disruption and  
weakened 3 Para Bde at the time. 
  However the result of his leadership style was that Gale established a strong sense of trust 
in his judgement amongst his officers and men.  The three elements (energetic 
communication, a key authority status and familiarity with the airborne establishment and a 
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simple and straightforward approach) combined to facilitate in building what Montgomery 
referred to as the right ‘atmosphere,’ for his subordinates to work and fight: 
His army must know what he wants; it must know the basic fundamentals of his 
policy; it must be given form guidance and a clear “lead.” Inspiration and guidance 
must come from above and must permeate throughout the army.567 
 
This trust is the basis of effective leadership of any kind, and in return his men engendered 
an effective reciprocal followership.568 He placed trust in the capabilities of his carefully 
selected leaders and men, allowing the imagination and initiative of his formation 
commanders to be the key elements in the creation and execution of 6 Airborne’s D-Day 
operational plans. This empowered his leaders, though divergent from the set-piece battle 
‘master plan’ approach adopted by the conventional role forces of 21 Army Gp, and acted as 
a force multiplier.569 Yet Gale retained control of his division with the authority he had 
generated through his highly-respected airborne credentials, strong communication skills 
and familiar knowledge of his subordinates. This positive environment formed the basis of 
the success of the division in Normandy, combined with a clear focus on the task in hand 
and not inconsiderable skill at arms.  
II. Leadership - The selection of Brigade and Battalion Commanders 
The appointment of 6 Airborne Div’s HQ staff and its brigade commanders was central to 
the later success of the division in Normandy. The core of Gale’s divisional staff was formed 
from officers he was familiar with from his time at the WO. Lt-Col. Robert ‘Bobby’ Bray, 
Gale’s GSO 1 (Chief of Staff), had been in the WO Military Operations Branch at the 
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outbreak of war and later fought in the Norwegian campaign.570 He had been a GSO 1 at the 
Air Ministry where Gale had worked with him. Major Bobby Lacoste was selected as GSO 2 
(Intelligence) while Colonel Bill Bradish, an early parachutist, became GSO 2 (Air), who had 
worked closely with Gale at the Air Directorate as one of his staff officers.571 Lt-Col. 
Smallman-Tew was appointed Commander Divisional Signals (CRS), having been one of 
Browning’s original ‘Dungeon Party’, and second in command of 1 Div Airborne Signals.572 
The Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) was Lt.-Col. Jack Norris, while Lt.-Col. Frank Lowmen 
took the post of Commander Royal Engineers (CRE).  All of these officers were well-known 
to Gale and their familiarity with each other would have provided considerable command 
stability at the top of the division.  
  Brigadier James Hill, a Royal Fusiliers regular soldier, joined Airborne Forces in 1941 and led 
1 Para Bn in Tunisia, winning both the Legion de Honeur and DSO. After commanding 7 Para 
Bn in the new 3 Para Bde, he was promoted by Gale when Lathbury was dispatched to 
command 1 Para Bde in the Mediterranean.573Hill was a young brigadier and quickly became 
highly knowledgeable in the airborne field; his nickname ‘Speedy’ reflected his energy and 
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determination which drove his men on.574 A hard and ruthless trainer, and with current 
operational experience, Hill was an obvious choice for 3 Para Bde. 
The division’s junior parachute brigade was commanded by Nigel Poett, who on 
appointment appeared a curious choice, but in fact in many ways mirrored the appointment 
of Gale in 1941. Poett had secured a regular commission in the DLI in 1927, and gained 
operational experience on the North-West Frontier and in the Sudan. At the outbreak of war 
he was a GSO in Staff Duties 2 at the WO before holding a staff role with 2 Div on its return 
from Dunkirk. Recalled by Archibald Nye (the Vice CIGS) to his old War Office department, 
Poett made a positive impression on Churchill when called upon to explain the length of 
Middle East Command’s ‘administrative tail’, as he later accompanied the latter to 
Washington in December 1941.575 After a year of commanding 11 DLI in 49 Div, Poett was 
appointed to command a parachute brigade, Poett’s battalion having exhibited the same 
high standards present in Gale’s 5 Leicester.576 Hugh Kindersley, the commander of 6 AL 
Bde, was of a similar age to Gale and had also won the MC in France in 1918. Renowned for 
an immaculate personal turn-out, he had won the respect of the airborne soldiers by 
qualifying as both a glider pilot and parachutist. Not a regular officer, having pursued a 
commercial career in the inter-war period, Kindersley had come to airborne forces having 
commanded 3 Scots Guards (SG).577 His brigade benefitted from his ability to command and 
his wide experience of handling people at all levels.’ Like Gale, he was also a versatile 
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communicator.578 Both Poett and Kindersley were noted ‘thrusters’, with enhanced profiles 
thanks to War Office staff service and practical experience of command. 579 
  The appointment of infantry battalion commanders was simple and systematic. The first 
stage was a merciless weeding out of the COs of the converted battalions. From the creation 
of 1 Para Bde onwards, an airborne brigade commander was able to ‘RTU’ (Return to Unit) 
any officer which he felt was not performing adequately: ‘Personal of air service units may 
be returned to former units if found to be unsuitable under authority of the Brigade 
Commander.’580Nigel Poett summed the situation up: 
It was extremely difficult for any officer or man to get into a parachute unit. An 
officer would have an extensive interview with the Brigadier, and a soldier would 
have other equivalent tests. At any time an officer or man could be returned to 
regimental duty if not up to the mark.581 
 
At the time of 10 Som LI’s conversion its CO was in hospital after injuring his arm in an 
accident, but by the end of December had been posted to No. 3 Infantry Training Depot, 
Southend-on-Sea.582 This fate, being posted to an ITC (Infantry Training Centre) to await 
another appointment, also befell the commanding officers of 13 Warwick, 10 Essex, 2/4 
PWV and 12 Devon.583 Their replacements were posted into the new airborne battalion 
after two to three months, the previous CO having assisted in the interviewing of possible 
airborne volunteers and overseeing the posting of those who had decided to remain 
conventional infantrymen. Only one CO was immediately posted to command another 
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infantry battalion: on 10 September 1943, Luard assumed command of 13 Para Bn and Lt.-
Col. G.A.B. Russell posted to command 5 W Yorks.584 It is important to note that these 
officers were sent to ITCs and not the Hardwick Depot – they had been rejected by Airborne 
Forces and would not be recycled back into the AAC. 
  The second stage was an influx of AAC officers, typically pre-war regular infantrymen who 
could give airborne experience and knowledge to the new battalions.585 With the 
foundation of the AAC in February 1942 a large enough pool of airborne officers to transfer 
into the new division was created.586 The organisational foundation of airborne forces 
continued to be expanded culminating in the creation of Airborne Forces Depot (Hardwick) 
and Development Centre (Amesbury) as a distinct command 11 May 1943.587 Brigadier ‘Ted’ 
Flavell was appointed its commandant, one of the men closest to Gale, just as 6 Airborne 
was created and therefore beholden on the Depot for recruits and training. Browning’s own 
evolving HQ, Headquarters Airborne Forces /Airborne Troops, also provided a further layer 
of potential talent for operational leaders in the two airborne divisions.588This pool of officer 
manpower and the mobility provided by the AAC/Airborne Base allowed cross-posting to 
make the best use of officers’ talents. One important example of can be seen with the 
appointment of second in commands (2ic) for the airlanding brigades.  Lt.-Col. R.G. Parker 
had been transferred into airborne forces together with his battalion, 10 Green Howards.589 
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On 6 February 1944 he was promoted to full Colonel and became 2ic of 6 AL Bde, being 
succeeded by Major A.P. Johnson as CO of 12 Para Bn.590 Likewise, Lt.-Col. H.N. Barlow, who 
been made CO of 7 Para Bn was given the same role in 1 AL Bde three weeks later.591 This 
made good use of two experienced mature regular infantrymen while A.P. Johnson and 
Geoffrey Pine-Coffin were capable replacements at hand. The COs of 13 Para Bn and 12 
Devon were similarly replaced with available airborne officers, in the first case with Lt.-Col. 
Peter Luard (2ic 4 Para Bn) and Lt.Col. G.R. Stevens (from divisional HQ) for the latter.592 
The most direct and immediate benefit of this mobility for 6 Airborne of this ‘Corps’ pool of 
leadership was a transfusion of experienced airborne commanders, and therefore latent 
airborne doctrine. By 1944 these experienced leaders were spread between the two 
divisions, and Gale carefully balanced knowledge between his parachute brigades. James 
Hill (who had commanded 1 Para Bn during its Tunisian landing) commanded 3 Para Bde 
while 8 Para Bn593 was led by Alistair Pearson who had led the same unit in the latter stages 
of the Tunisian campaign and Sicily.594 1 Cdn Para Bn had been accommodated in Hill’s 
Brigade, which facilitated 7 Para Bn’s move to the later formed 5 Para Bde, the Canadian 
battalion came with its own CO, Lt-Col. George Bradbrooke.595 9 Para Bn was commanded 
by Lt.-Col. M.A. ‘Polar Joe’ Lindsay, a polar explorer and a 1940 airborne pioneer.596 Lindsay 
had commanded 151 (later 156) Para Bn in India, formed from British volunteers from the 
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twenty-three battalions stationed in India.597 5 Para Bde’s senior battalion was 7 Para Bn 
was commanded by Lt-Col. Pine-Coffin, who had won the MC (Military Cross) leading 3 Para 
Bn in Tunisia, and had been transferred to the Parachute Regiment from the Devonshire 
Regiment in 1941. This gave Colin Poett one parachute battalion commander with combat 
experience of known ability. Peter Luard was appointed CO of 13 Para Bn, having been 2ic of 
4 Para Bn. Therefore 6 Airborne Div was fortified with men who had been landed in action 
and were able to facilitate the transfer of first-hand knowledge of airborne warfare.598 
Some stability appeared to be offered by the settled leadership of established units 
transferred from 1 Airborne to the new division.  2 Oxf Bucks and 1 RUR had been part of 31 
Ind Inf Bde which had been converted into 1 AL Bde in October 1941 when Browning’s 
division had been created.599  However the CO of the latter unit had changed as recently as 
March 1943 when Lt.-Col. ‘Hank’ Carson had superseded Lt.-Col. Campbell who had 
commanded the battalion since 1941.600  Another March command change concerned the 
Airborne Light Tank Squadron RAC Commanded by Major Godfrey Stewart (13/18 H) now 
attached to the new division. Once built into the four squadrons of 6 AARR, it contained a 
considerable complement of officers and NCOs due to the dispersed nature of its role. From 
a total establishment of 309 it included twenty-nine officers, seven warrant officers and 
twenty-one sergeants.601 
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   The selection of the division’s artillery regiment owned much to the ‘thruster’ who 
commanded it.  53 Worcs Yeo. had become available with the disbandment of 42 Armd Div 
in September 1943.602 Lt.-Col. Tony Teacher remained in command of the regiment on its 
transfer to the airborne role, the instigator of a spectacular success during Ex Spartan. This 
was a massive Home Forces’ manoeuvre involving ten divisions and four independent 
brigades, although viewed by some participants as too ‘heavily umpired’ and of ‘limited 
tactical value’.603 42 Armd Div was fighting on the ‘German’ side and Teacher faced the 
might of the Guards Armd Div commanding an A.Tk screen of ninety A.Tk guns, twenty-four 
field and eighteen Bofors anti-aircraft (AA) guns. Under the scrutiny of the umpires, Teacher 
co-ordinated this effort and was adjudged to have knocked out sixty per cent of the Guards’ 
tanks for the loss of four guns.604 
(c) An attack by the armoured brigade of Guards Armoured Division (its infantry 
brigade was detached) on 11 March on a narrow front through a minefield against 
an infantry brigade in position supported by the bulk of an anti-tank regiment and a 
divisional artillery. This ended in the virtual destruction of the armoured brigade.605 
 
Teacher’s success was further elevated by Home Forces as it contrasted with the C-in-C’s 
general criticisms of artillery during the exercise. While the principles regarding the 
centralisation of artillery had been well observed, no orders to support operations had been 
given and the information acted on was often ‘stale’; also A.Tk Regt fire had been poorly co-
ordinated with that of infantry A.Tk guns.606 
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Two extraordinary changes occurred to the CO cadre of the division before it went into 
action in Normandy. On 2 December 1943 the 8 Para Bn war diary states that Hildesley had 
been posted to the Hardwick Depot and Alistair Pearson had assumed command.607 Julian 
James, Pearson’s military biographer, states that the battalion was ‘in poor shape’, citing the 
inexperience of its young soldiers who had been shaken by a serious training accident.608 
The incident in question concerned the drowning of two officers and five ORs who had 
parachuted into the river Tay on 13 June, while a different stick saw another fatality and six 
injuries.609 These accidents had however taken place nearly six months before Hildesley’s 
replacement.  Closer to that date Gale had reviewed the battalion’s church parade on 19 
September while Hill had inspected 1 October.610 At that time Pearson was a GSO 1 (Air) at 
Divisional HQ, having had to relinquish command of 1 Para Bn in Sicily due to malaria. This 
experienced officer was now fit and available and ‘Brigadier Hill asked General Gale if he 
could have Pearson.’611 Although a common sense replacement within the divisional 
framework, this example shows the AAC corps pool of manpower and 
organisational/personal familiarity (Hill’s service with Pearson in Tunisia) at work as key 
influences. As with Darling at 1 Para Bn, it also reveals Gale’s ruthlessness regarding COs 
careers should the morale of a battalion be jeopardised. 
  A second sudden change occurred in 9 Para Bn. Martin ‘Polar Joe’ Lindsay was appointed 
CO on 2 June 1943, having been James Hill’s 2ic until the latter assumed command of 3 Para 
Bde.612 The Battalion’s war diary baldy states that Lindsay ‘relinquished’ the command of 
                                                          
607
 TNA WO 169/10350 8 Para Bn 1943 WD, 2 December 1943. 
608
 Julian James, A Fierce Quality: A Biography of Brigadier Alastair Pearson (London: Cooper, 1989), pp. 87–88. 
609
 TNA WO 169/10350 8 Para Bn 1943 WD, 13 June 1943. 
610
 Ibid., 19 September and 1 October 1943. 
611
 James, pp. 84–88. 
612
 TNA WO 169/10351 9 Para Bn 1943 WD, 20 May 1943. 
174 
 
the battalion 2 April 1944, as the battalion went on leave for three days.613 Stuart Tootal has 
probed the accounts and memories of 9 Para Bn veterans, Lindsay apparently being 
removed after a lapse of D-Day security. Tootal points to the ambition of Otway 
manipulating the situation to gain command of the battalion, Gale and Hill having no choice 
but to sack Lindsay once the breach had been formally presented to them by Otway.614 It is 
possible that Lindsay’s unconventional style had caused tension with Hill before this 
incident: 
The battalion was kept lively by many ideas, one of which was his order that any man 
who completed 15 jumps could wear parachute wings on both shoulders. At this, a 
balloon soon appeared on the barrack square at Tidworth and the soldiers of the 9th 
Battalion began to go up and down like Yo-Yos. However, Brigadier Hill got to hear of 
it and the order was cancelled.615 
 
 Later evidence shows Lindsay’s credentials as a highly capable soldier cannot be doubted. 
He joined 1 Gordons as replacement 2ic in July and fought in Normandy/NW Europe with 
distinction; winning the DSO and frequently acting as the CO of 1 Gordons.616 Horrocks 
recalled Lindsay’s later contribution to the Rhine crossing with some admiration: 
....the 1st Gordons, who were under the command of a very famous character, 
Lieut.-Col. Martin Lindsay, DSO, who had already distinguished himself in the 
Reichswald and usually made a habit of leading all attacks in person.617 
 
The late replacement of both Hildesley and Lindsay should be viewed in the context of the 
1944 situation. In the first case Gale could not afford to have a new battalion’s morale be a 
problem and a pragmatic solution was required. The second sacking appears hard-nosed, 
but in the context of the security surrounding the build-up to D-Day the change was 
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unavoidable. Otway carefully planned for the attack on the Merville battery and then 
carried it out in the most difficult of circumstances, but certainly was the beneficiary of 
Lindsay’s downfall.618 
   The Lindsay incident throws up the question of politics within the Division. The Airborne 
Establishment and 6 Airborne, like the rest of the Army, was packed with ambitious career-
minded officers. A fascinating insight into the Lindsay incident is provided by an Imperial 
War Museum (IWM) interview recorded with Alistair Pearson in 1989, which perhaps 
reveals some of the friction between personalities within the Division. The former CO of 8 
Para Bn was in discussion with Julian Thompson, the former commander of 3 Cdo Bde 
during the 1982 Falklands Conflict. Pearson spoke frankly in a wide ranging discussion 
regarding airborne forces and his involvement in operations, and Thompson challenged him 
about the Lindsay sacking.  Pearson felt there had been no breach of security, it was that 
quite simply ‘he and James Hill did not get along.’ ‘The politics in Bulford was unbelievable 
... and went over Joe’s head.’ Further, Pearson maintained that while Gale had supported 
Hill’s decision to sack Lindsay, he offered no additional support to Hill in the court martial, in 
which Hill was ‘hammered.’ Pearson had been a rival with Hill for the command of 1 Para Bn 
when the latter had returned to the unit after having been wounded, so the account he 
gave to Thompson could reflect some residual animosity there. Alternatively, Gale’s failure 
to assist Hill in the court could point to his annoyance at being obliged support the sacking 
of a valuable CO on a point of absolute security.619 Interestingly, as just before he moves the 
discussion onto another topic, Thompson makes an interesting comment. He states that 
when he had previously spoken to Hill, the latter had explained that he had got along well 
                                                          
618
 Otway’s plan will be examined in chapter five. 
619
 IWM Interview - Pearson, Alistair, no.21033 (recorded 1989). 
176 
 
with Eric Bols (Gale’s successor as GOC of 6 Airborne) but ‘Gale had been very difficult.’  
However the IWM interview with Hill of 1991 reveals nothing of any such friction.620 Politics 
amongst the commissioned ranks of the Division was obviously at work before D-Day, but if 
Pearson’s account is taken at face value Gale had little time for it. 
From reviewing the schedule of events regarding the appointment of airborne commanders, 
a simple selection process can be seen. After a ruthless weeding out of the converted 
battalions’ commanding officers took place, at least two out of four criteria had to be met. 
First, was the officer familiar to Gale and/or was an existing airborne officer?  This was an 
obvious requirement to fill a role on the divisional staff. Also, six out of seven replaced 
battalion COs were already in the AAC if not the division - Stevens, Hildesley, Hill/Lindsay, 
Luard, Pine-Coffin and Pearson. Next, was the candidate a regular infantryman? Six of the 
seven were - Pearson was TA but with extraordinary combat experience.  
Obvious indications of ‘keenness’ toward the idea of airborne warfare when the individual 
outside of the airborne community was the third point. Only R.G. Parker of 10 Som LI was 
retained of the donor battalion COs, and was noted for enthusiastically engaging with his 
parachute training. The Ringway course instructor’s notes stated he was - ‘Exceptionally 
keen. Sets a fine example.’621 Parker’s replacement when he was posted as 2ic of 6 AL Bde 
was Major A.P. Johnson, another regular infantryman who had converted with 10 Som LI 
and had displayed his zeal from the outset. On the announcement of conversion Johnson 
had just returned from ‘course No.9 at the school of infantry, Barnard castle’ to find Lt.-Col. 
Dennys, his CO, in hospital with a broken arm.622 Just three days later, Johnson wrote to the 
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COs of the other Som LI battalions asking for volunteers to maintain light infantry standards 
and traditions.623 This use of a light infantry back channel to obtain more quality airborne 
volunteers must have made a positive impression on his new brigade commander, 
Lathbury.624 
  The fourth and final important qualification was another key determinant for men being 
drafted in from outside the airborne fraternity. This was to be seen as a ‘thruster’ who had 
made a good impression in the right quarters either in Home Forces or the War Office. Such 
as Nigel Poett who had pursued a similar career path as Gale and had an enhanced profile 
within the WO, while Hugh Kindersley was an up-to-date armoured Guards commander 
with experience gained since the Great War. Teacher had impressed during Exercise 
Spartan, with his massacre of Guards armour, achieved importantly by co-ordinating the 
firepower of several interlinked artillery units. Otway, made a battalion CO only two months 
before D-Day, makes an interesting example of all four criteria at work. A regular RUR 
infantryman, he had briefly commanded 31 (later 1) Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron in 
October 1941 when 31 Ind Inf Bde was converted into 1 AL Bde therefore having some 
acquaintance with airborne forces. After Staff College he served as a GSO 2 Military 
Operations at the WO, Otway was posted to 9 Para Bn as 2ic on 12 June 1943; ten days after 
Lindsay had assumed command.625 Otway was certainly a determined ‘thruster’ as his 
command of 9 Para Bn revealed, and his plan and its execution for the attack on the 
Merville battery will be reviewed in the next two chapters. 
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 Gale carefully selected his commanders at brigade and battalion level as they would be the 
critical conduits of his dogma regarding aggression, initiative and standards. He relied on 
existing airborne officers, regular infantry officers and noted energetic outsiders, but all 
were bound by an enthusiasm for the concept and possibilities of Airborne Forces. 
 
III. Case Study – Lieutenant Nick Archdale, 7 Para Bn 
It is worth reviewing the nature and experience of commissioned leadership at the opposite 
end of the organisational chart – the platoon. Lieutenant Nick Archdale would be engaged 
heavily in the fighting for Le Port on D-Day, and would stay with his parachute battalion until 
the end of the war. Archdale was only nineteen years old in 1943 when Pine-Coffin and 
Captain Blood visited his UK barracks recruiting for the Parachute Regiment. Archdale was 
serving with the KRRC and was annoyed that a draft of officers had just been sent to Italy to 
join the Regiment’s twelfth battalion and he had not been included.626 His CO gave him his 
blessing to volunteer, which was surprising as the KRRC ‘didn’t like its officers going off to do 
other things.’ Archdale took command of the twenty-eight man mortar platoon within 7 
Para Bn, including no less than ten NCOs. His ‘life as a young officer was made incredibly 
easy’ by his NCOs, three of his sergeants having been warrant officers who had dropped a 
rank to join Airborne Forces. Archdale believed that while Airborne Forces was not a large 
organisation in relation to the rest of the Army, it did lure many NCOs. 
 His encounters and impressions of senior officers bear out the importance attached to 
standards and enthusiasm. Hilaro Barlow, the first CO of 7 Para Bn, ‘set the pattern for 7 
Para, you didn’t make mistakes ... standards were very high.’ Meanwhile Archdale felt as if 
he was one of the Brigade commander’s ‘blue-eyed boys’, Colin Poett was ‘always about ... 
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very confident , very full of good humour and enthusiasm.’ Archdale clearly admired Pine-
coffin’s personal courage during Operation Varsity, the drop in support of the Rhine 
crossing, witnessing his CO being hit in the mouth. ‘He spat out the blood and bits and just 
carried on.’ Archdale formed a very positive view of Gale. ‘I think he was a very good 
general. Always around and about, we saw a lot of him. On the first day [D-Day] he 
appeared at Bénouville, ‘quite unconcerned about everything, or putting on a show about 
being unconcerned.’ 6 Airborne was ‘happy, good, very well-run,’ Archdale and his 
colleagues believing it was better than the 1 Airborne Div. He did believe that the constant 
raiding required in the Bois de Bavent was ‘futile’ however, ‘all done to show we were being 
aggressive’, achieving nothing but adding further casualties. All of these observations point 
to the aggressive and ever-present nature of senior officers in Gale’s formations, positively 
reinforcing junior officers. This of course is as it should be in any military organisation, but 
the nature of airborne warfare, with no front line, pushed HQs into the line and Gale 
fostered it.  
  Training was the element which separated airborne infantry from conventional role troops. 
He recalled a ferocious training regime beginning at 0600 hrs every day, summer or winter: 
‘Very violent’ PT [physical training], and thirty-six miles in twelve hours router marches 
once a month. My colonel, Pine-Coffin, quite rightly was hell-bent on everybody being a 
good shot. [A] Lot of weapon training. Didn’t go into assault courses very much, you 
were kept busy all the time, and then you had days when you had to run everywhere, - a 
very good idea. If you were caught not running you were in trouble.’ 
 
From his experience confidence flowed through the Division: ‘Oh you never had doubts at 
all that we wouldn’t win. Never came across anyone who didn’t think we would succeed.’ 
Even on the afternoon of D-Day when events were turning against 7 Para Bn he still felt 
personally invulnerable, ‘[he had] an overriding sense of superiority and confidence. Never 
had any doubts.’ Archdale believed that it was this training that allowed ‘little groups of 
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soldiers fight on their own’ when scattered. The conventional role troops he encountered 
on D-Day were different. 
That was so noticeable about the soldiers that took over from us [Royal Warwicks], I felt 
sorry for them, they stood around in groups and didn’t know what to do. No fault of 
their own, just didn’t have the training our boys had had.’ 
 
 Archdale’s experience on D-Day showed all the themes of this thesis at work. He adapted to 
the situation of his platoon having lost all its mortars during the parachute descent and 
immediately accepted an infantry command role. He displayed considerable leadership 
gathering all available personnel from 7 Para Bn HQ and forming them into a scratch force 
to reinforce the position at Le Port. The fighting was so ferocious there that his group 
prepared for a last stand, until the advancing infantry were identified as Warwicks from 3 
Div. All this was possible due to the challenging training he had received in 6 Airborne Div 
and the leadership culture that Gale espoused. 
IV. An Analysis of Gale’s Leadership 
The case study above and the discussion in the first two sections of this chapter allow this 
study to pause and establish a prescription or theory of Gale’s leadership practice. This 
section will show the impact of Gale’s leadership style through the thesis chapters to show 
how it impacted on 6 Airborne’s eventual combat effectiveness in each key area. His 
leadership characteristics will be detailed here and further illustrated in Figure 3, and as 
each aspect is posited the chapter reference will be detailed. Some of the proofs for the 
theory have already been established in previous chapters, and some in the following 
chapters five and six will be indicated. 
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  Richard Gale was selected by the WO in October 1941 to command 1 Para Bde, whose 
officers and men formed the foundation of the two divisions which followed.627 Gale was a 
fervent but practical ambassador for Airborne Forces. His time as Director of Air at the War 
Office saw him build relations between the army and RAF and resolved many logistical and 
technical issues that had held back airborne forces. By the time Operation Paddle began, the 
breakout from the bridgehead, he commanded not only his division but four others: the two 
SS Bdes, the Belgian Infantry Bde and the Royal Netherlands Bde. 628 
Gale was a highly capable planner, of both training and operations. Chapter two explained 
the advantages that the use of airborne forces could give to the commander in the field – 
high mobility through air transport and the shock-surprise effect; and also the challenges – 
few heavy weapons, dispersed landings, the reliance on early support by conventional role 
forces and DZ/LZ close to the objectives. Gale demanded that his brigadiers and battalion 
commanders thoroughly prepare for their operations. The characteristics of his planning 
framework were always consistent: proximity of landing, redundancy of force; surprise; 
close command and control, and always simplicity (see chapter five). 
Gale carefully chose his commanders. His own command style was orientated around high 
standards and clear and energetic communication and he looked for these qualities in 
others. Regular infantrymen, airborne veterans and noted ‘thrusters’ were understandably 
sought after. Gale also trained his immediate subordinates. He added considerable value to 
the operational effectiveness of the division with the development of his subordinates, 
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which began almost immediately when the division was formed, and straightforward unit 
training (chapter three).  
  Gale was an imaginative and tough trainer. This was in contrast to the unimaginative 
training much of the field force divisions received before D-Day (chapter five).629 The role-
specific training which began at Hardwick House was stretching and tough; only one in four 
volunteers were accepted.  But its physical challenge engendered unit cohesion as did the 
presence of officers mixed in with the ORs at both Hardwick and Ringway. This dissimilarity 
also poses a further question over the allegation that the best men were siphoned off for 
Special Forces, as to whether their higher combat effectiveness was due to nurture rather 
than nature (chapter three). It must be acknowledged that airborne forces were always able 
to discard any man who didn’t fit their bill. However the rapid ‘tidying up’630, and later 
retention, of many of the non-parachute trained replacements received in Normandy 
(Chapter Six) showed that 6 Airborne was able to maximise the capability of many of the 
men posted to it. 6 Airborne was an all-volunteer formation, but the vast majority of its men 
had no combat experience. It was Gale’s focussed vision of how the division should be led 
and trained which enabled its extraordinary performance on D-Day in the face of the 
scattering disaster which should have paralysed its cohesion. Martin van Creveld stated that 
‘Command may be defined as a function that has to be exercised more or less continuously,’ 
and Gale’s presence in and around 6 Airborne as it trained was a constant.631Gale was 
fortunate that his Great War experience, personal charisma and architect status with the 
Airborne Establishment gave him a great deal of authority before he gave an order with his 
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newly formed division. But his obvious skill as a trainer allowed him to mould a largely brand 
new division into a highly effective formation which performed well in Normandy.  
Gale was a clever and decisive battlefield commander. It will be shown in the next chapter 
that the defensive scheme he wove the entire Division into once it had accomplished all its 
D-Day tasks was formidable, and 346.Gren.Div broke upon it when they attempted to seize 
DZ N from 5 Para Bde. With the most slender of resources he held the threatened front line 
between Le Mesnil and Sallanelles from 8 – 12 June, before launching a well-conceived and 
ferocious assault with his last reserves. But this battlefield success was due to his leadership 
before 6 Airborne got to the battlefield. ‘6 Airborne was the best trained division in the 
British army ... trained by Richard Gale.’632 His leadership had directed thorough preparation 
and training, which had led to highly cohesive units and formations and intelligent plans. 
These factors created and sustained 6 Airborne’s high combat effectiveness during the 
Normandy landings and campaign (chapter six). 
Interestingly Gale summed himself up quite succinctly as a battlefield general in a RUSI 
lecture he gave in 1956, having just completed a four-year appointment as C-in-C British 
Army of the Rhine.633His paper was entitled ‘Generalship and the Art of Command in this 
Nuclear Age,’634 and intended to update the themes discussed by Wavell in his three 1941 
lectures.635Gale discusses the impact of the mechanization of warfare which came of age 
during the Second World War; the massive impact of air power and the possible impact of 
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nuclear weapons. But as he concludes his talk he returns to more established themes when 
he describes an effective general in the new age: 
It is always best when command is direct and personal. It requires of a man great 
robustness, but it also requires great tactical ability and a full and detailed 
understanding of those scientific and engineering developments which are so much 
the hallmark of our time. It requires a broad-minded and understanding approach to 
air warfare today, and presupposes a complete understanding, not only of air 
strategy, but of all the facts of air/land warfare. It requires an understanding of the 
staff machine and ability to use it to the hilt, whilst never letting it get control. It 
demands confidence in all levels which postulates the encouragement of initiative. It 
calls for the determination to control events and not to be controlled by them. It 
calls for political sagacity and tact, understanding and a reasonable humility. It calls 
for patriotic fervour but also an international outlook.636 
 
Gale combined an up-to-date understanding of air power and its application to air assault 
warfare, with the experience he had gained in the MGC and in conventional infantry 
appointments. In the ‘Discussion’ part of the lecture the Chairman, Sir Brian Horrocks, adds 
his own description of Gale’s frontline leadership: 
General Sir Richard Gale was a general who commanded from in front. He was 
always up in the battle area, and he was the type of man who really ‘smelt’ the 
battle and had the feel of it the whole time. That is why he was such a very 
successful divisional commander. 637  
 
  In conclusion, Gale’s leadership acted as an accelerator to the best practice of preparing 
military forces for combat, which can be shown in a short hand through the three elements 
which make up ‘Fighting Power’ as shown in the Army Doctrine Publication – Operations 
2010.638 These are the Conceptual, Moral and Physical foundations, which encompass the 
crucial components of training, cohesion, equipment and doctrine (shown on diagram 3).639 
His application of all-encompassing communication to all ranks in the Division and careful 
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leader selection was supported by his familiarity with Airborne Forces which was enhanced 
in turn by the architect of airborne forces status he enjoyed. With these elements he built 
upon the inculcation of identity which had taken place when the men had joined Airborne 
Forces. His powers of communication allowed him to support Airborne Forces aims in the 
WO and in inter-service debate with the RAF, and later facilitated his command of three 
additional brigades, two Commando and the Belgian Infantry Brigade (chapter six). His 
projected mask of command was that of a traditional infantry soldier, but concealed a clear 
understanding of the challenges which faced 6 Airborne Div in Normandy. Proximity of 
landing zones to objectives and redundancy of force were all conveyed to his formations 
and units as simple plans. Gale was also able to adapt and innovate with his own formations 
to generate the maximum combat power and with those of conventional role forces around 
them (see the Bréville episode in chapter six). Above all, Gale aimed to achieve a synthesis 
of his own command persona with that of his division, as explained by another airborne 
soldier, Sir John Hackett: 
A man only really gets the best out of the men he commands by something 
approaching a complete fusion of his own identity with the corporate whole they 
form. He is the Eighth Army, or No. 2 troop of C Squadron, or whatever it is. He is the 
living personification for so long as he remains its leader.640 
 
Gale achieved that, and his energy and desire for success was transferred into 6 Airborne 
Div. 
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Chapter Five – Focus: The 6th Airborne Divisional Plan 
 
The looming Second Front, 6 Airborne’s raison d’etre, added urgency to the division’s 
formation and shaped its training. Chapter five explores the value attached to airborne 
forces by both sides in anticipation of spring/summer 1944 operations, and then the tasks 
that 6 Airborne would be set to accomplish.  The chapter question being how did Gale’s 
Division prepare for D-Day? Again, Gale provided key input with five tenets for the 
operation – ensuring proximity of the DZ/LZ to the objectives; making the maximum use of 
the element of surprise; simple plans; redundancy of force and finally close command and 
control. The first chapter section moves beyond the airborne establishment to assess wider 
expectations. 21 Army Group and Dempsey’s British Second Army placed considerable value 
on the potential capability of airborne forces. The landings at Salerno (Operation Avalanche) 
and Anzio (Operation Shingle) had both been less than satisfactory. The first had almost 
been overwhelmed by the local German response, while Shingle had been effectively sealed 
off by the enemy, and building attacks had nearly annihilated the lodgement. Only superior 
Allied air and naval firepower support had secured the beachheads. General Sir Miles 
Dempsey anticipated that airborne forces would not only shield his vulnerable eastern 
(Orne) flank from enemy counter-attack, but would provide a vital outflanking option should 
offensive operations become bogged down. By framing the role of 6 Airborne in the wider 
Neptune landing plan at this point of the study, the effectiveness of the division in action 
will later be easier to examine.  
  No other Allied offensive operation during the war was as meticulously planned as 
Neptune/Overlord, but in turn no other action had so many variables and vulnerabilities. 
The second section will discuss the robustness of Gale’s divisional outline plan, with 
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particular attention paid to its scope for adaption if faced by unexpected adversity. The 
plans’ flexibility was highlighted by the solutions developed when 5 Para Bde was switched 
into the Tonga plan with the appearance of the ‘rommelspargen’ on RAF reconnaissance 
photographs, which precluded the use of 6 AL Bde’s gliders to consolidate Operation 
Deadstick. Gale fully utilised the existing ‘Appreciation’ scheme for planning operations and 
delegated much of the detailed planning to his brigade commanders, his work developing 
their personal thinking paid a dividend here.641  
This chapter then turns to review the capability of the waiting enemy. The Wehrmacht’s 
anti-airborne capability is interpreted to give an indication of how the enemy valued 
airborne forces.  An assessment of the deployment and preparedness of the defenders will 
show Rommel’s determination to destroy the seaborne invasion on the beaches and any 
accompanying airborne forces as quickly as possible. A review of the training undertaken by 
192.Pz.Gren. Regt will show the Wehrmacht expectation of Allied air superiority and the 
intense training focus of mechanised forces, the troops which Rommel hoped would defeat 
the invasion. The deployment of German units in the invasion area will illustrate that great 
reliance was placed on fixed defences to brace the largely immobile and second-class 
infantry of 711 and 716. Gren. Divs. This policy played into the hands of 6 Airborne, as little 
remained to form ‘gegenstoss’ - local infantry counter-attack forces capable of mounting 
swift counter-attacks to eliminate the lightly armed airborne troops.642 In the second half of 
this section the quality of intelligence will be explored. How accurate were the 6 Airborne 
Div’s intelligence estimates regarding the forces awaiting them in the area which would 
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form the Orne bridgehead? These sections review the rival plans from the standpoints both 
of the reality of the balance of forces, and, in ‘the circumstances then prevailing,’ 643 The 
fourth and final chapter section will show the relevance of the mission-specific training Gale 
third arranged for his units, and the special care taken to plan for a solution to scattered 
drops and the menace of German armoured forces. 
I. The Divisional Plan - the wider D-Day Plan and the Expectations of British Second 
Army 
  In the final plan for Overlord/Neptune, SHAEF anticipated the use of three airborne 
divisions to secure the flanks of the seaborne landing. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
Operations Ladbroke and Fustian had been near-disasters operationally, but the British 
Army was prepared to disdain the potential of catastrophic airborne forces losses landings 
for the advantages perceived in disrupting the enemy’s response to a seaborne invasion.  
Yet the issue of limited RAF aircraft lift capability remained, and the therefore the Inter-
allied and inter-service tensions which had surrounded the Mediterranean airborne 
operations in 1943 were still in place. This is the atmosphere in which 6 Airborne’s plans 
were formulated, and why the hasty formation of 46 Group RAF was required.   
 Again, as shown in Chapter Two, the commander of the British landings placed great store 
in the potential of airborne forces. Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey was appointed the 
commander of British Second Army, and it was he who would decide how British airborne 
forces would be used in the forthcoming invasion.644 On 26 January the Second Army and 
assault corps planning staff, together with those of 83 Group RAF and that of the Eastern 
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Naval Task Force, were established by Dempsey at Ashley Gardens in London.645 Dempsey 
was a good fit for the Second Army command having experience of combined operations as 
commander of 13 Corps during Operations Husky and Baytown, and it had been 
conventional role troops under his command which had relieved 1 Airborne Div during 
operations Ladbroke and Fustian.646 This experience would be crucial as the success of 
Neptune/Overlord depended on one combined service plan to support the seaborne 
assault, including the unique impact on operations offered by airborne forces. It is unlikely 
he would have been appointed to the command of Second Army if his view of airborne 
forces had been negative, and therefore in contrast to Brooke’s and Montgomery’s view. 
  The reasons why the Calvados/western Cotentin coast was selected for the site for the 
Neptune landings must now be reviewed before a study of the involvement of 6 Airborne 
Div begins. The key personalities in the decision-making process are shown, and also the key 
geographical challenges facing Second Army’s eastern flank are identified.  
 The decision to choose the Normandy beaches between the Vire and Orne rivers had been 
made by the Combined Planning Staff in February 1943. This group had produced a clear 
and concise paper for the Combined Commanders which worked through the advantages 
and disadvantages of all the possible landing areas for an invasion of north-western 
Europe.647 In summary the coast above Bayeux and Caen offered the decision makers 
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beaches sheltered from the full fury of the Atlantic; within the range of Allied fighter cover; 
not vulnerable to massive flooding by the enemy (which eliminated the Dutch/Flanders 
coastline); and, in early 1943 at least, poorly developed German defences.648 Major-General 
Frederick Morgan as COSSAC created a plan for a three division attack which was approved 
in August 1943 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 649  The scale of the proposed operation was 
limited by the landing craft resources known to be available by 1 May 1944, the provisional 
date of the invasion.650 His plan was drastically altered in January 1944 after the 
appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander and General Montgomery as 
his nominated ground forces commander in the invasion phase of Overlord.651 The frontage 
of the assault was widened to include a beach on the western Cotentin and the whole 
operation consequently put back a month to allow the building of the additional landing 
craft required.652 Montgomery’s appointment as Eisenhower’s field commander energised 
the detailed planning process as his experienced former Eighth Army subordinates flooded 
the key staff roles in 21 Army Group,653 with early planning conferences setting the 
intensive “atmosphere” for his general officers. 654 Montgomery’s experience in 1942/1943 
offensive operations and his close eye for detail made him a good choice for the assault on 
the Atlantic Wall, reflected in his former desert and Mediterranean cohorts which 
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surrounded him. The outline for 6 Airborne Div’s operations, when viewed within the 
context of the overall Second Army plan showed imagination, making the most of their air 
transport mobility to seize vital objectives; then off-setting their lack of battlefield mobility 
by giving them a defensive task that would make the most of the high quality of their 
infantry. It was now up to Gale and his subordinates to create brigade and battalion plans to 
achieve the tasks which made up the divisional objective. 
 Dempsey faced both enemy and topographical challenges on the eastern side of his 
potential bridgehead for which airborne forces seemed an effective solution.  British Second 
Army would land on the east side of the bridgehead, between the Orne estuary and Port-en-
Bessin. 655 The landscape of this area posed questions for both attack and defence, and 
Dempsey and his staff now contemplated these issues and in turn assessed the 
opportunities to employ airborne forces. While the western side of the British landings were 
shielded by the proximity of the US descent on what would be Omaha beach, crucially the 
eastern flank of the British area was open to attack from massed enemy reinforcements 
from the interior of France. The River Orne/Caen Canal656 potentially formed a ‘complete’ 
anti-tank barrier against such attacks, although a riverine assault from either east or west 
across River Orne/Caen Canal might well incur heavy casualties. 657 The wooded high ground 
of the Bois de Bavent between the Orne and the more westerly River Dives offered any 
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incumbent a commanding view directly into the Sword landing area, and would be an 
excellent defensive position facing either east or west. 658  This area offered an attractive 
buffer zone to defend the 1 Corps landings. The city of Caen to the south east of the landing 
area offered the key rail and road hub needed by the enemy to quickly transfer 
reinforcements to the battlefield, while it would also be needed by Dempsey to break out of 
his lodgement.659 The areas to the south-east and south-west of Caen offered good going 
for mechanized forces of either side, with the space for German attacks driving either side 
of the Orne barrier. Enough space had to be captured within the first twenty-four hours to 
allow Second Army to begin landing its follow-up divisions and assets rapidly, to both 
continue offensive operations and ensure the beachhead had enough depth to withstand 
enemy counter-attacks. Dempsey summarised his problem at the final St. Paul’s School 
planning conference on 15 May: 
To get ashore on a broad enough front to give a sufficient base for the development 
and build-up of the force; and in sufficient strength to carry out immediate tasks.660 
 
The airborne forces available to Dempsey gave Second Army the capability to seize 
objectives beyond the beaches swiftly, and also insert additional infantry formations into 
the line to stiffen the defensive screen.  
   Dempsey’s proposed plan involved landings by two corps on three beaches with each 
developing their own operations. It was hoped that this approach would avoid the 
congestion that could result from one corps carrying out all the initial landings, and then 
reinforcing corps landing and attempting to move through its formations. Dempsey planned 
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to land two corps on three beaches: 30 Corps led by 50 Div on what would be Gold beach, 
and Crocker’s 1 Corps on Juno and Sword beaches, with 3 Infantry and 3 Cn Divs leading the 
way. Once firm lodgements had been established, 30 Corps would push on to capture 
Bayeux while 1 Corps would take Caen.661  
Dempsey saw his airborne divisions as the solution to a possible stagnation of offensive 
action due to determined German opposition utilising the defensive terrain available. His 
counter-part on the western flank, General Omar Bradley, the commander of the US First 
Army, also regarded their employment as vital.662 By June 1944 the value of airborne forces 
was established in the mind of Allied senior commanders. 
  HQ Airborne Troops had begun to work in earnest on an invasion plan in December 1943, 
having been placed under the command of 21 Army Group since the previous July,663 and 6 
Airborne would add the detail from February 1944 onwards. The core of this first planning 
group was Browning’s ‘Dungeon Party’ created with the formation of 1 Airborne Div,664 with 
the additional input of Major-General Richard Gale and Air Vice-Marshal L.N. Hollinghurst 
(38 Group RAF).665 As discussed in Chapter three, Gale and Hollinghurst had enjoyed a 
productive working relationship resolving many of airborne forces’ problems while the 
former was War Office Staff Duties Director of Air, and Hollinghurst his opposite number at 
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the Air Ministry.666 Dempsey’s plans for the use of 6 Airborne developed steadily. A paper 
dated 14 February entitled ‘CAPTURE OF THE AREA EAST OF RIVER ORNE’ analysed the key 
objective and possible approaches that could be taken. 667 These were identified as the 
seizure of the Caen Canal and Orne river bridges at Bénouville/Ranville to frustrate the 
enemy’s attempts to attack the bridgehead as he advanced over the Dives and Orne bridges. 
The airborne forces which could be landed were limited by the air transport assets available 
- one parachute brigade, one parachute battalion and a SAS regiment; with the later 
reinforcement of a Special Service brigade. Two options were discussed. 
  The first alternative proposed that the parachute troops available would be dropped 
behind Franceville to clear the enemy defences to then allow the commando brigade to land 
unmolested on the beach. This formation would then advance swiftly inland to capture the 
two critical bridges. This option was quickly discounted essentially due to time constraints. 
The paratroopers would need to be dropped a distance from the objective to allow time to 
form up and then at least six hours allotted to entirely clear the fortifications of the enemy. 
Working back this would mean the airborne contingent would have to be landed at dusk on 
D -1 (the day before D-Day) to carry out the task. The paper concludes that the combined 
airborne/commando force would then have a long distance (in reality just under ten 
kilometres as the crow flies668) to cover to get to the bridges, and with limited fire support. 
This plan was wisely discarded. It would have required an extra invasion beach within range 
of the guns of Le Havre,669 and the forces suggested would have found light infantry 
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advancing towards fully alerted defences at the bridges and in some isolation from 1 Corps 
advance to the west of the Orne barrier.670   
  The second option was to be adopted. The parachute brigade preceded by a coup de main 
force would be dropped to capture the Orne barrier, while the SAS Regiment landed in 
depth on the Vimont and Troarn roads to Caen to delay the enemy.  The commando brigade 
would advance from the 1 Corps beach before Ouistreham to reinforce the 
Bénouville/Ranville position bridges from the beaches, and then columns would be sent out 
to ‘overrun as much of the country NORTH of TROARN and WEST of the floods’.671 A key 
element of the 14 February plan was the assumption must that the bridges would have 
been destroyed by the enemy, and that all plans must reflect this situation.  
   This plan was considerably revised following a meeting that took place the following day 
with the I Corps commander and the two key Special Forces leaders in the British Army. ‘I 
had General CROCKER, General BROWNING and General STURGESS in at 1000 Hours 
today’.672 The tasks of all the formations remained the same with two important revisions.  
First the timing of the airborne operation had clearly been discussed, as now the parachute 
brigade would land ‘as late as possible in darkness on D-Day to capture and hold the 
BÉNOUVILLE-RANVILLE bridges’. Second, the offensive columns of the 14 February now had 
some clear direction; the commandos would press on from Ranville to attack the defences 
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between Cabourg and Franceville, which would have to include the Merville battery. 
However with only two brigades available the operations east of the River Orne appeared to 
be gravely under-resourced. Indeed, James Hill recalled his divisional commander’s 
annoyance when two days later Browning informed him of the single brigade plan, ‘and 
Richard Gayle [sic] was so upset about no aeroplanes.’ 673   
 This factor, the perennial scarcity of air assets, now inhibited the airborne element of 
Dempsey’s plan. Yet just six days later a two brigade lift was possible, allowing a divisional 
operation as the necessary aircraft had been found.  Gale had been the War Office Director 
of Air between April 1942 – April 1943674 and Hollinghurst had then been his opposite 
number at the Air Ministry as RAF Director of Organisation. Together they addressed the 
various resource challenges which affected the development of airborne warfare with 
general issues of army-air cooperation.675 Gale attempted to integrate RAF personnel where 
possible - in the very first ‘syndicate’ exercise held by 6 Airborne, Exercise Pegasus, three 
RAF staff officers were made available by telephone to assist each discussion group.676 The 
success of their interaction now bore fruit with the inclusion of the rapidly formed 46 Group 
RAF to increase the first lift available to 6 Airborne Div. The fortnightly progress report for 
this formation dated 25 February revealed that Squadrons 512, 575 and 271 each now had 
forty complete crews, with Coastal Command personnel expected to arrive at Brize Norton 
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to complete all the crewing needs.677 This evidence shows that the moment it was able, the 
RAF was prepared to facilitate HQ Airborne Force’s plan by pledging half-trained aircrews. 
As 6 Airborne Div created its plans at the ‘Mad House’, a small 38 Group team was in 
attendance which completed the air plan, liaising continually with the Division.678 The full 
interaction now enjoyed by both services was a far cry from the high-level dispute of late 
1942, and created the environment needed for airborne operations to flourish. 
   Therefore by 24 February the air resources needed for a two brigade lift operation had 
been made available. At this point a small planning staff from 6 Airborne Div now joined 1 
Corps HQ, which included Gale’s GSO 1 Operations Col. Bobby Bray, his intelligence officer 
Major Gerald Lacoste and his divisional artillery and engineer commanders, Norris and 
Lowman.679 The expanded plan was now centred on 6 AL Bde, flown in to reinforce the 
Bénouville/Ranville Coup de Main party which would seize the two bridges as the operation 
began. The more heavily armed airlanding brigade, able to make a concentrated landing 
thanks to its gliders, was seen as the best formation for the defence of the Orne barrier 
area.680 3 Para Bde would ‘dominate the area’ from Cabourg to Troarn to Caen.681 This two 
brigade plan remained in place through March; however 6 Airborne’s scheme would 
undergo one major revision before D-Day, when a proliferation of obstacles precluded the 
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early use of 6 AL Bde. 682  
The 6 Airborne plans underwent one major revision in the run up to Neptune as a result of 
enemy action. Gale had originally intended that 6 AL Bde would be the spearhead brigade 
on D-Day, as it could land in a concentrated fashion and had considerably more heavy 
weapons than the parachute brigades. However, the plan was to be drastically altered after 
low level reconnaissance photographs taken on 13 April revealed that the enemy had 
planted numerous poles in the proposed landing zone between Ranville and Amfreville.683 
When the pictures were reviewed in the Napier Crookenden, the Brigade Major of 6 AL Bde, 
was horrified to see ‘white dots’ (the tops of the poles) had appeared all over the planned 
LZs for his brigade. For a while Crookenden feared the security of the operation had been 
compromised, but then the same dots appeared all along the coast.684 The poles were 
specifically intended to cause landing gliders to break up or tip over, and scrutiny of the 
pictures showed they were being wired together. ‘With their customary skill and their usual 
thoroughness these things were going up at an astounding rate’.685 This measure was being 
adopted throughout the area the landings would take place so 6 AL Bde’s landing zone could 
not simply be moved. Gale’s flexible planning scheme allowed the Staff to substitute 5 Para 
Bde at short notice into the holding role at the bridges. 591 Parachute Squadron RE and a 
detachment of 286 Field Park Company RE were added to the brigade and drilled by 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Loman to fell the poles.686 The altered plan was presented to the 
Supreme Command at the final conference held at St. Paul’s School on 15 May and 
approved.687  
     Brigadier Hugh Kindersley now wrote a late Appreciation for his formation’s revised role, 
and had to formulate a plan in which his 6 AL Bde would now form the second lift 
reinforcement charged with expanding the bridgehead to the south.  His Appreciation of 16 
May shows a clear methodical approach, making simple deductions upon which to build his 
proposed actions. In fourteen sections the paper addresses the issues of objective, own 
strength, the ground, communications, air operations, time and space, the operations of the 
two parachute brigades nearby before assessing likely enemy reactions. This document can 
be compared to Hill’s appraisal of 14 April, which points to a common approach adopted 
across the Division.688 The paper concludes with his own simple outline plans to be 
communicated to his battalions. The Appreciation was developed into the No.1 Operational 
order for the Brigade on 19 May which included the most up-to-date intelligence on the 
enemy forces in the area of operations. The plan consolidated all the key elements of the 
appreciation mentioned above together with the firepower support that could be expected 
from conventional role and naval forces once the seaborne phase had begun.689  
Gale’s final plan for 6 Airborne’s Normandy operations is built around key characteristics 
common to his planning style, one which he inculcated amongst his subordinates. It is useful 
to analyse the Normandy plan alongside these key elements, as it shows the value that 
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Gale’s direction and thorough training added to the Division’s effectiveness once in the field. 
These key factors present in Gale’s airborne warfare planning mantra were: the maximum 
use of the element of surprise; the importance of proximity of dropping zones and landing 
zones (DZ/LZ) to the objective; ensuring all plans are essentially simple and easy to 
understand; the need for a degree of redundancy to be built into the forces allocated to 
each task; and finally the need for close command and control by the divisional and brigade 
HQs. These elements are all set down in his ‘Remarks’ following Exercise Rufus. This action 
was a key milestone being the culmination of six other exercises and five months of ‘damn 
good solid work’ by the Division.690 This exercise, which took place in October 1943, pitched 
6 AL Bde against 5 Para Bde in typical attack/defence operations involving prepared 
positions. Gale communicated his observations and thoughts concerning the exercise back 
to his officers in a four page paper. It is useful to compare his comments on Rufus with the 
Normandy plan.691  
  ‘Our long suit is surprise and assault from a comparatively unexpected direction’ Gale 
explained with reference to 12 Para Bn’s attempt to storm a heavily fortified battery 
position during Rufus.692 He had explained that the heavy firepower and equipment 
required was not available to airborne troops, and that shock and surprise would be 
needed. All the tasks carried out by the division on the night of 5-6 June would benefit from 
the element of surprise augmented by darkness.  In particular, Operation Deadstick, the 
Coup de main operation spearheading the whole divisional assault, provided this element to 
seize the two most critical objectives in the entire operation – the Caen Canal and Orne 
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River bridges. It was assumed that the bridges were wired for demolition and defended by a 
garrison of at least fifty men supported by an assortment of Anti-aircraft MGs and at least 
one anti-tank (A.Tk) gun. Similarly, the destruction of the Merville Battery by 9 Para Bn 
depended on a double surprise – an assault by the whole battalion on the position’s 
perimeter while three gliders carrying a special assault force would land directly on top of 
the gun casements.  
The second key element was proximity of DZ/LZ to objectives. In his Rufus notes Gale 
acknowledged that the RAF would always favour DZ/LZ that were easy to find, but ‘I would 
go so far as to say that unless they agree to drop us in an area which is suitable from the 
point of view of our assault the show is not on.’693 DZ/LZ N, the key landing area, was only 
1000m from the most important objectives – the bridges, and the defensive positions to be 
located at Ranville and the Bas de Ranville.694 Likewise DZ/LZ K and V were both close 
enough for 1 Cdn and 8 Para Bns to find their way to their objectives being only 1000m and 
5000m away from the bridges at Troarn and Varaville respectively.695 
   The one element concerning operational planning that was continually reiterated in his 
Exercise Rufus notes was the need for straightforward plans. His point on page two needs 
no further clarification: 
Just a few words about a simple plan. This applies right down to private soldiers. For 
a plan to be simple it must be understood by the private soldier. The individual man 
working in the dark and carrying a heavy load must know exactly what he has to do 
and why, and must know this the whole way from the DZ to the assault. Now I am a 
man of average intelligence but when I got to the position I don’t mind telling you I 
was facing in the wrong direction, and I had not had to carry anything but myself. If 
you set a soldier off and tell him that he has got to go in a certain direction and if you 
have a set drill for your assault and each man, according to what he is carrying, 
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knows what to do, he will go ahead and do it. But if you ask him to change direction 
several times in the dark how can he go into the assault with intelligence.’696  
 
 All the companies landed during Deadstick/Tonga had typically one task to complete before 
falling back to locations in the Division’s overall defensive scheme. The demolition of the 
Dives bridges required 1 Cdn and 8 Par Bns to break down into companies to destroy each 
crossing, but would then fall back and regroup on the Bois de Bavent together with 9 Para 
Bn.697 
  The two final key elements present in Gale’s planning style can be dealt with together: 
redundancy and close command and control. Gale allocated a strongly reinforced company 
to perform the coup de main, 180 men, outnumbering the expected enemy garrison almost 
four to one. They would then be further strengthened by a whole parachute battalion and 
then a brigade. During Rufus Gale had made a habit of removing one company from a 
battalion about to embark on a task, reasoning ‘We plan on the assumption that something 
like 20 per cent will not be put down on the right spot.’ 698 He went on to affirm his belief 
that ‘100 per cent will be dropped in the right spot and I believe casualties will not be very 
high’; but Gale’s plan allowed for considerable losses on landing and enough men to hold 
the key positions if heavily attacked. The location of both the 5 Para Bde and Divisional HQs 
in Le Bas de Ranville allowed Gale to exert his influence closely over the critical battlefield 
area, while James Hill was able to do likewise from his command post at the Le Mesnil cross-
roads.699 The concentrated daylight landings of Operation Mallard would bring in the well-
armed 6 AL Bde directly into the heart of the airborne bridgehead and add much needed 
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heavy equipment and bayonet strength. 5 Para Bde would hold the villages 
Bénouville/Ranville/ Bas de Ranville while to the south 6 AL Bde would hold a southern 
screen comprising Longueval/Escoville/St. Honorine back to Le Bas de Ranville, while 3 Para 
Bde would defend the difficult ground of the Bois de Bavent down to Troarn. Six battalions 
would all be within 4000m of the Caen Canal Bridge, while Hill’s HQ would be no more than 
4000m from that point.700 In summary, Gale endeavoured to magnify the potential combat 
value of the 6 Airborne Div by creating a simple and robust plan. While scattered landings 
threatened the success of operations as part of Neptune, Gale’s planned deployment 
overlapped the brigades and battalions and knitted together the strongest defensive screen 
for the Bénouville/Ranville area.  
   How does Gale’s plan stand when measured against the Airborne Operations 
success/failure process? When Gale’s plan is compared to Figure 1 it can be seen that the 
preparation being undertaken was robust. Accurate intelligence was being amassed about 
the possible enemy forces which waited in the Orne bridgehead area, while the RAF aerial 
photographs and detailed maps were furnishing the detail needed regarding the terrain and 
foxed defences. Close contact was in place with the RAF to assist in planning. Gale’s 
planning and his Staff’s information gathering had already established a firm base for the 
operations to be undertaken in Normandy. Once the destruction of the battery and Dives 
bridges had taken place, Gale’s plan to defend the crucial bridges in depth was robust. He 
had assumed a worst case scenario that of a German mechanised attack being swiftly 
mounted in the first twenty-four hours of the invasion, but his preparations would allow his 
units to mutually support each other and await the relief by 3 Div. 
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   However, a key element of his plan had diverted precious glider space which could have 
allowed the lift of additional A.Tk guns or 75mm Pack howitzers (see below). Gale had 
planned to send out ‘a small battle group’, from troops landed in the 0320 hours wave, to 
capture one of the villages beyond the bridgehead near the Caen-Troarn road and to ‘sally 
out’ raiding the enemy. This force would have comprised A company 12 Devon, the one 
battery (211th) of 53rd Airlanding Light Regiment RA (53 RA) landed, an A.Tk gun troop and 
the 6 Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (6 Armd Recce).701 In the event, Gale 
wisely decided not to send out ‘Parker Force’, which though had considerable mobility, 
would probably been badly mauled by the encroaching 21.Pz.Div, and the unit was able to 
harbour in the 8 Para Bn position.702 Indeed, Gale himself had stated earlier in 1944 that the 
armament of the Tetrarch light tank was ‘certainly not of sufficient weight to have any 
offensive value except against the most flimsy resistance.’703 
   But far from being a ‘small group’ in terms of space in the precious heavy-lift Hamilicar 
gliders, it was a massive load.  The Reconnaissance Regiment’s eleven Tetrarch light tanks 
took a Hamilicar glider each, while the regiment’s thirty Bren/Lloyd carriers could only be 
carried (in pairs) by the larger glider.704 All in all, thirty Hamilicars and nineteen Horsas 
would be needed to carry the 6 Armd Recce.705 If this unit had been transported by sea the 
space freed up in the Hamilicar gliders could have flown in the complete 3 A.Tk Bty (which 
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later had to go by sea) and another battery of the Light Airlanding Regiment. In his memoir 
Gale stated that the Recce regiment performed well gathering intelligence operating from 8 
Para Bn’s positions in the Bois de Bavent,  and he was sure that they would have ‘paid a 
handsome dividend’  if used in the planned role.706 However once their roving role had been 
cancelled, the carriers and light tanks would have contributed only weak firepower to the 
defence of the perimeter in the face of enemy attacks. Gale can be accused of a degree of 
over-optimism in the formulation of this scheme, the consequences of which detracted 
from his division’s defensive artillery potential. The additional twelve guns of 3 A.Tk Bty 
(including four 17 pdrs) would have made his position much stronger, especially in covering 
the ‘best tank killing ground’ between St.Honorine and Escoville.707 Ironically, before 53 RA 
was converted into 6 Airborne’s airlanding light regiment, it had been the AT regiment of 42 
Armd Div. If Gale had wanted extra anti-tank guns his gunners were already trained.708 
   What must be balanced against this argument in Gale’s defence was his clear desire to 
retain the initiative, a stipulation of the 1943 airborne doctrine. These light vehicles did give 
the division a mobile reserve that could be moved quickly in the event of a breakthrough by 
fast moving Wehrmacht elements, such as armoured cars. 709 Indeed, Gale’s plan also 
echoed Montgomery’s call on both Bradley and Dempsey to show ‘offensive eagerness’710 
by throwing armoured units forwards to confuse the enemy and blunt his counterattacks: 
Armoured units and Bdes must be concentrated quickly as soon as ever the situation 
allows after the initial landing on D day; this may not be easy, but plans to affect 
such concentrations must be made and every effort made to carry them out; speed 
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and boldness are then required, and the armoured thrusts must force their way 
inland.711 
Montgomery was prepared to ‘risk even the total loss’ of these armoured units, although he 
believed this was unlikely that they would be annihilated as they would be closely 
supported by the mass of forces consolidating the bridgeheads behind them.712 It might also 
be that Gale felt he had to find a role for the airlanding tanks, which the Hamilicar glider had 
been specifically designed to carry in 1941, and had been enshrined in War office airborne 
policy from then on.713 The decision to withhold ‘Parker Force’ ultimately reflects well on 
Gale’s judgement, but its prioritisation as far as air transport was concerned perhaps 
showed too much faith in ‘élan’714 and too little realism when considering the Wehrmacht 
response to a thrust by thin-skinned armoured vehicles. Evidence of Gale putting greater 
store in the motivated individual rather than equipment can be seen in his notes from 
Exercise Needle: 
Remember that battles are not won or lost on War Establishments; they are won or 
lost as a result of the skill and determination of commanders and the troops whom 
they lead.715 
 
This comment reveals Gale’s personal belief in the value of dynamic leadership, over and 
above the possibility of augmenting firepower. For airborne troops, aggressive attack 
directed by vigorous leadership and taking the maximum advantage of the shock-surprise 
effect made best use of their lightly armed shock troop character. The seemingly indulgent 
inclusion of the ‘Parker Force’ element to his plan has been explored above, and can be 
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mitigated by what was essentially a conservative and sensible defensive plan once the 
division had landed.  
 
II. The Divisional Plan – The Waiting Enemy: fixed defences, mobile forces and the 
veracity of 6 Airborne’s Intelligence 
 
  This chapter will now turn to assess the value that the waiting Wehrmacht placed in the 
potential of Allied airborne troops, by assessing the preparations made to confront them. 
This section will first give a brief overview of the background influences which shaped the 
enemy situation, before moving on to more closely analyse the defences which faced 6 
Airborne Div in the landing area. The basis of this examination will be two case studies, 
focused on 716 I.D. and 21.Pz.Div. These contrasting formations were in position in the 
Ouistreham-Caen area and would do battle with Gale’s men first. Again, the thesis themes 
of adaptation/innovation, leadership and training can be seen in the preparations of the 
forces 6 Airborne would have to face. 
      From July 1941 until the end of 1943, the Wehrmacht’s main focus was set on the 
Russian Front, as the key theatre.  As part of extending the U-boat campaign against Britain 
a programme began in the autumn of 1941 to fortify all the main harbours along the entire 
coast.716 The remaining divisions left in France were steadily drained of first-class men to 
replace the losses in Russia, while the formations moved there were often being rebuilt 
after severe losses in the east.717 With his Directive No.40 of 23 March 1942, Hitler 
acknowledged that the invasion potential of the western Allies was steadily increasing. 
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While seaborne attacks on the coast could be expected so must ‘the possibility of parachute 
and airborne attacks on a large scale must also be envisaged.’718 The failure of Operation 
Jubilee that summer in the face of Wehrmacht defensive positions reinforced the notion 
that the key battle areas - ‘den küstenverteidigung’ - against a cross-Channel invasion had to 
be the seafront.719  Hitler had then prognosticated that without the capture of a major port 
the chances of the Allies being able to establish a successful bridgehead were slim and the 
fortification programme along the Atlantic coast was stepped up.720 Over the next two years 
17,300,000 cubic yards of concrete were consumed as all major ports were fortified and 
ringed with pill-boxes. However, on 30 October 1943 Hitler was presented with a large 
report from the Commander-in-Chief in the West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, which 
stated that the present condition of the Atlantic Wall would not prevent an Allied invasion 
on the scale seen in Sicily and Italy. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, his tremendous fighting 
reputation undimmed by his defeat in North Africa, was instructed to inspect the defences 
and to generate recommendations for their improvement.721 
  The impact of new leadership for the invasion coast area would completely overhaul the 
Wehrmacht defences in the first five months of 1944.  His appointment had been preceded 
by another Führer Directive (No.51) of 3 November 1943, which had recognised the threat 
of a massive Allied landing on the coast of north-western Europe in the following year.  
Hitler had promised the forces in France a mass of extra equipment, including that all panzer 
and panzer grenadier divisions be equipped with ninety-three Mark IV tanks or self-
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propelled guns by the end of December 1943, and a monthly allocation of a hundred heavy 
A.Tk guns in both November and December.722 Rommel’s experience in North Africa had 
exposed him to the full might of Anglo-American air power, and he believed that a central 
reserve of mechanized formations located in the interior of France would be pointless – 
they would simply be shattered by Allied fighter-bombers while attempting to drive to the 
beachhead. Therefore the invasion had to be crushed at the water’s edge, and he 
demanded that the mechanised panzer and panzer grenadier divisions be positioned close 
to the potential invasion beaches. This brought Rommel into dispute with Geyr von 
Schweppenberg and Guderian, who wished to maintain a central panzer reserve that could 
be swiftly moved to the landing area and launch an overwhelming armoured attack. 723 This 
argument has been recorded elsewhere, and while it was of key importance for Second 
Army and the success of Overlord, it is not pertinent to this study.724 Thanks to Rommel’s 
resolve 6 Airborne would have a panzer division in its landing area, 21, and so the armoured 
threat was immediate.   
     The value that Rommel placed on Allied airborne forces was now revealed in what 
happened next. In line with his determination to crush the landings on the beaches, his main 
effort to the defence of Normandy was a large-scale programme of minefield, fortification 
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and beach obstacle construction.725 He called for the laying of up to 20,000,000 land mines, 
and up to the 20 May 1944 an extra 4,193,167 had been laid under his direction. Rommel 
envisaged that airborne forces would either be scattered in small groups across all of France 
to motivate and mobilise French resistance forces, or more likely be employed in divisional-
sized operations to compromise the seaward facing defences ahead of an amphibious 
landing. 726  
 While this programme made the fortifications more formidable, Rommel’s personal drive in 
boosting the fortification program had its negative aspects. One negative aspect was that 
for the infantry ‘general training was now almost completely neglected’ as all the men 
‘became construction troops.’727 The diversion of activity exhausted troops, stalled field 
training and was often carried out inadequately.728 Rommel’s reputation and micro-
management also delayed effort: 
The inspection process which started in Denmark on 5 November 1943, did not 
conclude until March 1944. German commanders who did not wait for Rommel to 
evaluate ongoing programs risked being told to make significant changes while those 
who deferred major improvements until the Field Marshal arrived also risked 
incurring his wrath. As a result, commanders implemented improvements of German 
coastal defences in the West in a sequential fashion, rather than in a centralized and 
coordinated program.729 
 
As discussed above, Allied air reconnaissance discovered that anti-gliders were being 
installed in mid-April which caused a radical change to Gale’s divisional plan. It was intended 
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that these poles would be wired together, and shortly before the invasion Rommel had also 
gained the release of a million captured shells to arm these poles.730 In the area defended 
by 346 Gren Div and 17 Luftwaffe Field Div, some 250,000 of these poles were raised in 
fields considered possible airborne landing zones.731 Again, construction work demotivated 
some troops. Werner Kortenhaus, a 21. Pz Div tank driver saw the focus on building yet 
more defences as a waste of time: 
The troops, which were already fully occupied with constructing positions, digging in 
all heavy weapons and exhausting guard duty were now additionally burdened with 
such work, despite the employment of French civilians, who were well paid. Training, 
especially combat training, of the troops was severely neglected as the result of this 
work.732 
 
Indeed, Lieutenant Rudolf Schaaf (1716 Artillery Regiment) was simply happy to be in 
France: 
Twice wounded in the leg in Russia, Schaaf was one of many officers and men posted 
to France because they were unfit for further duty in the east – he walked with a 
pronounced limp. He and most of his comrades were enjoying their time in France, 
with plenty to eat and drink, all of it cheap. Above all, they were thankful to be out 
of the east.”The soldiers did as little work as possible,” he said, “and we were too 
busy putting up wire and planting ‘Rommel asparagus’ to have much time for 
training.733 
 
 However, the war diary of Heeresgruppe B recorded Rommel’s satisfaction with this news 
and the construction of anti-glider obstacles on 16 May: 
The O.B. explains the confident mood of leadership and troops, pointing out that a 
corps alone has positioned 900,000 traps for enemy gliders, while 1 million grenades 
are to be used to sharpen the airborne obstacles in the next weeks.734 
 
The failure to wire and mine the posts before D-Day would allow 5 Para Bde and its attached 
RE to cut them down quickly. In addition to fixed defences being developed, the fields 
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surrounding the rivers Douve, Dives and Merderet were flooded to hinder any airborne 
landing.735 Rommel’s application of his frenetic innovation to create plans to destroy gliders 
and kill paratroops, and the allotment of an enormous quantity of munitions, reflected the 
value he attached to Allied airborne forces. His driving leadership rapidly developed the 
fixed defences of the Atlantic Wall adapting old and captured munitions for his purpose. 
   The first troops that 6 Airborne would encounter would belong to 716 I.D.736 This was a 
Bodenständige (static) infantry division formed in May 1941 in Wehrkreis (military district) 
VI at Bielefeld specifically for garrisoning the threatened Atlantic/Channel coast.737 It had 
been posted to 15 AOK (Army) in Belgium in June 1941, and later moved to Normandy 
coming under the control of 84 AK (Army Corps) in June 1942 where it remained until D-
Day.738 The division was weak, with only two Grenadier Regiments (726 and 736, of three 
battalions each), some obsolete French tanks, while its organic artillery regiment (1716) was 
largely employed in manning fixed batteries.739In April 1944 the Division received two ‘Ost’ 
infantry battalions, 439 and 642.740 Seventy-two of these battalions had arrived in France in 
early 1944, composed of non-Russian Red Army POWs or Russian prisoners who had 
previously served in the German Labour Service, all officers and NCOs were German.741 They 
were integrated into existing German Army infantry regiments as third and fourth battalions 
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to boost bayonet strength. A set of minutes generated after a meeting of the senior 
commanders of 7 AOK gives recorded some key principles to be followed in preparing for 
the forthcoming battle. It gave a mixed message regarding Ost battalions: 
2) Eastern troops 
For a certain given reason Eastern battalions must be shifted out of key coastal 
positions. Care of the East. Regimental commanders must keep the Eastern 
battalions close to their hearts. 742 
    The presence of the Ost battalions augmented the Wehrmacht forces but was evidence of 
the exhausted state the German Army found itself in by mid-1944. 
 An analysis of the final defensive scheme adopted by the Division merits close study as it 
reveals critical weaknesses that 6 Airborne was to exploit. This was communicated to its 
personnel in a tagesbefehl of 13 April 1944.743 The fighting front of 716 I.D. was split 
between two large battle groups (kampfgruppe), Kommander Courselles and Kommander 
Riva Bella. Each group was led by the respective commander of the 726 and 736G.R, their 
organic battalions being augmented by ‘Ost’ battalions and the division’s artillery. This 
defence was conceived to crush a landing from the sea and guard key locations, and kept 
little in reserve that might be used to defeat Allied airborne troops. The limited mobility of 
the division would force it to fight from the positions it had prepared. The anti-tank troops 
(panzerjäger) and heavily armed pioneer infantry (Pionere) were carefully placed at key 
points, the plan detailing down to platoon level in the latter’s case.744 A German version of a 
French map of the Calvados coast provides further illustration of the 13 April instruction. 
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716 I.D.  is positioned in layered defence lines facing the sea, 6 Airborne Division’s objectives 
being surrounded by a plethora of company sized outposts.745 While this deployment meant 
that a local commander could quickly call on mutually-supporting forces close to a DZ/LZ to 
begin to counter-attack, unit cohesion had been dissipated with a knock-on effect in terms 
of generating sufficient weight for an attack to succeed. German doctrine maintained that 
defending infantry forces should mount ‘gegenstoss’, counter-blows, but 716 I.D. had little 
or no reserves to do so.746 Not everyone held Rommel’s view: 
The grouping of the reserves was a hobby of Field Marshal Rommel. It was his 
opinion that he could destroy the enemy with an attack in front of the MLR – 
consequently, in the water. All heavy weapons of the infantry were incorporated in 
the defensive installations, or had joined new combat installations (field strength). 
On the occasion I visited in May, I was reproached because I did not bring the 
reserves (Rifle Company without heavy weapons) close enough to the coast. He 
wished every soldier to be able to concentrate his fire on the water.747 
 
Von Schlieben the commander of 709 I.D. concurred, ‘Rommel didn’t want any local 
reserves, and crammed all and everything into the coastal main line of resistance.’748 ‘Hier 
steh ich- ich kann nicht anders’.749The counter-attack role was effectively handed to 21, 
Pz.Div, whose deployment in part overlaid that of 716 I.D. 
   21.Pz.Div was the reincarnation of a one of Rommel’s Afrika Korps panzer divisions lost 
with the surrender of Axis forces in Tunisia in May 1943. The Division had subsequently 
been rebuilt from a mechanized brigade located in France in July 1943, while it had been 
completed with recruits it still retained around 2,000 veteran troops who had fought either 
in the desert or Russia. These were mixed in with good quality conscripts and 
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Volksdeutschen recruits.750 The Division’s commander, Major-General Edgar Feuchtinger, 
stood out when compared with the commanders of the other Normandy panzer divisions as 
lacking current combat experience. He had commanded the Artillerie-Brigade West, the 
formation the Division had been built upon, and appeared to use Nazi Party connections to 
retain his position when it was transformed into 21.Pz.Div.751 The division had been 
equipped on the cheap – captured French Somua and R35 tanks had been gathered from 
across France, together with armoured carriers and commandeered Lorries. Major Becker, 
the commander of the Division’s self-propelled (SP) battalion, had however used his family’s 
engineering plant in the Ruhr to upgrade this assorted collection of vehicles.752 Panzer 
Regiment 100 (renumbered 22 in June) never received the battalion of Panther tanks which 
equipped most Panzer divisions, and went into action with a battalion of mixed obsolete 
French tanks and elderly Panzer Kampfwagen (Pz Kpw) IV together with a battalion of the 
latest ‘H/J’ version.  The view of the commander of Panzer group West, Geyr von 
Schweppenberg, was unfavourable as far as 21. Pz. Div. was concerned: 
21st Panzer Division: The division was reorganized after the African campaign with 
undesirable personnel from a large number of divisions. Even very thorough and 
experienced training could never overcome this basic fault. Part of its materiel was 
manufactured in French factories.753 
 
  Yet 21.Pz. Div. was heavily equipped with AFVs and its experienced officers trained its 
recruits to create a force that had the potential to eliminate any lightly equipped airborne 
formation.  The waiting mechanized German forces expected a massive commitment of 
Allied airborne forces, and trained hard to be able to crush them: 
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The theoretical aspect of the training consisted of a large-scale wargame in Paris in 
September 1943 involving the commitment of eight enemy airborne divisions. The 
bulk of these divisions were represented on a strategical scale, not tactically. All the 
leading figures of the Panzer forces in the West were summoned to attend. In a 
practical sense, individual Panzer divisions were engaged in manoeuvres involving 
both day and night fighting against airborne troops. The Fallschirm (paratroop) 
school at Dreux furnished the cadre for these manoeuvres. The objective was to 
“drill” these tactics.754 
 
  2. Pz .Div received orders in mid-February to be ready ‘for a swift march, aimed either 
against an airborne enemy, or a counter-attack against such enemy forces that succeeded in 
piercing the “Atlantic Wall.” II-SS.Pz AK, and 9-SS.Pz.Div in particular, were especially 
practiced in anti-airborne drills.755 Ewald Klapdor, serving with 10.SS.Pz.Div ‘Frundsberg’, 
recorded in his Normandy history how comprehensive the anti-airborne training was in 
II.SS.Pz.Kps. The locations over which manoeuvres and map wargames were played out 
were prescient: 
The troops were introduced to the structure of Anglo- American formations, 
parachute and airborne troops into divisions, each with one parachute brigade and 
two airborne brigades each of three battalions. An understanding  that the jump of a 
battalion of about five minutes would cover an area of approximately 720m X 
1,080m. Enemy landings south of the Seine estuary between Trouville and Tracey sur 
Mer (during map exercises on 9.1.1944 and 23.1. 1944) and in the area Evreux 
(simulations carried out on 2.2.1944) were envisaged. In an exercise of 23.3.1944, 
10.SS Panzer Division was inserted between Honfleur and Deauville which was pretty 
realistic, as events were to show a few weeks later. The written evaluations of these 
simulations, the emphasis of enemy air superiority, and how the troops would 
conduct themselves in this situation, troops was always in mind.756 
 
As seen in the above Schweppenberg quote, Luftwaffe Fallschirmjäger expertise to 
anticipate and counter Allied airborne forces was spun throughout the German defence 
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plans.  II. Fallschirm. Korps (3. FJ Div and 5. FJ. Div) was placed in Brittany to stop an early 
seizure of Brest while 91. Luftlande Div was stationed in the Cotentin to shield Cherbourg.757 
6 Fallschirmjager Regiment (6/F.G.R.), airborne troops themselves, were charged by LXXXIV 
AK ‘to assume responsibility for defence measures against parachute and airlanding troops’ 
in the southern part of the Cotentin peninsular.758  
     Infantry formations also engaged in specific training to deal with Allied airborne force as 
D-Day approached.  346 I.D., 6 Airborne’s future opponent in the Orne bridgehead, was 
charged with anti-airborne measures behind the Le Havre fortress. James Gavin stated in his 
personal war memoir that the US 82 Div captured a handbook issued by OB West entitled 
‘What Every Soldier Should Know About Airborne Troops’, while 243 I.D. produced their 
own anti-airborne forces memorandum.759 Divisional intelligence estimates assumed Allied 
invasion plans were entirely in place by April 1944, the number of divisions in place double 
the actual number and including ‘7 airborne divisions and 8 paratrooper battalions.’760 
  Returning to the crucial mechanized forces, whether the enemy came by air or sea 
determination and vigour can be seen in the training programme undertaken by 192 P.G.R. 
The Regiment would practice to maximise the effect of its role capability to achieve its 
mission of defeating the enemy – overwhelming mechanized attack.  With two battalions, 
one of which was carried in armoured personnel carriers (schützen panzerwägen - SPWs). 
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Each battalion had had four companies (Kompanie – Kp), three rifle and one heavy (nos. 4 
and 8), the latter fielding SP 75mm A.Tk guns. Kp 9 and 10 were SP Howitzers and 
Nebelwerfer (multiple rocket launcher) units.761 Its commander, Oberstleutnant Josef Rauch 
had seen action in the east and was determined to turn it into a first class regiment. In four 
memoranda the development of the Regiment can be seen over January and March 1944. 
The first set of notes dated 21 January concentrated on developing driving skills and anti-
aircraft drills.762 Both of these areas were clear priorities; around fifty per cent of the 
division’s drivers were unable to drive on joining, and the Allied air threat would be a 
dominating influence in the forth-coming battle.763 The inexperience of many of the junior 
leaders is revealed when disciplinary action was threatened if some initiative was not shown 
should a vehicle break down, ‘if a vehicle has failed, there is no reason for the crew to stand 
close to the vehicle or sit down. The leader should set a direction and the group should start 
walking.’764The second set of notes, an addendum issued by Rauch to the first dated 16 
February, pursued the importance of leadership. The responsibility of the company 
commanders in all aspects of training is addressed: 
For the generation of power and knowledge amongst his soldiers, the company 
commander is responsible for training even in the smallest tasks. It is particularly 
important that ferocity and spirit, discipline and confidence are kept high. It is 
mandatory to ensure that all orders are carried out. In this way the mutual trust 
which creates the fighting spirit needed under the rubble is made.765  
 
The note goes on to order training in night operations, adopting hedgehog (‘igeln’) positions 
if surprised by enemy attacks, and ensuring that all reinforcements were brought up-to-date 
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in all training areas.766 These subjects echo the battalion specific training that 2 Oxf Bucks 
pursued as they prepared for operations.767 Commanders on both sides appreciated that 
the landing battles would begin with surprise action and probably at night. 
  The third document is a general memorandum issued to every unit in the division and 
again supported by additional notes from Rauch. Training in March must now embrace 
‘individual training, unit training and leadership training,’ with all of the divisions units called 
upon to perform combat group (kampfgruppe) training by no later than 15 March. 
‘Shooting, driving and radios’ are all to be concentrated on while all tank gun practice at less 
than 1000m range is prohibited. Night training is to be carried out by all panzer grenadier 
battalions on 15 March, while 100 Pz.R is to organise an exercise to focus on tank versus 
tank combat.768 This training would be disrupted when 21.Pz. Div was suddenly ordered to 
transfer to Hungary in March 1944, when a pro-Soviet coup was suspected. It had travelled 
half the distance when it was recalled to Normandy.769 This incident reflected the German 
Army High Command’s (OKW) habit of pilfering France for forces should an emergency arise 
in the east. Considering the Wehrmacht believed that the invasion would take place 
probably in the early summer this was a desperate act.770  
  This assessment of 192 G.R.’s training regime is important, as 21.Pz.Div’s two motorised 
infantry regiments were in position close to the Calvados coast, heavily armed and mobile 
enough to smash the British airborne landings. It should be noted that Rauch’s training was 
as similarly relevant and task-focussed as Gale’s, although the former was training his men 
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to perform either a stubborn defence or participate in an overwhelming mechanised attack. 
However, like 716 I.D. their companies were scattered around individual locations.771 
Rommel visited the division frequently, and once suggested that in the counter-attack role 
against Allied airborne troops 21.Pz.Div was too dispersed, ‘O.B. has the impression that the 
21.Pz.Div has moved too far apart to secure the area against airborne troops.’772 ‘The way 
that the 21. Panzer Division was positioned in the Caen area ran risk that an airborne 
landing in the division’s billeting area would preclude its employment as a coherent 
formation.’773 Yet the policy of company positions remained in place, an important 
exception being 642 Ost Battalion which was concentrated bar one company at Hauger.774  
     The enemy that awaited 6 Airborne was therefore of a mixed quality but still quite 
capable of eliminating airborne troops. The reliability of Gale’s divisional intelligence was 
crucial.  The report of 28 April 1944 furnished a wealth of detail. The information available 
to Gale for 716 I.D. was meticulous, even down to the address of the divisional H.Q. in Caen 
– 83 Rue de Geole. It was accurately stated that 716 I.D. had two Grenadier Regiments, and 
was ‘only capable of 40% of the performance of a first class division in defence, and 15% in 
the attacking role.’775 It stated the ‘Russian bns’ were strong in numbers with five or six 
companies with around 200 men each, but short of heavy weapons.776 The tank strength of 
21 Pz. Div was overestimated, with two tank regiments of tanks of two battalions each 
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supported by heavy Tiger and ex-French tanks. The ‘Tps reported as elite and smart in 
appearance aged 18-30.’777 It was known that the fields in the Dives area had been flooded, 
‘artificial flooding of the river valley commenced in May 42 and caused principally through 
the closing of sluice gates at the mouth of the R.DIVETTE.’ 778 
  Apart from strengths, 6 Airborne also had some understanding of how the enemy would 
behave if attacked by airborne troops: 
In the case of coastal divs it is believed that the res bn would have an alarm pl or 
even coy kept ready to move off at any moment, possibly by MT [motor transport]. 
Reports have also been received of anti paratp Kommandos probably of pl str with 
the task of holding up air tps until rfts arrived. The alert would be given by bugle.779 
 
The final map issued to 6 Airborne before D-Day detailed the area of forthcoming 
operations in microscopic detail, the final version of a series of maps which had been issued 
to allied units for planning and training.780 Every type of artillery piece and mortar is shown, 
down to light machine guns. Lines of barbed wire and anti-tank ditches, trenches, strong 
points, areas of ‘inundation’ were all shown. Anti-glider poles were highlighted with 
distinctive blue and brown ‘X’s.  
For the men of 6 Airborne the waiting enemy had adopted a policy which potentially 
heightened personal risk. British airborne and commando forces had captured the close 
attention of the enemy at the highest level by late 1942. Hitler had received a continuous 
flow of reports concerning British special operations since August 1942, and on 18 October 
issued the ‘sharp’ order. This stated that all enemy soldiers captured in uniform while 




 Ibid., p. 3. 
779
 Ibid., p. 5.  
780
 BIGOT map, stop press edition, 20 May 1944, information as at 19 May 1944. (Bodleian Library, c.21 (198). 
222 
 
fighting like ‘bandits’ could be summarily executed.781  It did not apply to soldiers might 
‘surrender in the course of normal battle operations (offensives, large-scale landing 
operations and large-scale air-landing operations)’, but would effectively allow the 
execution of any airborne or commando soldier captured either alone or in a small group. At 
the lower end of the Wehrmacht chain of command British airborne troops had also made 
an impact. 1 Para Bde had gained notoriety amongst their opponents in Tunisia, and earned 
a nickname for British airborne forces: rote teufel - Red Devils.782  
   To summarise this section, Rommel had recognised that the invasion would have to be 
defeated at the water’s edge and therefore began a massive scheme of obstacle building 
along the threatened beaches. The value he attached to Allied airborne forces can be seen 
in the extension of the programme to include specifically anti-glider measures inland, 
indeed the one million shells to arm every post was a considerable investment at a time 
when Germany was scraping the bottom of every resource barrel. The negative aspect of his 
plan to fortify and hold the coastal crust was the resultant lack of strong local reserves 
capable of mounting counter-attacks with the necessary weight. This is apparent in the 
deployment of 716 I.D. If large mobile formations could arrive unmolested by Allied air 
power and naval gunfire to destroy the landings, then holding the coastal crust with a 
screen of infantry would be effective. But by deciding to fight the decisive action this zone 
required ready formed kampfgruppe to strike at landings (both by air and sea) according to 
a pre-arranged plan and without delay. Such a situation would have had dire consequences 
for scattered airborne forces, which could have been hit hard very quickly after landing and 
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not allowed to regroup or manoeuvre into more easily defended positions. As it was, the 
German defenders began the battle scattered themselves. This issue was counter-balanced 
somewhat by the increasingly heavy armament of German infantry at the lowest level,783 
but in the first instance of an airborne landing counter-attacks would be limited to company 
size. 
  The thesis themes can be seen at work in Rommel’s command as he envisioned defeating 
the invasion at the water’s edge or on the airborne landing zones. He had catapulted 
Heeresgruppe B into a frenzy of adaptation and innovation with fortification building and 
laying of mines, while he exhibited a strong leadership presence to push this work on. At the 
formation level, Josef Rauch similarly focussed doggedly to develop 192. Gren. Regt’s ability 
to initiate either a swift mechanised counter-attack to any invaders or enduring defence. 
 Gale’s divisional plan was straightforward and built on the his own planning principles of 
surprise, simplicity, proximity of DZ/LZ to objectives, some redundancy of force and close 
command and control once landed. Once his division was ensconced on its objectives it 
would defend the Orne bridgehead in depth, drawing enemy counter-attacks to their 
destruction.784 Returning to Figure 1 introduced in chapter two, the pre-operation 
preparations of both sides can be seen. The waiting defenders had invested much in fixed 
defences and some anti-airborne training, while 6 Airborne had been given extraordinarily 
detailed intelligence on the enemy and terrain and had developed their plans relying on this 
knowledge. The division’s training to achieve its D-Day objectives is where this study turns 
to next. 
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III. Mission-Specific Training – dealing with enemy armour and scattered drops 
 
It could be said that all the training the man received once he had been allocated to a unit in 
6 Airborne was mission-specific, as the prospect of the Second Front loomed large.  This 
section will view the unit level training through the example of 7 Para Bn’s preparation, and 
later review the training completed to deal with two of the most serious threats to the 
division on D-Day, that of scattered drops and enemy mechanised forces. 
At the battalion level, the planning and task-specific training undertaken by Pine-Coffin’s 7 
Para Bn again reveals the building in of redundancy to the overall plan, indeed an 
expectation of a worst case scenario. Aside from Bizz II785 where the Division was landed by 
either glider or parachute complete, 7 Para Bn jumped as a unit during Exercise Charity. 
They also parachuted as companies from C-47s, Stirlings, and also at night.786 Moving by 
company marches and A.Tk training reflected the concern that scattering could afflict the 
battalion and the possibility of an enemy armoured attack.787  However, for the battalion 
the most crucial period of preparation began on 11 May when a forward party was sent to 
Exeter to prepare for ‘boat training’, around the Countess Wear bridges. On the 13 May the 
second-in-command and intelligence officer were briefed on the battalion’s role during 
Operation Tonga before the whole unit undertook boat/dingy training on 15-16 May. 7 Para 
Bn was to act as the immediate reinforcement for D Company 2 Oxf Bucks, the coup de 
main party at the Caen Canal and Orne River bridges. The parachute battalion would be 
prepared to capture the area and complete the mission even if Major John Howard’s force 
had been annihilated and the bridges blown. 
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The Coup de main operation was successful and as a result of this success it was not 
necessary for the bn to cross the water obstacles by dinghies as had been expected. 
These dinghies were carried in kit bags, together with the necessary ropes for 
making the ferries, either on the legs of men or attached to bicycle chutes and 
thrown out by number ones of certain sticks. 30 dinghies and 12 recce boats 
together with a large number of ropes (falls) were carried in all.788 
 
    Once 7 Par Bn had landed, the 2 Oxf Bucks coup de main force under Major John Howard 
would come under Pine-Coffin’s command. Due to security constraints Howard was unable 
to inform his platoon commanders what their Normandy objective would be, but pursued 
Gale’s appreciation approach by holding ‘very lively discussion’ with them all concerning D 
Company’s bridge capturing mission in Ex Mush. This outline would become the basis of 
Howard’s final plan for Operation Deadstick.789 Howard’s force followed 7 Para Bn down to 
Exeter to practise their task around the Countess Wear bridges and would later rehearse the 
operation over and over again in an area with the canal and river marked out with white 
tape.790  
    Other examples of task-specific battalion training can be observed. 2 Oxf Bucks had 
rehearsed tactics which would have a direct benefit for their role as they advanced 
southwards to expand the airborne bridgehead. They practised day and night fighting 
patrols, ‘freezing into A.Tk hedgehog’ and street fighting.791 Similarly, the summary 
completed by 1 Para Bn’s CO at the start of their April war diary showed skills that would 
needed in the forthcoming campaign being boosted; field firing, swimming, street-fighting: 
Tempo of training during this month was speeded up in preparation for the 
operation that everyone felt was not far away. Special Courses were given to various 
Companies including a street-fighting course in Southampton, and a swimming 
course in the Yeovil Baths. The entire Battalion spent three days at Brighton under 
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adverse weather conditions on Field Firing. A Corps Scheme “MUSH” was held on the 
21st April. 1944, in which the 6th Airborne Division was pitted against the 1st 
Airborne Division. The Battalion performed very creditably on this Exercise. The 
Battalion received a large number of reinforcements from Camp Shilo, Manitoba, 
Canada, and they were turned over to the Training Company. The Battalion started 
to bring its self up to full War Establishment.792 
 
The war diary pages for the rest of the month then show that each of the specialist 
elements within the unit (Signals, MMG, Mortar platoons and the Intelligence section) also 
received additional training. May began in a similar vein, with the Exercise Lookout being 
held in the first week for the Intelligence Section to practice observation post work and to 
give them all the latest intelligence on the enemy in France. The Section’s weekly planner 
does however end with ‘TEN MILE FORCED MARCH’.793 
   Anthony King has identified training as a crucial basis for combat effectiveness, by 
developing strong cohesion through shared knowledge and rehearsal: 
In this way training generates solidarity in and of itself because it unites technical 
competences with a moral imperative to utilize them, even at personal risk. By 
uniting competence and morality (skill and morale), training is critical to combat 
performance and to the generation of cohesion.794 
 
This process can be further enhanced by soldiers being led into battle by the men who had 
trained them.795 6 Airborne’s training at all levels for the task it was to perform in Normandy 
was extremely thorough. Crookenden recalled how every platoon was carefully briefed 
using photographs and sand models, at the end of which each soldier had to stand up and 
repeat to his platoon commander what his own specific tasks in the operation. 6 Airborne’s 
continuous training created a virtuous circle of increased personal skill combined with 
personal pride and synergy with each mans’ closest comrades. 
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This chapter will now analyse Gale’s plans and the innovation of new equipment to deal 
with two key issues that had the potential to turn 6 Airborne Div’s Normandy operations 
into a catastrophe. First, how did 6 Airborne plan to deal with the problem of scattered 
glider landings and parachute drops? Second, the threat of a Wehrmacht armoured riposte 
to the airborne landings east of the Orne barrier. While 3 Div would be shielded by these 
two water barriers, Gale’s men on the eastern bank would be vulnerable to mobile 
armoured forces, lightly equipped as they were. 
    If Gale’s units were sufficiently dispersed by miss-drops and scattered glider landings then 
not only would it be unlikely that sufficient combat power be generated to achieve their 
objectives, but there was every chance that the division would be annihilated piecemeal by 
the Wehrmacht reinforcements advancing on the seaborne lodgement. 796 Also command 
and control would be greatly diminished as those men disorientated and lost through 
scattering would inevitably include commissioned and non-commissioned officers. 
Operation Deadstick would rely on the exceptional skill of the selected tug and glider pilots 
detailed to the mission, while Mallard would benefit from landing zones cleared and marked 
out in daylight. The mass drops of 3 and 5 Para Bdes were the most vulnerable, occurring 
over three separate dropping/landing zones (N, V, and K) at night, under fire and while 
other significant air operations were taking place around them. The navigational skill of the 
pilots, the effectiveness of the lead pathfinder paratroops, and the reliability of the 
Eureka/Rebecca system were the key interlinked factors here. 
   The first cause of scattering was navigational error. If the tug aircraft pilots were unable to 
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navigate their way to the DZ/LZ all else would be in vain. Hopkinson’s report into the 1  
Airborne Div’s severe scattering issues encountered during operations in Sicily laid much of 
the blame at the door of the aircrews that ‘were insufficiently trained for the tasks they 
were called on to do and that they lacked experience of anti-aircraft fire.’797 So how well 
trained were the air crews of 38 and 46 Groups RAF for the Normandy operations? 
  The well-established 38 Group RAF had built up its flying hours steadily in the months 
which preceded D-Day. In the period January to May 1944, the Group’s aircraft had amassed 
30,710 flying hours (peaking with an average of thirty-one flying hours per aircraft in May), 
carrying out on average at least nine glider towing missions and nearly ten live parachute 
drops per aircraft.798 46 Group RAF had been formed hurriedly with a group equipment of C-
47s in early 1944,799 but by the end of April had a trained crew for every frontline aircraft for 
parachute operations. Night training had been difficult to expand due to the close proximity 
of other RAF bases in the area, but had been the focus of ‘maximum concentration’ in 
April.800  The 20 April report also notes that while some progress had been made with Gee 
system training,801 Rebecca equipment training had been difficult due to a lack of trained 
ground staff able to maintain it.802 The intense preparation for Tonga/Mallard also included 
extensive use of scale models and photographs: oblique and vertical pictures were issued to 
the crews; a special night target map of the area of airborne operations was created, while a 
film was produced by moving cameras at the appropriate height over the scale models built 
                                                          
797
 TNA CAB 106/691, 1st Airborne Divison Sicily Report. Part Five: Lessons and Conclusions, p. 2. 
798
 Calculated from TNA AIR 8/1386 38 Group Monthly Progress Reports, January-May 1944 and TNA AIR 
37/111 38 Group Organisation and Formation. Loose Minute 20 February 1944, '38 Group Squadrons'. 
799
 See chapter two – air assets. 
800
 TNA AIR 38/110 46 Group Formation and Progress Reports. 27 March 1944, p. 2, and 20 April 1944, p. 2. 
801
 GEE was a Bomber Command navigational device invented in 1942. A navigator could work out his position 
by observing the time taken to receive pulse signals from three separate ground stations. John Terraine, The 
Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (Sevenoaks: Sceptre, 1988), p. 473. 
802
 TNA AIR 38/110 46 Group Formation and Progress Reports, 20 April, p. 3. 
229 
 
by 6 Airborne at Tileshead camp.803 All air training involving troops ceased at the end of the 
first week of May to allow the RAF three weeks of concerted effort to bring its crews and 
aircraft ‘up to concert pitch.’804 The pilots of the gliders and tug-aircraft for Deadstick had 
the most demanding mission of all in terms of navigation. The mission was a coup de main 
working under the assumption that both of the bridges were prepared for sudden 
demolition, so complete surprise was vital. The use of gliders would allow for a near silent 
approach giving the men the best chance to land in concentrated platoon groups to 
complete the task. Eight of the best glider crews were selected from the Glider Pilot 
squadrons and sent to Brize Norton for specialized training. Two sodium flare-lit fields were 
set up which were approximately the same sizes as LZ Y and X, and landings practiced, with 
the pilots wearing dark glasses. The number of flares was gradually reduced until the pilots 
could land the gliders in near complete darkness.805   
     The air plan extracted the best value from the experience of the crews and matched the 
right tasks with the aircraft available. The C-47s would drop the bulk of the lightly equipped 
3 Para Bde on its three DZ/LZs; while the more experienced 38 Group pilots would drop the 
pathfinders, advanced parties and the coup de main force, the larger Halifax aircraft would 
tow the gliders carrying the A.Tk guns and other heavy equipment.806 
   6 Airborne’s part in guiding aircraft to the DZs and LZs was the duty of the pathfinder 
company, 22 Indep Para Coy. The pathfinder plan for Tonga relied on eighty men split into 
six sticks of ten men (two sticks per DZ/LZ K, N and V) to mark out the three landing zones 
with a reinforcement group of twenty men. It was planned that they would land at 0020 
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hours, four minutes after Deadstick had commenced, aiming to have their Eureka beacons 
and holophane lights in place and working five minutes before the main Tonga landings 
(0050 hours).807 This allowed twenty-five minutes from the pathfinders leaving the 
Albemarles to completing their set up.808 Major Lennox-Boyd’s company had practiced 
extensively for the mission. From 1 January to 27 May they had carried out twenty-five 
named exercises which included four division sized, each of ninety or more gliders, LZ 
marking missions.809 Fifteen exercises (not all overlapping the named schemes) had included 
night activity. Two exercises, Heathen and Heathen II had focused specifically on setting up 
the EUREKA II equipment. 22 Company had rehearsed both 3 and 5 Para Bdes, as well as 1 
Para Bde, the Polish Para Bde and US forces.810 In addition the Company had run two 
pathfinder courses for the men who would form the advance parties from the six parachute 
battalions before the main bodies arrived. While all this had been achieved the company 
had completed 560 jumps in addition to those as part of the exercises.8116 Airborne’s path-
finding parachute force was well prepared; the success of Operation Tonga thus depended 
on the navigational technology that they would set up for the approaching pilots. 
  The Rebecca/Eureka two part system was made up of a ground-based transmitter beacon 
(Eureka) which emitted a radio signal detected by a receiver (Rebecca) mounted in either an 
aircraft or glider:  
The aircraft transmits a R.F. pulse; when this is received by the beacon, the latter 
immediately emits an answering pulse on another radio frequency. The time 
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between the initial transmission and the reception of the answering pulse in the 
aircraft is measured by the observation of a time base on the screen of the cathode 
ray tube, and from this the range can be determined. Bearing is obtained with the 
aid of directive receiving aerials mounted on the wings to port and starboard of the 
aircraft fuselage. The amplitudes of the signals received on the aerials are compared, 
thus giving the desired information.812 
 
The system had been developed in 1941 to facilitate the blind dropping of equipment and 
weapons to the resistance groups organised by SOE, but by the summer of 1942 trials had 
been ordered to explore the possibility of using it in conjunction with airborne forces.813 The 
first use of the device on British airborne operations had not been auspicious. On 19 
November 1942 a detachment of airborne RE had crash landed two gliders in an attempted 
sabotage raid on the Vemork hydro electric plant in Norway. In the view of the RAF senior 
air staff officer of Army Co-operation Command, Operation Freshman had failed for four 
reasons. These were the poor briefing of the air crews, the unserviceability of the Halifax tug 
aircraft, the poor Norwegian winter weather, but primarily because the Eureka/Rebecca 
system failed completely.814  
The system was vulnerable in several key areas. The battery life of the Rebecca apparatus 
was very limited, the advice being that it not be turned on until with around five miles of the 
estimated position of the beacon, its battery life only lasting between thirty and sixty 
minutes.815 The height of the aircraft carrying Rebecca could also inhibit the system’s 
performance, whether high or low, a variable of up to 500 yards being possible from a signal 
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detected at 5,000 feet.816 Further, if the beacons were positioned close than five miles they 
would interfere with each other’s signals. 817 Next both the beacon and the receiver-
transmitter were physically vulnerable. The aerials for Rebecca covered much of the 
airframe of a Horsa, in addition to wiring connecting them to the battery and the control 
dials in the cockpit, all of which would be vulnerable to enemy flak from the ground. 
Moreover the Rebecca cathode tube indicator that the pilot of the glider read while 
approaching the landing zone was difficult to interpret, its short battery life then only gave 
the pilot thirty minutes to find the DZ/LZ at night and almost certainly under enemy ground 
fire.818 The Eureka beacon was packed into a kit bag for dropping while its batteries were 
strapped across the body of a paratrooper in a webbed harness and was therefore 
vulnerable to damage when landing.819 These shortcomings came together to make the 
system vulnerable to damage by either accident or enemy design. 
  In summary, 6 Airborne’s air plan had both strengths and weaknesses. The rapid build-up 
of 46 Group meant that it would inevitably be less experienced once committed to action 
when compared to 38 Group, but the pivotal Deadstick mission would be performed by 38 
Group RAF crews. The Eureka/Rebecca system had been used in action, and two sets had 
been provided to each stick of paratroops to provide some redundancy in the case of one of 
the sets being smashed on landing. The pathfinders had practiced vigorously for months 
leading up to the operations and had been thoroughly briefed on the vital task they would 
perform. Apart from allowing 46 Group RAF more flying hours to practice, with the 
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technology available in June 1944 the plans put in place were the best that could be 
conceived. 
   The second key threat concerned enemy armoured forces, for which a well-coordinated 
anti-tank plan was needed. The Wehrmacht forces waiting in Normandy fielded numerous 
armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) all capable of inflicting severe casualties on the lightly 
armed parachute troops that would seize the Orne bridgehead objectives.820   Gale had 
identified that a Wehrmacht armoured northerly push from the Caen area to the two crucial 
bridges represented the most critical threat to the 6 Airborne’s bridgehead, and organised 
two successive exercises which concentrated on the ‘siting and positioning’ of anti-tank 
(A.Tk) guns, Buster and Buster II.821 This was in addition to the airlanding A.Tk gun platoons 
being sent on routine ‘shoots’.822 The reduced strength 21.Pz.Div had been clearly identified 
to the southwest of Caen, air reconnaissance reports had indicated that the bulk of this 
division was harboured around Mezidon.823 This was some 30km from DZ ‘N’, near enough 
to allow warning of the capture of the bridges to be passed to the alerted division quickly, 
yet far enough away to allow  it breathing space to organise its self to attack the Ranville/Le 
Bas de Ranville position. Additionally the full-strength 12-SS.Pz.Div was located to the west 
of the landing area near Hernay-Dreux, which could develop operations along the same 
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channel. 824 The predictions for the appearance of the various components of 12 SS Panzer 
were hair-raising. The Recce battalion could be in action against the Ranville position by 
1000hrs, both panzer grenadier regiments by midday and the complete division by 
1800hrs.825 6 Airborne would be shielded by the canal and river if the panzers attacked from 
the west but if 3 Div was unable to relieve the lightly armed parachute brigades on the 
eastern side they would suffer heavily, if not be overwhelmed. It was anticipated that if 3 
Div ran to timetable it would be at the bridges by 1100 hrs, but Gale had to plan for a worst 
case scenario.826 
  Gale planned to deal with this threat making full use of all A.Tk guns within the division, 
and by closely co-opting the supporting elements available to him within the 1 Corps/Sword 
area. By the summer of 1944 the British army had effective A.Tk weapons to deal with all 
but the most heavily armoured Wehrmacht AFVs. The PIAT (‘projector infantry anti-tank’) 
was issued on a generous scale to the parachute units within the Division,827 but was only 
effective at short range (30m) from a well-concealed ambush position.828 The effective 
deployment of the division’s A.Tk guns was needed to secure the bridgehead against a more 
concentrated mechanised attack. Each of the airlanding battalions sported eight six-
pounders, 829 while 3 and 4 AL A.Tk Btys held twenty-four six-pounders (6 pdr) and eight of 
the powerful seventeen-pounder (17 pdr) gun between them (the latter being in A and B 
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Troops, 3 AL A.Tk Bty). While the 6 pdr had the advantage of being small enough to load into 
a Horsa glider with its jeep tow, it was incapable of disabling the most up-to-date panzers 
deployed in France until the widespread issue of armour piercing discarding sabot (APDS) 
ammunition later in the summer.830 However the 17 pdr had been identified as a battle-
winning weapon prior to the landings and had been in use since early 1943. 831 Indeed, in a 
letter to the GOC 8 Corps regarding the number of enemy Panther tanks that might be 
encountered, Dempsey wrote: 
17-prs in all forms, and sabot ammunition, are absolutely first in our priority of 
equipment. The QMG and all those concerned are quite clear on this.832 
 
The only drawback to the seven 17 pdr was its large size, which required a Hamilicar glider 
for both it and its tractor tow. Gale planned to make the best use of the A.Tk guns within 
the division to form as formidable a barrier as possible around the key Bas de 
Ranville/Ranville position that was vulnerable to an enemy armoured push.  The shortage of 
aircraft dictated that the six-pounders of 12 Devon and 3 AL A.Tk Bty would have to be 
delivered to the bridgehead on D+1.833 This removed twenty six-pounders from Gale’s 
calculations which dictated he could only allocate one section of two 6 pdrs (4 AL A.Tk Bty) 
to 3 Para Bde for the pre-assault shoot against the Merville Battery, and to later consolidate 
the Bois de Bavent-Troarn line.834 Gale weighted the loading of his fourth lift (0320 hours 
onto DZ ‘N’) towards his A.Tk guns in addition to RE assets and his divisional HQ. The four 
seventeen-pounders of A Troop 3 AL A.Tk Bty and the remainder of 4 AL A.Tk Bty were 
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flown in to cement the 5 Para Bde position around the bridges.835 The detailed instructions 
for Kindersley and Poett emphasised the importance of maintaining A.Tk and machine gun 
defences. To 6 AL Bde: 
The framework of your defence plan must rest on the anti-tank and medium 
machine gun layout. This layout must cover the open southern flank and must 
further include alternative positions to cover the open ground north of Ranville.836  
 
  Each of the airlanding battalions were eminently suited to a vigorous defence of the main 
LZ and the bridges. Not only did they contain the 6 pdr A.Tk guns, but also four Vickers 
medium machine guns, eight three-inch mortars and twelve 20mm anti-aircraft (AA) guns 
which could also be used to deadly effect against ground targets.837 Even with the absence 
of 12 Devon, Gale planned that the Brigade would potentially land 1,600 fresh men directly 
into the bridgehead adjacent to the key divisional objectives. 
   The defence of the two bridges was the most important objective that 6 Airborne Div had 
been set, and Gale’s simple plan made the best use of the light parachute and heavy glider 
troops he had at his disposal.838 The presence of the anti- glider poles forced Gale into 
switching 5 Para Bde for 6 AL Bde to seize the bridges, a task they were well suited for, 
landing at night with a strong short-range A.Tk (PIAT) potential, well capable of dealing with 
enemy probes by single or small numbers of AFVs. The fly-in of 4 AL A.Tk Bty towards dawn 
and later 6 AL Brigade would give the long-range A.Tk capability needed against organised 
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Wehrmacht attacks. The concentration of the two brigades would allow Gale and the 
divisional staff to exert close personal control on operations, being able to visit any area 
under pressure and organise a response immediately.   
The second solution utilised by Gale to the threat of a concentrated enemy forces was the 
planned co-option of the firepower of nearby conventional role forces. For a division with a 
light scale of heavy weapons due to its specialist role, 6 Airborne would be heavily reliant on 
its airlanding artillery once landed and engaged in combat.  General Sir Bernard Paget had 
made it clear to Gale in June 1943 that his division would almost certainly be included in the 
invasion operations it was anticipated First Canadian and Second Armies would be carrying 
out on the Continent, beginning a race to recruit and train his division.839 The inclusion of 
still forming elements in the airborne plan extended to organic units of the 6 Airborne 
Division itself, particularly its artillery and signals units.  The war establishment of the Signals 
detachment for each airborne division was still being altered only two months before D-Day, 
with additional personnel being drafted in from London District and Southern Command.840 
The 53rd Regiment Royal Artillery, the Worcestershire Yeomanry (53 RA), joined the Division 
on 27 October 1943 but was only fully mobilised by the end of January 1944; its three 
batteries fired together for the first time on 19 January. It would only take to the air for the 
first time in gliders on 19 March as part of Exercise Bizz II, just ten weeks before D-Day. 841  
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   As has been seen, only one battery of 53 RA was landed by air on 6 June, the other two 
batteries (210 and 212) and supporting elements being landed on 13 June by sea.842 
However the 6 Airborne’s CRA, Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Norris, formed an improvised unit 
later called the ‘Forward Observer Unit’. This placed the two battery commanders of the 
seaborne batteries with the two parachute brigades and used other Forward Observing 
Officers (FOOs) of 3 Div and Forward Observers Bombardment (FOsBs) who directed RN 
gunfire support. The two Parachute Brigades received the bulk of the FOOs, while 6 AL Bde 
and 1 SS Bde had just one FOO and some RN support.843 The system was set up before D-
Day by Norris who co-ordinated all the nominated officers and ORs who reported to him at 
Bulford to be briefed. Once established in the bridgehead the artillery support 6 Airborne 
could call on was considerable, enjoying the pooled assets of 1 Corps.844 By skilfully 
combining his own RA resources in this way Norris planned to completely alleviate 6 
Airborne’s shortage of artillery assets and enormously increase the Division’s firepower. 
   One area which could have been improved was 6 Airborne’s capability to call in RAF 
support. Sebastian Ritchie identified this as a major weakness in Operation Market, and he 
makes the point that nothing was done until the last minute before the Arnhem operation 
to rectify the problems 6 Airborne encountered in Normandy.845 Shelford Bidwell states that 
a Colonel Carrington visited Browning to discuss the Woodall ground-air system before 
Market, but nothing was done about developing an airborne version, laying the blame at 
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Browning’s door.846The post action report which he refers to, states that prior to Overlord it 
had been agreed that some signallers would be trained to call in air support but that ‘with 
all the other training commitments in an airborne unit’ there had not been time. Also, the 
WS 76 wireless set had been found to underpowered, and the British truck which had the 
radio ‘tentacle’ attached could not be carried by air.847 The utilisation of the massive Allied 
air component would certainly have made up for 6 Airborne’s shortage of heavy weapons 
and it is strange that another vehicle, most obviously a jeep, could not have been adapted. 
During Operation Thursday, the second Chindit operation into Burma (March 1944), 
Wingate’s air-transported Chindits had been ably supported by the Air Commando’s 
Mustang fighter-bombers.848 So the precedent was there.  
  The assault on the battery at Merville throws up some difficult questions regarding the 
plan formulated by Terence Otway. His task was daunting enough – 9 Para Bn was to assault 
a heavily fortified battery position garrisoned by an estimated 200 men. Otway formulated 
an intricate plan to break into and destroy the Merville battery which had been reliant on 
heavy weapons which were lost in the scattered glider and parachute landings. While the 
rest of the battalion established a ‘firm base’, the attack would be supported by a separate 
mortar position, two sniping groups armed with A.Tk rifles and Brens, a diversion group with 
PIATs and German speakers to confuse the defenders with misleading shouted orders and 
two 6 pdr A.Tk guns positioned to the west of the battery to add further fire. The actual 
assault would be carried out by a breeching company followed by an assault company while 
a glider assault party landed simultaneously on the casements, guided in by star shells fired 
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into the compound by the mortar group. 849 Otway’s plan was complicated, but he had 
trained his men exhaustively to ensure its execution and both he and Hill believed the task 
could be done.850  However, on D-Day the force Otway was able to muster on the ground 
made the enactment of this plan impossible – just 150 men from an original strength of 
613.851  
  Could Merville have been dealt with differently? Alistair Pearson’s view was set down in 
Alan Jefferson’s book, as he is recorded viewing one of the rehearsals to storm the battery, 
‘It’s all far too complicated for me.’852 In his IWM interview with Julian Thompson, Alistair 
Pearson, was frank in his views of Otway’s plan. ’For an airborne operation it was out of this 
world’, ‘going through a minefield – madness’, but ‘Hill agreed the plan.’ When asked how 
he would have tackled Merville, Pearson stated it needn’t have been that complicated – a 
diversion and then the main gate blown.853 In the light of the St. Nazaire raid (see Figure 2), 
a high effect/value result but at high cost, it could be construed that as long as 9 Para Bn’s 
attack foiled the battery’s activity a pyrrhic victory would be acceptable. In such a scenario, 
allowing Otway the extra weapons and the three gliders for his small coup de main would 
seem reasonable to give the battalion the best chance of success. 
 By 5 June 1944, Gale had created a high quality infantry division trained in a specialist role 
and ready to spearhead the British Army’s most important offensive operation in Europe 
during the Second World War. Only a small percentage of its men had seen actual combat, 
the division would be brand new to battle, and executing Britain’s first divisional sized 
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airborne operation at night.854 The division was lightly armed, but would be well-supported 
by the firepower of surrounding conventional role forces once they had landed. 6 Airborne 
was highly motivated and cohesive thanks to the development of a strong esprit de corps 
brought about a shared hardship which was the result of tough, realistic and relevant 
training.  
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Chapter Six - Combat Effectiveness: 6 Airborne Division in Action, 6 June – 27 
August 1944 
 
By 5 June 1944 Gale’s 6 Airborne Div was highly trained and well-motivated, but it was still 
untried in battle. Despite its lack of combat experience its very first action would see it 
tasked to perform vitally important tasks in support of the D-Day landings.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to isolate the combat effectiveness of 6 Airborne both during the landings 
phase of the campaign and later while holding the Orne bridgehead. The first chapter 
section will show how combat effectiveness has been defined by commentators, and how 6 
Airborne’s performance can be gauged. In part two, how successful was 6 Airborne in 
achieving its own objectives and supporting the seaborne landings? How can the investment 
in moulding be seen benefitting the division, and how did airborne leadership elevate its 
performance?  The truest measure of the combat effectiveness of military forces, apart 
from the achievement of finite objectives, has to be their effect on the enemy. The third 
part of this chapter explores the Bréville episode (10-12 June 1944), the decisive action 
fought in the Orne bridgehead. The opposition was formed from the strong 346 Gren. Div 
supported by elements of 711 Gren. Div and 21.Pz.Div.The battle is isolated as a case study 
to show the impact of 6 Airborne on the enemy by viewing the war diary of LXXXI A.K. The 
confidence of the German Corps command can be seen to erode as events unfold and 6 
Airborne dominates the Bréville battlefield inflicting severe losses on 346 Div. A final fourth 
section reviews how the Division held the line for three months, and how it adapted to the 




I. The Measurement of Second World War Airborne Forces Combat Effectiveness 
 The creation of 6 Airborne Div must balance cost against operational benefit, and the 6 
Airborne’s impact on D-Day operations can be viewed as a summation of their ‘combat 
effectiveness.’ A survey of how combat effectiveness has been defined and calculated is 
required at this point to set 6 Airborne’s contribution to D-Day into the theoretical 
discussion. 
  Combat Effectiveness can be defined as ’1) A term used to describe the abilities and 
fighting quality of a unit. 2) The quality of being effective in combat.’855 This meaning defines 
proven ability, distinct from ’combat power’, which is the summation of the potential 
destructive power, the means, that can be targeted against the enemy,856 or ‘broadly 
speaking, resources multiplied by effectiveness.’857  The human element of combat power 
could also be called ‘Fighting Power’, for which a more expansive definition was provided by 
Martin van Creveld: 
Within the limits set by its size, an army’s worth as a military instrument equals the 
quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by what, in the present study, will 
be called “Fighting Power.” The latter rests on mental, intellectual, and 
organizational foundations; its manifestations, in one combination or another, are 
discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the 
willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die. “Fighting Power”, in brief 
is defined as the sum total of mental qualities that make armies fight.858 
 
Put simply, combat effectiveness represents the ability/prowess of the unit, while combat 
power is the total destructive power it can level against the enemy. Therefore 6 Airborne 
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was lightly armed and in possession of limited munitions and supplies, its combat 
effectiveness must be the key focus. 
  The subject of military effectiveness, of which combat effectiveness forms an element 
(along with political, strategic and operational effectiveness) has been explored closely by 
the writers who have contributed to the three recent volumes which have been edited by 
Alan R. Millett and Williamson Murray.859 These volumes wrap combat effectiveness up in 
tactical effectiveness, which factors in the quality of equipment and vehicles. 860 Williamson 
Murray’s chapter in the Second World War volume which explores Britain’s military 
effectiveness applauds the UK’s strategic effectiveness, citing the use of intelligence and the 
allocation of resources as war-winning elements, but questions the British Army’s 
operational and tactical capability. Improvements could have been made, but: 
But it must be stressed that those improvements in effectiveness at best could only 
have been incremental in nature and would have required a substantial rethinking of 
tactical and operational approaches, a continuity of leadership that was not often 
present, and a willingness to train long and hard at making small improvements.861 
 
His words chime with the conclusions of Timothy Harrison-Place regarding the training and 
doctrinal clarity of conventional role forces as discussed in chapter five.862   
  Earlier analysis had attempted to calculate finitely a unit or formation’s combat 
effectiveness or fighting power. An actual empiric measurement of a unit’s combat 
effectiveness can be used in two ways – as a method of retrospectively assessing its impact 
in a historical action, or as a way of gauging its possible contribution in a future encounter. 
This obviously moves the measurement of combat effectiveness from being a historical 
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analytical exercise into the realms of current military affairs and defence policy. In either 
situation judgements have to be made in the allocation of numeric values to be set against 
variables, for example as to the extent the battlefield’s terrain will augment the defence, or 
perhaps the impact of a higher standard of training invested in one of the combatants.  
 Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy has gone to the greatest lengths to use a grading or mathematical 
approach to calculate combat effectiveness.863 The first method used a complicated 
calculation based on a large number of variables864, while a second system was based more 
simply on a ratio of casualties inflicted to own personnel involved moderated by a factor 
defined by the previous calculation.865  Dupuy’s approach fails in situations in which own 
losses are of no concern to one side, and cannot measure an improvement in an army’s 
performance which routinely suffers heavy casualties. The allocation of grades/numeric 
values can be subject to debate. For example, Lt. General John H. Cushman discussed the 
auditing of the armed forces of the fighting powers in the two world wars by the historians 
who had contributed to the Millett and Murray edited military effectiveness series, grading 
them for operational and tactical performance. 866He states in his footnotes that ‘ratings are 
highly subjective,’867 but the grades given to the British Empire can be questioned, especially 
when he states in the same footnote that the scores encompass the skill levels of all the 
nations’ armed forces, air land and sea. Few would argue that the British Army had doctrinal 
learning challenges during the Second World War, but scoring it lower than the Russian 
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army in the First World War seems questionable, and including the 1939-45 Royal Navy on 
the same grade is extraordinary. 
  Stephen Biddle’s 2004 monograph stimulated a lively response amongst established 
military analysts, as he sought to develop a new way of calculating combat power by shifting 
the focus away from calculations based on ‘gross numerical strength’ and towards a theory 
based more on doctrine as the reason why battles are won or lost: 
I argue that a particular nonmaterial variable – force employment, or the doctrine 
and tactics by which forces are actually used in combat – is centrally important, 
shaping the role of material factors and often predetermining winners and losers.868 
 
Biddle was criticised for the operational examples he used, the calculating system/statistical 
analysis presented and his focus on high-intensity battle at a time when asymmetric warfare 
seemed certain to dominate future conflicts.869Rupert Smith set forward his own formula to 
calculate ‘capability’, based on three factors that he identified as the vital elements in 
winning battles, viewing the action as a ‘trial of strength’, means, will and way: 
And so, having analysed and understood the necessary components, we can finally 
attempt to assess the overall capability of a force as a product of the trial of strength 
and a clash of wills: the means multiplied by the way multiplied by the way 
multiplied by the will times three. For those of a mathematical bent I express it as a 
formula: 
Capability = Means x Way2 x 3Will870 
 
Smith then gives no list of suggested factors for any combatants’ means, will or way factors 
for past wars. He does however illustrate his thinking with a brief discussion of the Vietnam 
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War, to show the importance of will, and the British in Malaya to show how limited means 
can be managed to produce victory.871  Two recent theses have also explored combat 
effectiveness. Andrew Hargreaves, in his exploration of Allied Special Forces identified two 
simple metrics for these raiding units: 
The value and cost-effectiveness of specialist formations varied widely, and turned 
on many calculations. Yet it is both proportionality (in the number of formations 
raised and the scale of each) and utility (the frequency, duration and significance of 
their use) that are perhaps the most significant considerations.872 
 
Peter Wood exhaustively explored different systems for explaining combat effectiveness, 
creating his own flow diagram to show the influences which he determined affected the 
performance of 21 NZ Bn.873 Succinctly, he clearly stated that attaining operational goals was 
an absolute measure of success in battle; ‘A determinant of 21 Battalion’s combat 
effectiveness, irrespective of casualty ratios or tactical effectiveness, will be whether it 
successfully completed its assigned mission or not.’874 
   Reviewing the high stakes nature of 6 Airborne’s objectives and combat performance on 
D-Day through the criteria set down above, it becomes apparent that Wood’s absolute 
measure of success/failure on objectives has to be a cornerstone measure.  Achieving 
Hargreaves’ ‘disproportionately favourable results’ in casualties inflicted on the enemy to 
satisfy Dupuy’s formula is irrelevant, as the objectives are critical to Second Army and 
stretching enough.875  Therefore of perhaps more use as a measure of airborne forces, 
operating in role, would be ‘mission effectiveness – the ability of a unit or formation to 
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accomplish an assigned mission,’876 although Smith’s ‘way’ could represent the shock-
surprise element. The ‘means’ being the light scale of arms airborne forces carried and 
obviously the emphasis on ‘will’ represents the effect of the hardening-type training these 
units receive. As airborne forces during the Second World War were used, once landed, to 
conduct the final stage of close infantry assaults, with little chance of a safe withdraw in 
case of failure, achieving operational success as planned was paramount.  
  What must temper this focus on success or failure is the issue of Pyrrhic victory.877 As Smith 
observed there is no point in a commander using his men in such a way as to ‘lose the 
force.’ 878 In the early hours of 6 June 1944, the attainment of the operational goal would be 
pointless if 3 and 5 Para Bdes were so reduced by casualties they were incapable of holding 
the bridges/Ranville area and Bois de Bavent high ground. The German pre-disposition to 
launch vigorous local counter-attacks would be challenging to a lightly armed airborne 
force; especially one which had suffered serious losses of weapon-bearing head count and 
perhaps more significantly, junior leaders. Also in the longer term, the context of the 1944 
UK’s diminishing manpower pool would mean that a rebuild of the division would be 
prolonged, or simply not viable. In short, a success formula for airborne forces during the 
Second World War must see the objective(s) achieved, but not at a cost which leaves the 
units in question too weak to defend them until relieved. 
The conclusion of this study is that the combat effectiveness of 6 Airborne must be 
measured by the simple metric of whether it achieved its set objectives. 
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II. In Role Effectiveness - The Landings Phase – 6 June 1944 
The impact of the superb success of the critical coup de main operation on the two Orne 
barrier bridges must first be considered. The six Horsa gliders carrying Howard’s reinforced 
company were released at 0020 hrs, four landing with great accuracy close to objectives 
which were quickly captured with only three casualties. The garrison was completely 
surprised by the near silent arrival of the gliders, in what Leigh-Mallory would later call the 
‘greatest feat of flying during the whole war’. 879 If Operation Deadstick had failed the entire 
divisional plan would have begun to unravel. If Howard’s force had been destroyed by 
mishap or enemy AA fire, or badly scattered, 7 Para Bn would have been required to capture 
the bridges. This unit, reduced by scattering, would have had to attack an alerted garrison 
and the battle could have become costly and drawn out if more enemy troops had been 
drawn to the firing.880 The success of Deadstick allowed 5 Para Bde to concentrate on the 
consolidation of the Ranville/Bas de Ranville position and to prepare for the glider landings 
due at 0230 hrs. This company-sized operation provided the key element of surprise for the 
whole of Gale’s plan. While it has been revisited time and again by historians, the 
importance of its success cannot be underestimated as the entire divisional plan revolved 
around its success. 
                                                          
879
 In the case of the former, five of the tug pilots reported release from their tugs between 4,500 and 5,500 
feet. The three gliders intended to land on LZ X for the Caen Canal Bridge all landed on target, while the two 
for DZ Y (Orne River Bridge) landed 150 and 400 yards away respectively. The third glider for DZ Y was forced 
to release blindly on the orders of the tug pilot one mile east of Houlgate. This glider carried Captain Priday 
Howard’s second-in-command and another platoon and landed close to two bridges crossing the Dives at 
Périers-en-Auge eight miles away. BTC 119 (Shrivenham), ‘The Air Plan’, 1947 Staff College, Camberley, 1947 
Course, pp. 10-11. 
880
 The troops at the bridges were estimated as well armed all though not numerous. As far as the intelligence 
available to 3rd Para Bde was concerned, the two bridges were guarded by approximately 24 men with 13 
MGs, 2 other infantry guns and an AA gun. (AA) 4-H4-2.21.4, Gale Papers, ‘6 Airborne Division, Summary of 
Information No.1’, 28 April 1944, ‘Details of Inf String Pts and Areas believed to occupied by Tps, B- Inland 
Areas’, p. 2. 
250 
 
  From 0100 hrs the mass of the two parachute brigades began their descent. All of the 
battalions were scattered in a varying degrees, due to problems the Pathfinder Company 
had encountered, which included the untimely death of their CO, but where mainly centred 
around faulty and incorrectly positioned Eureka beacons.881  
   This large company was the path-finding unit for the Division, and was charged with 
marking out the night DZ/LZ for the subsequent landings by 3 and 5 Para Bdes.882 Six sticks 
of 22 Indep Para Coy together with advance parties of the parachute battalions were landed 
at 0020 hrs on DZ/LZ K, N and V. The divisional operational plan allowed 30 minutes for 22 
Coy to mark out these areas before the six battalions of the main body plus seventeen 
gliders carrying heavy equipment would be landed.883 Two Albemarle aircraft dropped a 
stick each on the DZ/LZ, however delays began to impact on the timetable for the operation, 
even before the men were on the ground: 
Exit difficulties were reported by four of the six aircraft, and in three cases, two or 
more runs were required, but all troops were dropped, with an average time error of 
about 2 minutes except for one aircraft which completed the drop on the third run, 
14 minutes late.884 
 
The causes of these ’exit difficulties’ were reported as firstly the ‘heavy loads’ the men were 
carrying, and secondly the ‘cramped spacing’ in the aircraft.885 These two issues require 
closer analysis.886  
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 Additionally in one case the flooding at the edge of the DZ and the confusion caused by the RAF raid on 
Sallanelles disrupted the pathfinders attempting to mark out V. TNA WO 171/1249 22nd Parachute Company 
WD 1944, 6 June.  
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 The load carried by the pathfinders was considerable. Each ten man section/stick was 
accompanied by three kitbags containing two Eureka sets and two holophane light kits,887 
which were thrown from the aircraft with the jumping paratroopers. In addition each 
section was equipped with ‘a Bren gun and supply of ammunition, 1 snipers’ rifle, 5 Lee 
Enfield MK IV rifles and ammunition, 5 Sten guns with spare magazines, Mills grenades, 
Gammon bombs, Phosphorous smoke bombs, Commando knives’.888 The addition of two 
extra weapons (the sniper rifle and Bren gun) unnecessarily encumbered the pathfinder 
stick.889 If enemy troops were on or close to the DZ/LZ these extra weapons would not have 
saved the pathfinders, and they would have been better served by fewer weapons allowing 
more freedom of action. Also each pathfinder group was dropped simultaneously with 
battalion advanced parties, who carried standard infantry weapons sufficient to protect 
them. Obviously followed within thirty minutes by hundreds of men would land as the main 
force arrived.890 
As outlined in chapter two the Albemarle aircraft was not built for this task. While faster 
than the C-47 and more nimble than the Stirling, it had restricted accommodation for the 
men and all the equipment needed:891 
Space inside the aircraft was cramped. Crouching positions had to be adopted. Each 
pathfinder was festooned with gear under his smock and had a kitbag strapped to 
one leg fitted with a quick-release and attached to him by a 20 ft. Cord. Travelling 
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positions were bum-on-floor, legs crooked, each man tucked into the next, No.1 
(stick commander) at the rear next to the exit-hatch, No.10 nearest the aircrew.892  
 
The ‘legs dangling’ situation of the stick commander was probably responsible for a tragedy 
which befell the company at the very moment it was about to go into action for the first 
time. The DZ N pathfinder party leader, the company CO Major Lennox-Boyd, ‘made a 
premature and accidental exit’ from one of the aircraft and was later found to have been 
killed.893 Trying to compensate for the lack of a role-specific transport aircraft by utilising 
Bomber Command’s cast-offs, had directly inhibited the airborne spearhead of the most 
important offensive operation Britain would undertake in Europe during the Second World 
War.   
   Once landed the pathfinders problems continued. As they hurried to gather the Eureka 
sets, they were further delayed by the presence of ‘young standing corn 2-3 feet high’ which 
the reconnaissance photographs had failed to reveal.894 One DZ K stick had been dropped in 
error on the corner of N and quickly set up its holophane lights and Eureka beacons. By the 
time the error was realised and the equipment deactivated, several 8 Para Bn sticks had 
been dropped onto N. 895 The other DZ K stick was even more unfortunate, ‘coming under 
fire almost immediately after landing’ half of its men were found to be missing on 
regrouping after landing, although one beacon was set up.896  On DZ V, both Eureka beacons 
of the first stick were smashed in the drop and by the time that the second stick had 
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organised its self the main drop had commenced.897 Therefore as the aircraft carrying the 
main bodies approached the DZ/LZ, ‘Lights were reported to be on all three D.Z./L.Z.’s, and 
Eureka to be operating on ‘K’ and ‘N’. Although it is confirmed that both sticks were 
correctly dropped on D.Z. ‘V’, both Eureka beacons were damaged and unserviceable’.898 
The thirty minutes allowed for the pathfinders to set up their beacons and lay out their ‘T’ 
light panels was simply not long enough, the level of confusion and equipment failure on 
each DZ/LZ then reflected and magnified as the main bodies began to land. 
As a means of entering the battle the parachute drop phase must be viewed as a disaster. 
Although over the following twenty-four hours many of the misplaced parachutists 
managed to regroup with their units, the true loss in this situation was time. The men who 
spent the early hours of D-Day blundering around in the dark were not contributing to the 
Neptune/Overlord plan by achieving their objectives, as the countdown clock ran down to 
0730 hrs when the Sword landings would begin. The DZ/LZ were reasonably close to the 
objectives but in terms of Figure 1 a considerable barrier now existed in terms of translating 
the shock-surprise effect of the landing into energy for the close assault on the objectives. 7 
Para Bn moved off to relieve Howard at fifty per cent strength at 0100 hrs, while 12 and 13 
Para Bns could muster around sixty per cent of their pre-jump strength.899 5 Para Bde was 
tasked with securing the Orne barrier/Bénouville positions located only 3000m from the 
furthest edge of DZ/LZ N at Bréville, the area least affected by pathfinder problems.900 Hill’s 
3 Para Bde bore the brunt of the miss-drops, and this formation’s battalions faced the 
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additional challenge of needing to march some distance to various objectives once landed. 
As described above DZ/LZ K and V had seen the most serious disruption to the Pathfinders 
set-up of EUREKA. The experience of 8 and 9 Para Bns form a useful case study, showing 
how strong leadership overcame the impact of scattering. The brigade’s initial numbers on 
landing were feeble; approximately thirty per cent of its WE manpower was available.901 For 
example, at 0120 hrs 8 Para Bn’s main body was represented by 30 men plus the CO, the 
advanced party reporting that the ‘Bn appeared to be very widely dispersed and that no 
container A/C had dropped on D.Z.’902 1 Cdn Para Bn estimated that their actual DZ had been 
approximately ‘ten times the size of that originally projected’ due to ‘apparently faulty air 
navigation’, but regardless the battalion went into action immediately.903 By 0250 hrs 9 Para 
Bn had amassed ‘150 all ranks’, while by 0330 hrs 8 Para Bn had gathered ’11 officers and 
about 180 ORs’.904  The final number of men lost by scattering for the two brigades would be 
thirty officers and 628 ORs.905 This represented just under eighteen per cent of WE for the 
six units, effectively one and a quarter battalions.906 A 711 I.D. account later stated that 
around 300 British airborne troops had been captured in its divisional area east of the Orne 
by the evening of 6 June.907 Losses of forty to seventy per cent would be seen as crippling in 
a single engagement, the missing men weakened the Division’s parachute brigades and 
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limited the further tasks they could undertake until replacements could be posted or the 
units augmented by supporting assets from elsewhere.908  
 Gale’s efforts put into battalion commander selection, thorough briefing and tough training 
now began to pay a dividend. With only approximately a third of their strength the chances 
of success appeared low, but both Otway and Pearson re-thought their plans and 
improvised to proceed with their missions. Key evidence of this improvisation is seen in 8 
Para Bn’s war diary and echoes Gale’s mission planning ethos. Pearson made a simple 
appreciation of the resources he had available to complete his tasks, estimated the enemy 
opposition based on local intelligence, and then created a simple plan: 
0300 – C.O. appreciated situation as follows:- 
1) From reports from recce party it appeared that remainder of Bn had dropped to 
the north of the D.Z. in area Ranville and Le Mesnil. 2) That Bn was not strong 
enough to capture Troarn and that we had no R.E. assistance to destroy the bridge. 
3) That we had sufficient strength and explosives to destroy the bridges at Bures 
which was of single span type and could be destroyed without much technical 
assistance. 4) That if a position was taken up in area x rds 146695 and track running 
east to Bures sufficient force could be collected to attack Troarn later in the day from 
the north. 
Therefore the plan was as follows:- 
1) Strong fighting patrol of 1 pl from ‘c ‘coy would move to Troarn to make a recce 
and report on defences at west end of town. 2) remainder of Bn would move to area 
x rds 153700 leaving two dets P.I.A.T.s and covering force in area x rds 146695 to 
cover any movement of enemy north; and to guide any stragglers to Bn posn. 3) 1 
offr and 2 ors to remain at R.V. till first light to guide any stragglers who may have 
arrived at R.V. after Bn had left. 
0400 – Bn moved off.909 
 
 In this description of Pearson’s plan Gale’s planning style can be seen. Pearson had taken 
full responsibility for the situation with no need to confer with his brigade HQ and acted on 
his own initiative. His plan was aggressive and made best use of the diminished resources to 
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hand, and its successful outcome reveals that it was clearly communicated to his 
subordinates. By daylight all of 8 Para Bn’s objectives had been achieved. As Pearson had 
done three hours before, Otway made the most of his reduced numbers and carried the 
position with a ferocious assault. At the end of the action only seventy-five men were left on 
their feet and Otway’s battalion was too weak to hold the position. His unit had been 
decimated by the scattering and combat losses but he had achieved the goal of disabling the 
battery for the critical hours of the seaborne landings.910Otway neutralised the Merville 
battery a quarter of an hour before schedule.911 The speed of recovery of the two battalions 
shows great drive and initiative on the part of Otway and Pearson, and strong unit cohesion 
within the depleted bands of paratroopers available. 
   Another indicator of 6 Airborne’s combat power were the small groups of scattered troops 
who were motivated to fight their way back to the bridgehead. Indeed, one of the key 
lessons garnered from the operations in Sicily had been this positive effect of scattered 
drops causing confusion to the enemy.912 An example of this can be seen in the one 
misplaced glider load of Deadstick. Captain Priday and Lt. Hooper’s platoon secured the 
bridge at Varaville where they had landed, eliminating its small garrison. He then realized 
they were in the wrong place and they moved quickly 10km across country and arrived at 
the bridge at 0230 hrs.913 Another group which fought its way back to the Orne bridgehead 
came from 13 Para Bn, crossing into the airborne bridgehead at 2030 hrs on 7 June. ‘CSM 
McParlan, ‘A’ Coy, reported. This WO was dropped off the DZ and established a fighting 
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base at ST SAMSON with 10 men of his stick and some Fighting French.’914 These small 
actions occurred across the entire Anglo-American landing area, and caused ‘a strong feeling 
of insecurity’ behind the front amongst the Wehrmacht defenders, and ‘only large-scale 
mopping-up operations of the infantry restored order’.915 Certainly many airborne troops 
would have simply given themselves up, but these small actions distracted the defenders 
from forming a clearer interpretation of what was unfolding. 
The final reckoning for the scattered drops reveals the cohesion that Gale had built in the 
preceding twelve months. In the final tally the division lost approximately eighteen per cent 
of the WE of its six parachute battalions, effectively one and a quarter battalions, due to 
scattering.916 However it should be noted that when 3 and 5 Para Bdes moved off their DZ 
on the night of 5/6 June, the formations’ strengths stood at approximately thirty and sixty 
per cent respectively – 1,655 men.917 The missing 2,023 would have equated to fifty five per 
cent losses due to dispersed landings if that had been the final number. However the 
determination of roughly 1,365 men, who as individuals and in small groups were 
determined to rejoin their units, reflects well on the esprit de corps that Gale had developed 
in less than a year. The return of stragglers can be seen in Hill’s recollection that by the 10 
June at St.Côme, 9 Para Bn had grown from the ninety survivors of the Merville attack to 
270 men.918  
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  The parachute brigades both achieved the tasks set for them. 5 Para Bde’s mission was 
simple; to seize and hold the Caen Canal and Orne River bridges and the area of open 
farmland which would form the division’s main landing and resupply DZ/LZ between 
Ranville and Bréville (N).919 12 and 13 Para Bns successfully beat off strong probing attacks 
from 125.Pz.G.R. throughout D-Day which culminated in a very heavy attack on 12 Para Bn 
on 7 June which included ‘9 MkIV Tanks and 50 lorried inf.’ This ended when the enemy was 
driven off after three of the tanks were destroyed with an estimated one hundred plus 
casualties.920 3 Para Bde had the most stretching tasks to perform on D-Day, employed in a 
destructive raiding role to demolish the Dives bridges and the Merville battery, and then 
obliged to fall back to vulnerable positions along the Bois de Bavent (‘the LE PLEIN feature’), 
distant from any supporting conventional role firepower.921 The Merville battery while not 
completely destroyed by Otway’s improvised attack, was certainly removed as a critical 
threat to Sword beach, and its limited firepower remained suppressed by the RN for the 
remainder of D-Day.922 The position remained an important objective for some time mainly 
due to its value as a forming up point for enemy efforts towards the Franceville-
Plage/Sallanelles area. As has been discussed 3 Para Bde suffered the worst effects of 
scattering which became a challenge as it engaged in operations along its front. Hill recalled 
his limited numbers, ‘that 300 Canadians that night turned up near my headquarters on the 
ridge in the centre position. At a cross roads, there were 280 8th Battalion holding the 
bottom end of the ridge and there were 90 very precarious 9th Battalion on the sea end of 
the ridge.’923 
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  The massed Operation Mallard landing at 2100 hrs was also effectively trouble free. On LZ 
N 142 of 146 launched gliders landed successfully in around 32 minutes, landing 6 AARR, 1 
RUR and the HQ of 6 AL Bde. On LZ W, 106 out of 110 gliders landed successfully, delivering 
2 Ox Bucks, A Coy 12 Devon and the heavy weapons of 7 Para Bn in 28 minutes.924  The 
crowded nature of the landings was not without confusion, the gliders on W landed facing in 
the wrong direction.925 Although the LZs were still under enemy fire, 6 AL Bde suffered few 
casualties, the worst incident being a 2 Ox Bucks glider which broke up under flak.926 The 
glider landings had benefitted from a cleared and marked LZ, and above all a daylight 
landing. 
Before assessing the impact of Gale’s division, it is worth briefly reviewing the wider support 
the airborne operation yielded in assisting the seaborne forces. The capture of the eastern 
flank high ground (Le Mesnil/Bois de Bavent) prevented a strong German defensive line 
forming, based on the close terrain of the Bois de Bavent and features such as the Chateau 
St.Côme. This had begun to take place around Caen on D-Day itself, and the in-depth 
positions the Germans manned would trouble 21 Army Group for many weeks. The 
Division’s landing greatly expanded the bridgehead to the east without the need for a 
further amphibious landing in the area around Cabourg-Deauville. If such landings had been 
required, the beaches would have been perilously close to the heavy German batteries 
located around the mouth of the Seine at Le Havre. The area dominated by the airborne 
forces greatly increased the area available for the build-up of 1 Corps and Second Army as 
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enemy interference was pushed away to the east and south by the advanced positions 
seized on D-Day. 
    By occupying the ground they did, 6 Airborne contributed to the destruction of many 
German units. Many prisoners were taken in the first twenty-four hours of the invasion by 6 
Airborne. In one example, 5 Para Bde’s war diary shows two entries made on 7 June which 
indicate the ruinous toll Hill’s men had taken on 642 Ost-Battalion. At 0400 hrs 
‘Considerable number of PW taken from BREVILLE area together with approx 40 rifles of 
varying types, 1 MG 34 and amn’; then at 0900 hrs ‘Total PWs [prisoners of war] number 
152, chiefly Poles and RUSSIANS; sent to Div.’927 Indeed, a report from the battalion dated 
14 June 1944 cast light onto the fortunes of this unit. As 3 Para Bde landed around it, 642 
Ost-Battalion’s headquarters had been in Amfreville with companies and platoons positions 
on either side of the Orne. The report is up-beat and records the unit’s success in extracting 
forces to mount local counter attacks and the ability of one corporal of its 4th company in 
shooting down a glider and a transport aircraft with a 20mm cannon. The intensity of the 
fighting is also recorded. By the end of D-Day the battalion can only count on around one 
hundred men from a possible original strength of between six and eight hundred as its 
headquarters relocated to Bavent.928 
While the bulk of 716 I.D.  was shattered by Dempsey’s landings between Arromanches and 
Ouistreham, 6 Airborne Div ensured that it had no safe area to fall back into. Richter’s 
report of 23 June 1944 states that enemy airborne troops were captured or quickly 
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eliminated on landing, but equally troops sent to investigate the airborne landings 
frequently did not return: 
In the meantime the II./G.R. 736 had already deployed the 8./G.R. 736 and one platoon of 
the 2./Ost-Btl.444 against the enemy who had landed by air south of Bernieres. Therefore 
the 5./G.R. 726 and one platoon of the 7./G.R. 726 were ordered to return to their reserve 
positions in order to avoid a dispersal of forces. The attack of the 8./G.R. 736 and of the one 
platoon of the 2./Ost-Btl.444 could not advance because of the intense ships’ artillery fire 
and was defeated. Further reports are not available, since all communications were 
disrupted and no one of the troops deployed returned. It cannot be ascertained either to 
what extent operations by enemy parachutists contributed to the loss of the local coast 
defence installations, since there were no connections with the W.N. and officers who were 
sent to investigate as well as messengers did not return.929 
 
By 15 June it was decided that the division would be withdrawn to southern France to 
regroup. By this time only around 1,300 men, from an original strength of 7,771, were 
fighting in various KG and sub-units attached to either 352.I.D. and 21.Pz.Div.930   
  Further,  6 Airborne and its associated commando bdes rapidly established a self-
supporting A.Tk screen and outpost line able to stall any concentrated German mechanized 
assault and thereby allow Second Army conventional role forces to be assembled for a more 
continuous defence or rapid counter-attack. This effectively freed up a mobile conventional 
role infantry division to participate in offensive operations to the south around Caen, rather 
than be stuck in defence in the Orne bridgehead. 
   The panicking effect of enemy airborne forces close by had already affected some men 
who had before the landings been some distance from likely seaborne landings. According 
to a signal intercepted by Bletchley Park on 9 June 1944: 
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At Carpiquet at 7.20pm/6/6 everyone lost their heads badly, the regional 
commander being present; the more so since numerous enemy parachute landings 
were reported only 5 km to the N.931 
 
The massed landing of 6 AL Bde and other elements in operation Mallard at 2100 hrs on D-
Day also caused local commanders to reconsider their position. Richter recorded that the 
operation forced KG Rauch to fall back from the coast, having penetrated between the Juno 
and Sword landings areas at Lion-sur-Mer: 
The attack proceeded successfully until the Church of Lion, however by 2000 hours 
the enemy dropped strong airborne units in the area south of Lion. The shock troops 
were therefore forced to avoid a threatening encirclement and had to pull back to its 
base.932 
 
The Mallard landings therefore had a material effect in themselves by inhibiting what could 
be considered the most promising German countermove of the day, Rauch’s strong battle 
group having offered the opportunity of blocking an early link-up between British and 
Canadian forces. 
  By the early evening of 6 June, KG Rauch (21.Pz.Div) had managed to push between Juno 
and Sword beaches as far as Luc-sur-Mer, linking up with defenders from 716.I.D. The sight 
of 6 AL Bde’s glider landing sweeping into DZ/LZ N caused their hasty withdrawal; the 
intimidating magnitude of the landings giving the impression that another airborne division 
had been employed either in response to their thrust. Reports to LXXXI AK stated ’about 540 
aircraft, towing toward the fortress of Le Havre had been released over the Orne’, 
confirmed at 2140 hrs that ‘enemy had been reinforced by several hundred gliders’ in the 
Orne estuary.933 The air operation involved 700 aircraft. 250 gliders had landed as part of 
Mallard, all obviously accompanied by tow aircraft, with a close escort of  15 fighter 
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squadrons of 11 Group RAF (approximately 200 aircraft).934 Over the following days to large-
scale false alarms were fed back to Kuntzen’s HQ. On the night of 9/10 and 10/11 June false 
alarms were received of more paratroopers and containers being dropped in the Orne area, 
possibly triggered by the Rob Roy supply missions; while on 11 June concerns were raised by 
Marine-gruppe West about a possible amphibious landing near Fecamp.935 While darkness 
was useful to cover surprise airborne operations, this incident reveals the considerable 
morale effect daylight airborne reinforcement could have on the enemy.    
III. Fighting as a Division – 7-9 June 1944 
 
 The Division now fought a series of ferocious battles as the enemy attempted to dislodge 
the airborne bridgehead. 6 AL Bde’s arrival at 2100 hrs on D-Day radically improved the 
division’s situation, adding over 1,500 fresh infantrymen who were considerably more 
heavily armed than their parachute counterparts.936 The introduction of Kindersley’s brigade 
to the battle allowed 5 Para Bde to withdraw into divisional reserve around Ranville-Le 
Marquet.937 Even allowing for the casualties suffered by his division Gale’s hold on the Orne 
barrier area was now robust as his formations concentrated into a compact area. From 
north to south, 1 SS (Special Service – Commandos) Bde was ensconced around 
Merville/Hauger; 3 Para Bde loosely held the Bois de Bavent; 6 AL Bde held the southern 
flank with 5 Para Bde in reserve. During the night of 6/7 June the brigade prepared to attack 
out of the bridgehead and by 0900 hrs of 7 June 1 RUR and 2 Ox Bucks had occupied 
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Longueval and Herouvillette respectively. The two battalions pushed on in the afternoon but 
St. Honorine and Escoville could not be secured due to the ‘stiff opposition from enemy SP 
[self-propelled] guns and armour’, forcing the units back to their previous gains.938 The 
airlanding troops had encountered KG Von Luck as it attempted to advance on the bridges 
through Herouvillette and Ranville with elements of II/125 Pz.G.R., 21 Recce Bn and some of 
Becker’s assault guns. This mechanised counterattack should have crushed 1 RUR and 2 Ox 
Bucks, if it were not for the massive fire support available: 
The reconnaissance battalion went straight into the attack from its march and, 
supported by the panzer company, penetrated to Escoville against their surprised 
opponents. Then all hell broke loose. The heaviest naval guns, up to 38cm in calibre, 
artillery, and fight-bombers plastered us without pause. Radio contacts were lost, 
wounded came back, and the men of the reconnaissance battalion were forced to 
take cover. I had gone up with the attack and saw the disaster.939 
 
 Indeed, the fire support plan created by Norris proved to be invaluable in this period: 
During the attacks of the 8 and 9 Jun, arty sup was most readily given by the Div Arty 
of 3 Br Div. whenever it was called for it came down the required place accurately 
and rapidly. The volume was far in excess of any fire that could be produced from 6 
Airborne Div’s resources and was annihilating in its effect. Although on occasions the 
enemy penetrated slightly into our posns the weight had been taken out of his 
attack by arty fire and local counter attacks restored the situation.940 
 
  Similarly the anti-tank defence provided by 3 and 4 AL A.Tk Btys and the 6 pdr guns 
furnished by the airlanding battalions achieved good results. The two batteries supported 5  
Para and 1 SS Bdes between 6-10 June, and knocked out at least six enemy AFVs, four being 
attributed to 4 AL A.Tk Bty on 6 June.941 Sixty-five per cent of enemy tanks destroyed in 
Normandy up until 7 August were knocked out by armoured piercing projectiles fired by 
either anti-tank guns or tanks, so the careful deployment and skill of 3 and 4 AL A.Tk Btys’ 
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gunners was critical.942 Even though the 7 June foiled attack was a setback for 6 AL Bde, this 
action to the south revealed the confidence Gale had in his formations’ situation and his 
resolution in adhering to his divisional plan. However in terms of self-generated offensive 
power, 6 Airborne was beginning to run out of steam due to its lack of mobility and integral 
heavy weapons.943 
    The fighting all along the Division’s front now became intense as elements of 21. Pz.Div 
surged forward, together with the remnants of 716 .I.D. and reinforced by the newly arrived 
346 .I.D.944 This division had trained to combat airborne forces landing behind Le Havre and 
was prepared to defend the coast under command of 17 Luftwaffe Feld-Div between le 
Havre and Fecamp. 945  It was now moved from the area it was familiar with and was steadily 
fed piecemeal into the Orne bridgehead battle, as fortress troops from Le Havre and 17 LW-
Feld Div redeployed to cover 346 .I.D.’s coastal defences. 946 This process began with KG 
Hartmann, identified by 6th  Airborne on 7 June: 
 A message received too late for inclusion in Int Summary No.2 reported 1,000 
enemy inf moving WEST through VARAVILLE 1875 during the afternoon of 7 June. 
These tps were later identified as II Bn and III Bn of 857 Regt of 346.I.D. These Bns 
left LE HAVRE at 2100 hrs on D Day travelling on bicycles. 947 
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 KG Hartmann attacked 1 Cdn Para Bn at Varaville supported by SPGs but was beaten 
back.948 
   This process continued with six concentrated enemy attacks launched against the 
bridgehead between 8-10 June, all supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire and often by 
SPGs and tanks.949 By the morning of 10 June the whole of 346.I.D. had been identified 
along the Bréville ridge.950 It now made its largest attack out of the village, pushing 
battalion-sized assaults south-west towards Le Mariquet/Ranville and north-west towards 
Le Plein.951   The first attack swept across DZ N at around 1100 hrs, troops of I /G.R. 858 
using the gliders for cover, put becoming pinned down.952 13 Para Bn opened fire and 
inflicted massive losses as the enemy crossed the open fields. The attack launched to the 
north-west on 1 SS Bde suffered similar heavy losses and was beaten back. An infiltration 
against No. 4 Cdo supported by SPGs developed into a two battalion attack on the whole 
brigade but ‘the lines everywhere held firm’, with prisoners taken from 857 Regt.953At the 
same time 3 Para Bde was attacked by another battalion in the St. Côme area: 
0730 – ‘2-Bn attack on 9 Para Bn and 1 Cdn Bn posns. Enemy infiltrate between Cdns 
and 9 Bn with Inf Guns and armour. Driven out by fire.’ 
1330 – ‘Situation in hand.’954 
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This attack was supported by SPGs but had no answer to the 6-inch guns of HMS Arethusa; a 
badly wounded officer captured in the attack ‘remarked that his battalion had been virtually 
wiped out in the last twelve hours.’955 
    This was followed up by a counter-attack by 7 Para Bn supported by a squadron of the 
13/18 H which had entered the bridgehead at 1400 hrs having been requested by Gale. 
During the whole action at least 200 enemy bodies were counted and over 100 prisoners 
taken from 858 G.R., while 7 Para Bn suffered ten casualties with four Sherman and one 
Stuart tank knocked out.956Again, massive co-opted artillery and naval gunfire support took 
a hand in driving 346.I.D. back. ‘Considerable losses were suffered from incessant heavy 
naval artillery fire which covered the whole attack area’, with artillery spotter aircraft 
directing naval gunfire support. 957 The bulk of the Wehrmacht attackers fell back into the 
village Bréville, of the six infantry battalions belonging to 346.I.D. possibly five had been 
roughly handled by 6 Airborne. The division’s battle report for 10 June reported its 
casualties up to midnight as 102 dead, 405 wounded and 450 missing, many of the latter 
presumably captured.958 As the fighting of 10 June drew to a close LXXXI AK took stock. 346 
.I.D. reported that ‘the enemy is tough and fights doggedly. There have therefore been 
heavy losses, particularly amongst officers.’959 While the enemy infantry was ‘not 
necessarily superior to our own infantry’, the Corps commander advised on the best way to 
eliminate the Orne bridgehead, he: 
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Points out that the pockets of enemy resistance need to be smashed bit by bit if one 
does not want to experience setbacks which are caused by wasting one’s own 
resources/power. This was the reason why today’s attack did not produce any bigger 
results.960 
 
Due to the compact nature of Gale’s defensive scheme, which allowed for mutual support 
between units and the access to powerful indirect fire from 1 Corps and the RN, 6 Airborne 
had beaten off the multiple and sustained attacks of a fresh enemy infantry division.  
6 Airborne’s results for D-Day are favourable when set against the simple metric generated 
by this chapter’s discussion on the measurement of combat effectiveness in the Second 
World War. The parachute brigades achieved their goals and held a defence line against 
enemy counter attacks. The airlanding brigade would have a difficult time securing its D +1 
objectives to the south of the bridges, but its offensive action was intended to expand the 
area held by the Division for added security. Of more importance was the fact that it had 
brought much needed manpower into the airborne bridgehead, along with anti-tank guns 
and further vehicles and equipment. 
IV. Adaptation and Concentration - The St. Côme – Bréville Episode – 12 June 1944 
 
The action at Bréville confronted the Division with an extremely difficult challenge which 
demonstrated its combat effectiveness. A close study of the events at Bréville indicates that 
there was careful resource management and decisive leadership at work. The Bréville 
episode is recognised as significant by many historians who have written about 6 Airborne in 
Normandy. For example, Robert Kershaw and Lloyd Clark have written important none-unit 
specific accounts of the action.961 Gale’s succinct summary of the importance of the episode 
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is set down in his memoir: 
There is a turning point in all battles. In the fight for the Orne bridgehead the Battle 
of Bréville and the 346th German Infantry Division was beaten. It never put in 
another single attack, and was from that moment until the advance to the Seine in 
august content just to hold its positions in front of us and mortar the line which we 
so thinly held.962 
 
  A close analysis of the Bréville action will serve to determine the how 6 Airborne generated 
combat effectiveness and the value of Gale as a commander. This chapter section will now 
review the battle of Bréville using the KTB of Wehrmacht LXXXI A.O.K. and British war 
diaries; adopting a narrative style to allow a methodical progression through the battle’s 
events and the intelligence available to Gale and Kuntzen at each point.  
  By the 10 June 6 Airborne Div together with 1 SS Bde had ensconced itself along the 
Bréville ridge, with Sallanelles in the north held by the commandos down to the Bois de 
Bavent which was patrolled by 3 Para Bde and 6 AARR. However, the village of Bréville 
remained in enemy hands; the elevated position of this village allowed an almost 
unhindered view across DZ/LZ N and of Ranville less than 3000m away.963 Composed of 
sturdy stone buildings, this position was now a useful start-point for attacks by 346. I.D. as it 
attempted to attack the Orne bridgehead. Any reinforcements introduced to the battle 
could go through this gap then sweep across the DZ/LZ N and seize the bridges. While this 
formation had been contained and appeared to be positioned to halt any British push to the 
Dives, the threat remained.964 
      It was part of Crocker’s 1 Corps plan that the bridgehead was to be extended and further 
reinforced to the south by 51 Div, the next goal being to isolate and capture Caen from the 
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east.965 At 1300 hrs on 10 June the Highland Div’s 153 Inf Bde’s commander and his COs 
conferred with Gale at his Ranville HQ.966 Nearby 13 Para Bn was busy shooting down the 
attack across DZ/LZ N, before the 7 Para Bn and 13/18 H967 counterattack crushed it, 
witnessed by Brigadier H. Murray of 153  Inf Bde: 
Whilst there it became apparent that a partial breakthrough had been effected 
through a gap at BREVILLE and that a severe engagement was taking place on the 
northern approaches to RANVILLE.968 
 
Murray pointed out that no expansion to the south could be considered as long as Bréville 
remained in enemy hands; therefore 5 Black Watch would come under command of 3 Para 
Bde and seize the village as soon as possible. Further, Murray’s  brigade was ordered to take 
over the southern half of the Bois De Bavent sector from Hill’s troops while 154 Inf Bde 
would relieve 6 AL Bde.969 As 153 Inf Bde crossed into the bridgehead on the night of the 
10/11 June, it appeared the load of 6 Airborne would be greatly eased and the line along the 
Bréville ridge finally secured. 1 Gordons and 5/7 Gordons moved into the woods to relieve 8 
Para Bn while 5 Black Watch prepared to attack Bréville at first light.970 The significance of 
the arrival of Bullen-Smith’s division was enormous, stemming from the fact that 6 Airborne 
Division had taken significant casualties since landing and had lost many of its heavy 
weapons. Now it was being joined in the bridgehead by an almost completely fresh infantry 
division. It contained over 18,000 men in nine battalions, 182 field and A.Tk guns, fully 
motorised, and many Eighth Army veterans, which further added to the significance of 
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Bullen-Smith’s division’s arrival.971  
   5 Black Watch attacked at 0430 hrs on 11 June and was flung back with heavy casualties 
having met concentrated machine-gun and mortar fire.972 Hill saw the Black Watch who had 
been placed temporarily under his command as ‘a lot of young fellows and they had more 
than they could take, and they had, quite frankly were falling back’.973 The battalion fell back 
into 9 Para Bn’s area around the Chateau St. Côme to regroup, where its losses forced it to 
re-organise into only three companies.974  5 Black Watch’s performance was later repeated 
on the southern flank. In the 6 AL Bde area, 1 RUR holding Longueval was to be relieved by 5 
Camerons on 13 June when they pushed past the Ulstermen to capture St.Honorine. The 
attack launched at 0500 hrs and by 0615 hrs the success signal was seen over the village. 
The situation then became ‘vague’, and soon Camerons were seen falling back on the 1 RUR 
positions. At 0925 hrs the CO presented himself at 1 RUR battalion HQ and stated that he 
had been forced out of the village by enemy armour and SPGs – he had one company under 
his control which he then placed at Lt.Col. Carson’s disposal. Carson called 1 RUR to stand-to 
by sending a ‘message sent to all Coys to allow personnel of 5 Cameron to pass through our 
lines and to remain fast in our present dispositions.975 
The disaster which had befallen 5 Camerons was no less alarming to those whom witnessed 
it at first hand:   
On Monday 12th June, we were told to pack up and fall in on the lower road as we 
were being relieved by a battalion of the Cameronians (51st Highland Division). 
When they arrived they told us they were going to attack Ste Honorine and show us 
how to capture the place. We were told to wait the outcome before we could leave 
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for Ranville. It wasn’t long before the Cameronians came running back and legged it 
past us heading for the beaches. We were then told to get back into our slit trenches 
to defend Longueval and we also had to go out and pick up the Cameronian 
wounded. This reversal of orders had a devastating effect on me, I had a feeling of 
sheer terror and fright, I was in a complete funk I immediately climbed over the wall 
at the side of the road and knelt down in the field to get a grip of myself. I did not 
want the lads to see the state I was in, I remained like that for several minutes and 
then I had a warm feeling flushing through my body and I became calm and 
relaxed.976 
 
During the early stages of the Normandy campaign 51 Division did not live up to its hard-
won reputation from the desert, and the reasons for their shortcomings have been assessed 
elsewhere. 977 51 Div’s initial costly attacks led to there being no relief available because 6 
Airborne troops were needed in support. Gale had been at 3 Para Bde’s Le Mesnil HQ and 
witnessed the ferocity of the fighting culminating in Hill’s desperate counterattack with the 
Canadian company, and he must have been aware of 5 Black Watch’s shortcomings.978 
     Having withstood this attack, 346.I.D. was determined to secure its position on the 
Bréville ridge with a view to further expanded operations. During the night of 10/11 June 
the General der Panzertruppen Kuntzen, commander of LXXXI A.K., was alerted to 51 Div 
crossing into the Orne bridgehead in strength. There were indications of further British 
offensive action. A captured 6 Airborne lieutenant had stated that his division would soon 
be pushing on Caen while an intercepted radio message had inferred that three British 
divisions would soon be massed in the bridgehead ahead of an attack.979 In the face of this 
feared build-up 346.I.D. was ordered to attack with its five remaining battalions and take 
the Chateau St. Côme ‘in a shock attack’ after a short artillery preparation. KG Luck was 
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recalled from 1.SS-Pz. Korps and moved back into its old positions facing Ranville with a view 
to support the drive.980 If the Chateau St. Côme could be taken and the ridge more firmly 
controlled, a combined 21.Pz.Div./346.I.D. attack was anticipated for 13 June, supported by 
7 Werfer Bde and possibly a Fallschirmjäger Regt, which had been requested.981 The 
airborne bridgehead had to be reduced if not eliminated to frustrate further British 
offensive action. 
   The following day at 1500 hrs the position came under heavy attack from at least a 
battalion of enemy infantry supported by SPGs and tanks982:  
 Hy bombardment heard from BLACK WATCH area. Kept up for 1 ½ hours with strong 
mortar and SA fire. Message from BLACK WATCH said they had drawn in one coy but 
had left A.Tk gunners with PIAT at CHATEAU. LO from 9 Para Bn said that though 
situation was severe posn could and was being held. Bde Cmd ordered up “C” Coy 1 
Cdn Para Bn and he with Bde IO went up to put them in posn. FOO and FOB 
for[ward]ed on wood near BREVILLE. Numbers of BLACK WATCH found in Bde HQ 
area.983 
 
5 Black Watch just held, but only after the decisive action of Hill leading forward a scratch 
company of Canadians. He had been at the HQ of 1 Cdn Para Bn and had demanded that the 
CO give him ‘whatever dogs’ bodies’ he had. With sixty or seventy men he launched ‘not 
very spectacular counter-attack but an effective one’ which drove the enemy out of the 
area.984 
  At 1745 hours details regarding the progress were still vague, but promising. ‘346.I.D. has 
taken the Chateau St.Côme with heavy losses despite strong air and naval gunfire strikes.’985 
At 2215 hrs, Major Becker, the commander of 21.Pz.Div. SPG battalion, had returned from 
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where the fighting raged to report on the unsuitability of the ground for his division’s tanks. 
‘The Englishman is a tough fighter. 346.I.D. losses are high and the fighting force is 
weakened accordingly.’986 346.I.D.’s own account for the attack, presented later at 2347 hrs: 
‘The Chateau St. Côme was taken after a very hard fight. 13 enemy tanks were destroyed.’987 
Oberleutnant Ludwig of the Pz.Jg.Kp is accredited with this success, although a British 
account allows for only ‘4 Shermans K.O.’ as two troops of 13/18 H and two sections of 3 
Para Sqn RE were sent up to reinforce Hill at the Chateau at 1915 hrs.988 
   Gale now decided that the Bréville gap had to be eliminated as soon as possible to prevent 
any further enemy attacks.989 This was the most important and perilous decision he made 
during the campaign, but was entirely correct considering the interpretation of intelligence 
regarding enemy intentions and his own resource situation. The full weight of 346.I.D. was 
pressing against 3 Para Bde through the Bréville gap supported by elements of 711.I.D., but 
it appeared that something bigger might be brewing.990 6 Airborne’s intelligence picture 
revealed that new enemy formations were closing up along 21 Army Group line. The 
divisional intelligence report dated 13 June completed by Captain Freddie Scholes for 12 
June reveals the information available to Gale and explains his desire to close the gap on the 
evening of 12 June:991 
(c) Enemy Sit. – Flanks 
The line up of enemy fmns from ISIGNY to CAEN is now 12 SS Pz Div, TK Trg Div 
[Panzer Lehr], 352 Inf Div and 30 Mob Bde with a possibility of 17 SS Pz Gren Div 
possibly approaching from the SW. 
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(d) The enemy has not stopped bringing new units into our area. 711 Inf Div may 
send further rfts to 346 instead of sitting back on the EAST bank of the DIVES AND 21 
Pz Div may be withdrawing units from WEST of CAEN for use EAST of the ORNE. We 
should soon have further details about this. The enemy may be on the defensive but 
it will be a def conducted along typical offensive lines with many counter-attacks.992 
 
Wireless intercepts since 11 June had indicated that this attack would soon take place. 
Dempsey instructed Crocker to concentrate his armour around Colomby-sur-Thaon, telling 
him that ‘this bit of ground was the heart of the British Empire, and that he wasn’t to move 
his armour from it except on orders from me.’993Indeed, the war diary of 13/18 H sets down 
the perceived threat from armoured forces on the eastern flank of the bridgehead: 
Regt ordered to move complete to east side of the ORNE. Rommel is now said to be 
in charge of this sector and to be mounting a counter-attack on 3 Br Inf Div or 
directed between them and 3 Can Div. Co went off on recce with Brig Prier-Palmer to 
choose positions for Sqdns to take up.994 
 
Later at 1400 hrs: 
51 (H) Div and 4 Armd Bde were to have put in an attack swinging onto the S.W. of 
Caen, but this has been delayed owing to armoured threat on 3 Div front. 995 
 
The indications were that a major armoured attack possibly led by Rommel himself was to 
be aimed at 3 Division. It would have been understandable for Gale to assume that a 
supporting flank attack would be mounted through the Bréville gap.     
  Gale’s verdict to mount an attack was a bold but considered choice. His confidence in his 
troops’ ability revealed the close knowledge he had of the division he had trained since its 
creation. He relied on the aggression and skill of his men to take the village, and the 
supposition that the enemy would not expect a night attack mounted so quickly after their 
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own effort. His resources to mount the attack were limited. 3 Para Bde was effectively 
exhausted; the other brigades had been weakened by losses and were barely holding the 
line. 51 Div’s first action in the bridgehead had been inauspicious, 153 Bde now being in no 
position to mount a night attack. The only unit available was 12 Para Bn which was resting 
having just been relieved by No. 47 (RM) Cdo as 4 SS Bde moved into the bridgehead, Gale 
added D company of 12 Devon and A Sqdn of the 13/18 H.996 The operation was quickly put 
together in three hours and would be supported by massed artillery support - five field and 
one medium regiments.997 Gale both anticipated a swift enemy counter-attack and wished 
to prevent the garrison from escaping, and so the artillery plan included belts of fire falling 
across the exits from the village.998 
   The attack was successful despite 51 Div dropping some of its rounds short on the 
Amfreville-Le Plein forming-up area killing Lt.Col. Johnson, 12 Para Bn’s CO, and several of 
his men, injuring two observing brigadiers, Hugh Kindersley and Lord Lovat.999 At this point 
the importance of effective leadership was again evident as Colonel R.P. Parker, a former CO 
of 12 Para Bn, went forward and took control of the battle pushing the airborne troops 
forward until the village was taken. ‘For about two hours Bréville was just a night hell.’1000 
However the artillery preparation which deluged the village set the buildings on fire and 
isolated the enemy positions from further reinforcement. The war diary of the supporting 
Shermans provided an eyewitness to the infantry combat: 
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‘A’ Sqn attacked with paratps from the North onto Bréville and shot the infantry into 
the village led by the Div Comd with the Ass Coy. Enemy Cas considerable, one SP 
gun (75mm) knocked out and five captured intact. One tp ‘A’ Sqn left in support of 
infantry at Bréville, remainder rallied in harbour West of Ranville.1001 
 
Further friendly-fire casualties were incurred when protective artillery fire was dropped on 
the village in anticipation of an enemy counter-attack. This was due to the loss of two FOOs 
who had gone forward with the attack, both were killed, and then a mix up at the gun end 
of a 51 Division battery.1002 Fifty men of 22 Coy were rushed up to cement the 
position.1003’Some 50 Germans were buried’ at the cost of 167 12 Para Bn and 12 Devon 
casualties.1004 
   346.I.D.’s early reports on Gale’s sudden attack on Bréville were dour but positive, ‘the 
fighting is hard and grim, but the division is master of the situation’.1005 By 2312 hrs the 
reality of the situation had begun to sink in although the supposed objective of the attack 
was misguided due to previous optimism: 
The enemy drives a major attack against the Chateau St.Côme from the west and 
southwest after a strong preparatory barrage. The enemy has broken through the 
line. It now seems questionable whether the planned main attack on 13 June can 
take place at all. 1006  
 
By 0130 hrs the British breakthrough between Le bas de Bréville and Bréville had been 
noted, followed at 0655 hrs by news of 51 Div’s attacks to the south around St.Honorine as 
5 Black Watch attacked out of the Chateau area supported by 13/18 H.1007 By 0900 hrs 
Kuntzen had decided 346.I.D. had to now hold in place while KG Luck should revert to 1.SS-
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Pz. Korps to hold the line beyond Troarn. In a mid-morning discussion both he and Rommel 
agreed that the best course of action would now be for 346.I.D. to fall back behind the 
Dives, but this could not be authorised without OKW assent.1008 This shared intention shows 
that 346.I.D.was by 13 June exhausted as an offensive force. The Corps and Army Group 
commanders both were now more concerned with holding a strong defensive line rather 
than attempting to eliminate the airborne bridgehead. 346.I.D. now consolidated a new 
main line of resistance to the west of the Dive lowland and abandoned its forward positions 
on the Bréville ridge. Its positions could still support the coastal defences to the north and 
could have been used as the basis for further attacks, but no longer threatened the Orne 
barrier as before.1009 
   Gale’s dogma of intense training, skill at adapting the resources available and perceptive 
leadership had secured an important success for the Division. Bréville was the turning point 
of the campaign for 6 Airborne. The Bréville ridge position was made safe and therefore the 
Orne bridgehead secure. Further, 51 Div now occupied the southern portion of the 
bridgehead, while 4 SS Bde under Brigadier ‘Jumbo’ Leicester came under Gale’s command 
adding four more commando units.1010The Bréville fighting which had raged on 11 and 12 
June had shown the importance of decisive leadership in close attendance to the airborne 
forces’ performance.  Hill had recovered the St. Côme situation with a spontaneous counter-
attack while Colonel Parker had seized control of the Bréville attack when 12 Para Bn’s CO 
had been killed in the friendly-fire incident. Gale had carefully assembled an assault force 
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from his dwindling resources, then co-opted the divisional artillery of 51 Div and made good 
use of 13/18 H’s Sherman tanks. Gale had successfully ‘battle-grouped’ his limited forces to 
achieve a result, using the tanks to ‘shoot in’ the infantry, the tanks Browning MGs and 
75mm guns being used to suppress the enemy’s preponderance of MGs.1011 6 Airborne 
losses had been heavy, and for 12 Para Bn alone they had been pyrrhic, but not for the 
Division. The episode showed derivation from the ‘Colossal Cracks’ theory espoused by 
Montgomery: careful preparation had been replaced by skilled spontaneous aggressive 
action which evokes comparison with the post-war professional British Army. At this crucial 
moment Gale had banked on the morale of his own troops and the initiative of his 
commanders. He focussed on utilising the loaned heavy weapons of conventional role units 
to nullify the firepower of the enemy; which in turn allowed his troops to close with the 
enemy and maximise the impact of their aggression in close contact.   
V. Sustaining Combat Effectiveness – Holding the Line and Operation Paddle, 13 
June – 27 August 1944 
   6 Airborne now settled down to holding the line. Despite a ‘verbal agreement’ that the 
division would be withdrawn after three weeks 6 Airborne was now retained to hold the 
static Orne bridgehead front.1012 6 Airborne now held a 9,000 yard front line extending from 
just east of Escoville to the sea with less than six thousand infantrymen until 4 SS Bde also 
joined Gale’s forces.1013  
  The experience of US airborne forces on the western flank of the landings was little 
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different. US 82 and 101 Airborne Divisions were landed on the neck of the Cotentin to 
shield the Utah and Omaha landings, and to begin the process of cutting off the peninsular. 
The parachute drops in this area also suffered considerably from scattering. While many 
scattered men returned to their units, the 101 recorded 1,204 permanently missing men 
while the 82 lost 756.1014 The first official Air Ministry report delivered to the War Office 
from Normandy regarding 6 Airborne’s descent was upbeat, possibly reflecting a wave of 
relief that the US landings had not been the complete debacle Leigh-Mallory had feared.1015 
The two US airborne divisions were withdrawn after approximately three/four weeks; the 
101 Airborne was relieved by US 83 Inf Division on 29 June and the 82 Airborne retired into 
army reserve on 11 July.1016 The US airborne division was of similar size to the British model, 
with around 12,500 men, fifty 57mm anti-tank guns and twenty-four 75mm pack howitzers. 
Three parachute regiments were fielded with three battalions each of a similar size to the 
British parachute brigades and likewise a larger, more heavily equipped three battalion 
glider infantry regiment.1017 Like 6 Airborne the US airborne troops were relieved by 
conventional role forces within 72 hours of landing. The 82 US Airborne Div was relieved 
three days after landing by the US 90 Div although the airborne troops had to assist the 
inexperienced division until D +11 (17 June) when the veteran 9 US Div pushed through their 
positions.1018 Bradley’s First US Army was able to relieve its airborne forces with 
conventional role as soon as the shipping situation allowed their deployment.  
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            In contrast the moment 21 Army Group landed in France it was effectively a wasting 
asset as the army had reached almost the bottom of its manpower barrel, the adjutant-
General general Adam visited Montgomery on 9 July to warn him that infantry replacements 
would soon be exhausted.1019Gale used his own in house newsletter, Pegasus, to maintain 
communication with every man under his command -  
We have fought for ground and gained all we fought for; all we have gained by skill 
and guts we have held with courage and determination. Our reputation stands high 
in the 21st Army Group and at Home. Let us see to it that none of us let the side 
down. As I go about I am constantly struck by the smart and alert bearing of men in 
the red and green berets. Just as they look alert and businesslike in the line, so in the 
rear areas and across the river they look clean and soldierly and fit. There are 
exceptions, and it is up to you and me to see that those exceptions are eliminated. 
Do not let us get scruffy and untidy. In this division we all work together; because we 
have a common interest and common ideal; it is that we should be second to 
none.1020 
 
Such a news sheet fostered esprit de corps and allowed Gale to issue directives, as above. 
In terms of organisational learning, any new useful experience in Normandy regarding 
airborne warfare effectively ended with the last Rob Roy supply mission on 30 June 
(D+30),1021 the further lessons being a shopping-list of order of battle short-comings when 
the division was obliged to hold the line. The need for more artillery the moment the initial 
surprise effect on the enemy was emphasised: 
However strong an airborne div is in small arms, once the enemy has recovered from 
his initial surprise it is essential to obtain arty sp on a scale at least comparable to 
that likely to be available for a normal div.1022 
 
More 17 pdr ATk guns were called for, the two A Tk Btys of 16 guns each were found barely 
‘sufficient.’1023 While the Division held the line the challenges faced were essentially outside 
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the parameters of its role. It had held the line as a conventional role infantry division and 
had been forced to adapt and improvise to compensate for its OOB shortcomings. 1 
Airborne Div benefitted from the Normandy anti-tank lessons as new gun troops were 
formed in time for Market, and the division would take 52 6 pdrs and 16 17 pdrs to 
Arnhem.1024 
   Infantry reinforcements arrived in early July, 600 men arriving from Second Army.1025 
These men had come from the SLI, and the infantry training they had received was ‘very 
bad.’ Notably a few trained paratroopers arrived from Hardwick Hall, trained Vickers 
machine-gunners who had all been in the KOYLI during the retreat from Burma. 1026 
approximately 450 of these 600 remained with the Division, going on to complete their 
parachute training at Ringway, while the others were posted to conventional role infantry 
units once the campaign was over.1027 However no artillery, engineer and provost 
replacements could be sourced and these units had to manage at only forty per cent 
strength until the end of the campaign.1028 While in this static stage of operations the supply 
situation adequately met 6 Airborne’s needs. Initially supplies were drawn over the beach 
but soon a ‘Road Head’ was extended into the divisional area. The system was able to 
sustain the two SS Bdes and the Belgian and Dutch contingents later, but the seconded RA 
regiments had to rely on other sources for the prodigious amount of shells they consumed.  
    After the first week’s heavy fighting 6 Airborne was well-positioned to hold the Bois de 
Bavent line, and had gained an intimate knowledge of the ground. The rolling wooded 
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landscape allowed the airborne and commando troops’ aggressive patrolling to dominate 
the ground: 
The hedges dividing the very small orchards in this country consisted of big trees 
growing out of high banks on either side of which would run a deep ditch. It was in 
these ditches and at the junctions of these hedges that both we and the Germans 
had established our positions. There was no front line in any sense of the word: 
there was a patchwork of forward posts as often as not, not even mutually 
visible.1029 
 
Gale’s troops could hold the line cheaply due to its expertise in aggressive patrolling 
techniques thus freeing up conventional role infantry formations to pursue offensive 
operations to the south: 
TASKS.  
(a) 6 Airborne Division 
Will confine its self to making the general line LE MESNIL 1372 – BREVILLE 1374 – 
SALENELLES 1376 absolutely firm. Combined with this task, there will be infiltration 
and frigging about EAST of the above line to the maximum degree the resources of 
the Div will allow, but remembering that the security of the firm base is the first 
consideration.1030 
 
 THE above comments crudely and succinctly summarises the task given to the division as it 
hunkered down on the eastern flank of the 21AG lodgement. The ‘abominably intrepid’ 
Alistair Pearson and his 8 Para Bn held the Bois de Bavent stoically, beating off enemy 
patrols and continually checking to see ‘if the enemy trenches are still occupied’ by probing 
No Man’s Land themselves.1031 
    One advantage of holding the compact Orne bridgehead area was that it nullified 6 
Airborne’s very low scale of motor transport. Each conventional role infantry battalion 
fielded no less than forty-six Lorries and trucks and thirty-eight Bren/Universal carriers for 
its supply and transport needs, and when combined with each brigade’s RASC company 
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every division was fully motorised. The three RASC companies attached to the airborne 
division were charged with simply moving supplies between units once landed.1032 The 1943 
Doctrine pamphlet section ‘Part VIII – Administration’ concentrates on supply from the air, 
the RASC Composite companies only being mentioned twice.1033 While portions of 398 and 
716 Coys were landed by air the full establishment had not been completed until the last 
seaborne elements had joined the division on D+6 (12 June).1034The lack of personnel 
transportation was keenly felt when Operation Paddle got underway, but would have also 
prevented 6 Airborne from fully participating if 21 Army Group’s greatest offensive 
operation, Goodwood, if operations had achieved a decisive breakthrough.  
Along with motor transport, in its new adopted conventional static role the more heavily 
equipped elements of the division, AFVs and artillery, were the most unsuitable. The 
Tetrarch tanks of 6 AARR proved to lack robustness in airborne operations. Two tanks had 
been lost in the landings phase through an unfortunate glider collision, but then eleven of 
the remaining eighteen tanks were immobilised after their bogie wheels became entangled 
in glider tug ropes.1035 It took most of the night of 6/7 June for the vehicles to be released 
with blow torches, which fortunately could take place in the safe harbour area.1036 The 
enemy appeared to have a healthy respect for the potential of the Tetrarch: 
 ‘Fighting Value ... (f) The most dangerous enemy is the transport glider which is 
capable of putting down complete fighting units ready for action. The ‘Tetrarch’ Mk 
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VII airborne tank is stated to have silenced German gun positions within two minutes 
of landing.’1037 
 
Two more tanks were lost on 7 June, one to a SPG and one to a mine.1038 A reference in 8 
Para Bn’s war diary makes possible reference to the first incident, ‘Armoured Recce 
reported than an SP gun at [blank space] was giving them trouble and would we deal with 
it.’1039 While 8 Para Bn was providing 6 Armd Recce with a safe harbour, their need for 
infantry to deal with an enemy AFV (probably open-topped and relatively thinly armoured) 
does not reflect well on the combat power of the Tetrarch, their most powerful asset. This 
reference perhaps also points to the unit’s misuse, an essentially light armoured unit 
deployed in woods. 13/18 H were used for the Bréville attack as the Tetrarchs were 
performing useful service carrying out reconnaissance in the Bois de Bavent, were unsuited 
for such a heavy assault role, and awaiting their arrival would have been an added 
complication to an operation that had to be launched quickly. However, on 5 July a proposal 
to use the tanks to support an attack from Le Mesnil on enemy positions was turned down, 
and by 31 July the regiment had been pulled back to assist 5 Para Bde in the defence of the 
bridges.1040On 6 August eight Cromwell cruiser tanks were allocated to the Regiment and 
organised into two troops within A Squadron, while the HQ Troop retained three close 
support (3” howitzer) Tetrarchs, while the Regiment’s HQ kept two Tetrarchs.1041 The 3” 
howitzer was useful light gun for supporting infantry and had previously been employed in 
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Matilda and Churchill Mk I tanks.1042  This re-equipment gave 6 Airborne an organic tank 
squadron made up of standard battle tanks, as the Tetrarch was unsuitable for prolonged 
operations in conventional role. The reason why the Tetrarch featured in the 6 Airborne’s 
order of battle was its air portability, so the change also indicates the extent to which the 
Division was now operating beyond the parameters of its ordained role. 
 The divisional organic artillery provision was also entirely inadequate for prolonged 
operations. Only one of 53 (WY) Lt Regt’s batteries had been landed in the airborne phase, 
211 Bty, and during the first few days of action the demand for their support was 
extraordinary: 
I had only one eight-gun battery of 75mm howitzers in the bridgehead for the first 
week. These eight guns shot ceaselessly, expending fifteen hundred rounds on “D” 
day, thirteen hundred on 7th June and two thousand five hundred on the 8th 
June.1043 
 
For 8 June, these numbers represent each gun firing every four minutes for twenty-four 
hours!  The other two batteries would not join the division until 15 June.1044 As discussed in 
chapter five and in the Bréville case study 6 Airborne was generously supported by the 
artillery of surrounding 1 Corps formations: 
Subsequently the division always had two Fd Regts and one HAA [Heavy Anti-
Aircraft] Regt (in the ground role) under command in addition to its airlanding Regt; 
and on occasions it had a bty or regt of med arty and after 12 August 44, 12 and 4 
guns belonging respectively to the Belgian contingent and the Royal Netherlands 
contingent.1045 
 
 In addition to the powerful allocation of field regiments allotted to its infantry divisions, 1 
Corps also had 4 AGRA attached with twenty-four25 pdr, fifty-six 4.5’ and sixteen 
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4.5’/155mm guns.1046 The Division’s artillery arm was effectively built up to that of a 
conventional role infantry division, but while these guns were supporting the airborne 
forces they were unable to support their own infantry. The attachment of the Belgian Piron 
Bde and the Princess Irene Netherlands Bde on 6 August added much needed infantry 
strength to Gale’s command but also usefully contributed sixteen 25 pdr guns. These 
additions were well-timed to support the Division as it prepared to pursue the enemy in 
Paddle.1047 
  On 17 August Operation Paddle began, 1 Corps’ pursuit of German forces as they fell back 
along the Channel coast.  To the south the Wehrmacht situation had collapsed with the bulk 
of 7 A.O.K. and 5 Pz-A.O.K. encircled around Falaise, and US/Free French forces driving hard 
on Paris. Gale had grouped 6 Airborne to make best use of the more mobile elements within 
it, but the pursuit would essentially be on foot. While 6 AL Bde pushed towards the coast 
with both the Belgian Peron Bde and Netherlands Princess Irene Bde under command, the 
two parachute brigades pushed east towards the Dives crossings.1048 6 Airborne’s campaign 
ended on 27 August when it was ordered to concentrate between Honfleur and Pont 
Audemer.1049  
   The final cost for the Division in men had been heavy. 6 Airborne had lost 745 ORs and 76 
officers killed in action, 2,510 ORs and 199 officers wounded, with a further 886 ORs and 41 
officers missing. 4,457 men lost, represented thirty-six per cent of total WE (war 
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establishment) divisional strength.1050 The level of casualties was serious, but not as severe 
as that suffered by 1 Para Bde in Tunisia, although that brigade was mathematically wiped 
out with a total of 1,700 casualties across three parachute battalions.1051 The loss of officers 
reveals a certain mayfly element to the nature of airborne leadership on the battlefield. 316 
officers dead, wounded and missing came from a WE of 701, therefore forty-five per cent 
losses.1052In the parachute battalions officer losses were especially severe, 1/CDN losing 
twenty-four of twenty-seven officers in the campaign.1053 
    6 Airborne Div took heavy losses in the first few hours of action, but Gale’s focus on 
aggression and initiative allowed it to absorb these heavy losses and carry on to achieve its 
tasks. The development of a divisional identity allowed combat support elements to ‘blister 
on’ seamlessly with the infantry units, as shown in the integration of 3 and 4 A.Tk Btys in the 
defence of the perimeter between 6 and 12 June. The divisional artillery support plan 
created by Colonel Norris facilitated the use of 1 Corps/3 Div and eventually 51 Div RA 
assets under the direction of airborne FOOs in addition to naval gunfire support.  
  The results of the landings phase, the actual airborne assault of 6 Airborne on D-Day, 
compares favourably when set alongside the Airborne Operations success/failure process 
(Figure 1) introduced in chapter two. Despite severe scattering the Division managed to 
recover its cohesion and take momentum into the attack led effectively by local 
commanders (such as Hill, Otway and Pearson). The defenders became quickly aware of the 
airborne landings: 
                                                          
1050
 Richard Gale, With the 6th Airborne in Normandy, (London: Sampson, 1948), Appendix 1. George Forty, 
British Army Handbook 1939-1945 (Stroud: Chancellor Press, 2000), pp. 168–169. 
1051
 Victor Dover, The Sky Generals (London: Cassell, 1981), p. 201. 
1052
 George Forty, British Army Handbook 1939-1945 (Stroud: Chancellor Press, 2000), pp. 168–169. 
1053
 Peter Harclerode, Go to It! (London: Caxton, 1990), p. 109. 
289 
 
 The reports of the troops about parachute jumps and airborne landings were 
received by the division at intervals, as the landings occurred, between hours of 
0040 and 0105. On the basis of these reports the division ordered at 0110 hours that 
alarm stage II take effect in the entire divisional sector, after the commander of the 
coast defence group at Riva Bella had already ordered alarm stage II for his group at 
0045 hours.1054 
 
Yet their reaction was sluggish and paralysed by the poor mobility and scattered 
deployment of the bulk of its infantry. It would be these small garrisons which would be 
isolated and eliminated rather than the airborne troops. The Bréville episode revealed that 
airborne troops required considerable co-opted support to confront ensconced enemy 
conventional role infantry; but again Gale’s units benefitted from the tough preparation he 
had put them through and the cover of darkness. They were able to use their aggression at 
close range under his direction and that of this carefully selected unit and formation 
leaders.  
  Overall Allied command was satisfied with the performance of airborne forces in 
Normandy, the concerns of Husky now excoriated. Enthusiasm again gripped the highest 
echelons of Allied command. On 10 August the COS sent a memorandum to the Joint Staff 
Mission in Washington stating that ‘we are in general agreement with General Marshall that 
the tendency in all theatres is to make insufficient use of airborne forces.’1055  Gale’s 
leadership had defined 6 Airborne Div’s identity and its combat effectiveness. 
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Chapter Seven – Conclusion 
 
  6 Airborne was created to take part in the invasion of NW Europe. The leadership of 
Richard Gale moulded it into a high quality division before it was committed to action, 
stamping his authority on its character through his appointment of its leaders and its 
capability through a ferocious programme of challenging training.  Once landed it generated 
and sustained its combat effectiveness through aggressive and inventive infantry fighting 
led by carefully selected leaders. 
This concluding chapter will view developments and events beyond the Normandy 
campaign to frame 6 Airborne’s effect into the framework of the wider war. First the 
enhanced worth attached to the Division after the campaign will be shown. It will then 
compare and contrast the cost effect comparison with Special Force, a similar sized effort in 
the Far East theatre 1943-1944. Third, the stabilisation and codification of British Air assault 
method will be reviewed. In the second half of this chapter the trail of the themes 
throughout the study will be highlighted with the thesis’ research outcomes set by the 
thesis and research questions.  
 
I. Beyond Normandy 
At the end of the campaign the British Army was left with a 6 Airborne Div that was an 
extremely valuable operational asset.  It had executed a successful divisional-scale airborne 
operation, in which it had achieved its objectives, and was battle-hardened after three 
months of continuous combat operations. Gale’s command was not alone in this; 15, 43, 49, 
53 Inf and 11 and Gds Armd Divs had also been inexperienced formations committed to 
battle in Normandy, and were now also highly thought of as experienced fighting 
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divisions.1056The division was called upon to support US forces in the Ardennes during 
January 1945, when the German ‘Bulge’ offensive fell upon the US First Army. 6 Airborne 
was committed as conventional role infantry, rushed by ship across the Channel, in the case 
of 1 RUR being escorted through a thick London fog under escort by the Metropolitan 
Police.1057 The use the Division in this way highlights the shortage of trained infantrymen 
that the Army was suffering from D-Day onwards. These were specialised troops used once 
more to hold the line, a task any conventional role formation would have been able to do. 
   Even in the immediate aftermath of the Market Garden failure, senior Allied commanders 
saw the value of airborne forces and were keen to include them in their plans. 6 Airborne 
was ready for further operations by 1 October 1944, and Guy Simonds, the Canadian Corps 
commander facing the challenge of clearing the Scheldt area of Holland, was keen to use 
airborne troops to clear the approaches to Antwerp.1058 Indeed, two enormous airborne 
operations with potentially strategic results, Eclipse and Arena, were planned by Brereton’s 
First Airborne Army staff and presented to Eisenhower in early March 1945. The first 
operation would have involved a two corps airborne assault onto Berlin and was supported 
by US General Arnold (the chief of the USAAF) and intended to capture the city before 
Soviet forces arrived. The second would have used ten airborne and air portable divisions to 
effectively cut Germany in two and provide a great airborne-defended bridgehead on high 
ground near Paderborn for conventional role formations to converge on before using it as a 
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supply hub for a final offensive.1059 With senior commanders still requested airborne forces’ 
assistance and such expansive thinking in play at First Airborne Army, it was inevitable that 
airborne troops would be used to cross the last great natural barrier opposing the Allies on 
the border of Germany. Therefore 6 Airborne would be used in role in one other large scale 
operation before the war ended.  
  Operation Varsity, the airborne element of 21 Army Group’s Rhine crossing operation, 
Plunder, took place on 24 March 1945. 6 Airborne was given an important role as part of 
XVIII US Airborne Corps (which also included 17 US Airborne Div), seizing the town of 
Hamminkeln, bridges over the River Issel and important high ground behind the enemy’s 
main defensive line. The division was inserted in one lift, and landed close to its objectives, 
showing that the lessons of Normandy and Arnhem had been learned regarding proximity of 
landings and the need for a maximum first lift.1060 The division did however suffer heavy 
casualties, particularly amongst the glider-borne units. 53 RA suffered the loss of twenty-
two out of seventy-eight gliders.1061 2 Oxf Bucks lost half their strength in the landing, the 
regimental history attributing these severe losses to a group of German light AA guns saved 
from the RAF preparatory bombardment by a ‘ground haze’: 
As the gliders cast off and circled for landing they were greeted by fire from 20 
millimetre [sic] guns. On the Regimental Landing Zone there were four sites each 
containing four guns, each having four barrels. The Result was unpleasant. There was 
scarcely a glider that did not receive a hit somewhere.1062 
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The aircraft and glider operations for both divisions amounted to forty-four transport planes 
and eighty gliders, while 6 Airborne suffered 347 killed and 731 wounded.1063 When 
compared to the total losses for the period March-May 1945, when the Division advanced 
to the Baltic, the losses for Varsity amounted to fifty per cent of those killed.1064 The 
Division‘s casualties, even in the view of a supporter of airborne forces, ‘were eye-watering 
losses pitted against enemy units at perhaps forty per cent strength, broadly assessed as 
already beaten.’1065  The use of 6 Airborne and the Varsity operation has been censored by 
recent authors. The views that ‘Plunder would undoubtedly have achieved its aims without 
the supporting airborne assault’ and was a great risk to take considering the ‘spotty and 
limited response‘ the enemy were capable of have merit set against the situation the 
Wehrmacht found its self in March 1945.1066 ‘The clear lesson was that airborne operations 
succeed when they can be rapidly joined by formations with heavier equipment’, had been 
made again.1067 The landing of tanks from the air was again of questionable success. 6 AARR 
flew eight American-built Locust light tanks into the bridgehead in Hamilicar gliders. Four 
were damaged on landing and only two were serviceable enough to reach the rendezvous 
point.1068 
  Launching an airborne operation against an enemy well equipped with anti-aircraft guns in 
daylight had been costly, and the landing losses of some glider borne units through enemy 
fire can be compared to those suffered by the Luftwaffe on Crete. However, 6 Airborne 
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concentrated quickly on the ground and succeeded in achieving its objectives, and was 
rapidly relieved by Second Army. 
Beyond the NW European theatre another unconventional forces endeavour is useful to 
assess and compare and contrast with the Airborne Establishment effort. Though more 
short-lived and more ad hoc in nature, Orde Wingate’s ‘Special Force’ endeavour is an 
interesting comparison to the creation of airborne forces in terms of resource cost and 
operational effect. The Chindits1069 eventually became almost corps sized and absorbed a 
considerable proportion of the infantry manpower devoted to the Burma campaign.   
Archibald Wavell had been inspired by Orde Wingate’s use of long range penetration (LRP) 
operations in the successful defeat of the Italians in East Africa. Wavell therefore supported 
Wingate with a view to employing similar irregular tactics in defeating Japanese forces in 
Burma.1070 The first Chindit operation, Longcloth, was launched in 1943, the Special Force 
being composed of 77 Bde. This formation could not be considered a picked force in its 
entirety, having units that had been converted from other roles.1071 The operation was 
originally intended to support an offensive by IV Corps across the River Chindwin, but this 
was cancelled. Wingate gained Wavell’s permission to proceed to test the LRP concept in 
Burma and to consolidate his brigade’s morale. The force was structured to disrupt 
Japanese communications by cutting railway lines and causing confusion through 
diversionary actions. The operation ended with the Chindit groups dispersing and making 
their own way back in groups of various sizes to avoid contact with large conventional role 
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Japanese units. In a post action report, the new C-in-C, Claude Auchinleck1072 praised the 
operation for lessons learnt regarding air supply, much intelligence gained and possibly six 
to eight Japanese battalions diverted from other operations. The operation was much 
lauded in the British and US press and boosted morale as the effort was seen as a spirited 
offensive action which had succeeded against the until now seemingly invincible Japanese in 
Burma.1073  
  Wingate was recalled in July 1943 to report to Sir Alan Brooke on his operations. By an 
extraordinary turn of events he was interviewed by Churchill just as the latter was about to 
embark on ship to the Quebec Conference with Roosevelt. He made a significant impression 
on the Prime Minister, ‘we had not talked for half an hour before I felt myself in the 
presence of a man of the highest quality.’ Churchill was drawn to the proposal for two 
reasons. First, the effort appealed to his interest in unconventional warfare. Second, as 
discussed, the effort could begin to eliminate the notion amongst the conventional role 
army that the Japanese were somehow invincible when fighting in the jungle. This had 
developed since the fall of Malaya and Singapore in 1942. Churchill spontaneously decided 
to take Wingate with him to Canada. Wingate presented his ideas and plans for LRP forces in 
Burma to the combined Chiefs of Staff. Due to Churchill’s wish to see offensive action 
against the Japanese, Wingate’s engaging charisma and the Americans’ desire to pursue 
operations in support of Chiang Kai Shek’s Chinese Nationalist forces – all his plans were 
approved.1074  
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   The resources allocated to the renewed Chindit effort were considerable. Against the 
wishes of the India C-in-C, Claude Auchinleck, the battle-hardened 70 Div was directly 
converted to Special Force under Wingate’s command. This British division had fought in the 
Middle East and had played a key role in saving Tobruk in 1941. It was a potential 
cornerstone with operations in Burma in prospect. As the Special Force would be dependent 
on close air support and supply, Wingate was also allocated American LRP troops and the Air 
Commando. This air formation was powerful – with 127 aircraft and 225 gliders.1075 The 
greatly enlarged Special Force trained hard and also filtered out any unsuitable men which 
had to be replaced with volunteers from other conventional role forces, ‘possibly some forty 
per cent.’1076 Having a sixth of all the infantry available for offensive operations in 1944, 
Wingate’s force had to be used in key operations.1077 Operation Thursday’s goals for Special 
Force were the establishment of air-supplied defended bridgeheads; the capture of Indaw; 
and the general aim to disrupt Japanese operations by sending columns all over Burma to 
attack communications.1078 Beginning on 5 March 1944, 77 and 111 Bdes were airlanded 
behind enemy lines beginning with an initial wave of fifty-two gliders towed by twenty-six 
aircraft. 1079Wingate’s ‘Stronghold’ – his theory of a defended air-supplied location – at 
‘Broadway’ was supplied every night by 100 Dakota aircraft which landed 12,000 men, all 
their equipment and food and 2,000 mules.1080  Wingate would be killed in an air crash in 
the middle of the operation, which certainly engaged Japanese forces across their lines of 
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communication just as the crucial Imphal/Kohima offensives were launched.1081 The 
operation also assisted Stilwell1082 in pushing forward the Ledo road to support Chiang Kai-
shek’s Chinese forces.1083 Wingate was viewed as a controversial figure by more orthodox 
soldiers when alive and by historians since his death. Indeed, he is the subject of a detailed 
critique in the official history.1084 
The bravery and determination of the Chindits cannot be denied, but the project’s 
effectiveness can be challenged. When the Chindits are measured against the primary 
combat effectiveness metric discussed at the start of chapter five – the achievement of 
operational goals, an issue can be seen.  The Chindits objectives – in practice - appear to 
have been indistinct and did not directly support Fourteenth Army in sweeping the Japanese 
out of Burma by supporting a conventional offensive by the latter. The Imphal/Kohima 
offensive must certainly have been hampered by Wingate’s activity, but it is uncertain that 
the Chindits directly compromised it. With so uncertain a return the investment of 
resources placed in Special Force must be questioned. The Air Commando presented to 
Wingate in August 1943, and the promise of considerable transport support from RAF and 
US Dakota squadrons, was far in excess of what RAF 38 Gp could furnish for the entire 
British airborne project in the UK in the summer of that year.  Not even a complete 
parachute brigade could be lifted at this time (see chapter two). The Chindits took sixteen 
per cent of all the infantry available for Burma offensive operations in 1944.  While 
Wingate’s small corps included non-British elements, this dwarfs the five per cent of 
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infantry allocated across the Army dedicated to airborne and commando forces in all 
theatres (Tables 1 and 2). The disbandment by conversion of the experienced 70 Div also 
added to the dislike and resentment amongst the orthodox officers which Wingate’s poor 
interpersonal skills fed. This friction could also be seen as a cost to the project, although the 
reverse side of Wingate’s obvious insight and vision – but in stark contrast to Gale’s 
collaborative style. Overall in sharp contrast 6 Airborne’s results can be seen clearly and 
overall offered a better return on investment. 
  Operation Varsity showed that the lessons learnt in Normandy and Arnhem had been 
combined – particularly proximity of DZ/LZ to objectives and the rapid link-up with 
conventional role forces.1085 The codification of British airborne knowledge was also 
consolidated in 1945 with a new War office pamphlet.1086 This 118-page booklet is a far 
more comprehensive, considered and well-though out than its 1943 fifty-page 
predecessor.1087 As discussed in chapter two, while the 1943 document is largely the War 
Office viewpoint of German early war operations that have then been reverse-engineered to 
assist in planning, the latter pamphlet gathers all the experience of 1 and 6 Airborne Divs in 
NW Europe. The characteristics of airborne forces are discussed soberly, with a key section 
on the vulnerability of scattered troops on landing.1088 Air support, planning, training and 
communications are all dealt with in their own sections, together with the characteristics of 
airborne forces. In appendix seventeen – ‘Outline of Army and Air Force Responsibilities’ -  
all the relative tasks are divided and outlined, ending with ‘Selection of dropping and glider 
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landing zones and airstrips’ as a ‘Joint Responsibility.’1089 This is set out as one line upon the 
page and could be no clearer. 
  The closer inter-service relationship outlined in the 1945 pamphlet which Gale and 
Hollinghurst founded, but also the friction over air resources, is echoed in a RUSI lecture 
some four years later.1090 Major-General Cassels outlined the British airborne experience 
during the Second World War and explained the factors that could affect airborne 
operations. In the discussion that followed his lecture, Group Captain G.C. Barrett RAF 
challenged the lecturer whether ‘an attempt has been made to make a balance-sheet’ of 
cost of the creation of Britain’s airborne forces? Barrett’s point being that if perhaps the 
effort funnelled into airborne forces had gone into more ‘direct support aircraft and heavy 
bombers’ maybe 30 Corps would have got to Arnhem alone. He then tempers, and 
somewhat contradicts, his comments by suggesting that it should be considered whether 
the whole Army should be made ‘air-transportable.’1091 Cassels’ responds by stating that the 
bridges would most certainly not have been taken intact in such a situation, and further 
airborne forces are a valid way in which the RAF can support the Army in the land battle in 
addition to close support. He finishes the exchange by saying ‘I cannot give you a definitive 
answer, as it is mainly a matter of opinion.’1092 The discussion is amicable but the resonance 
of Brooke and Harris’ dispute in the autumn of 1942 reverberates within it.  
  Richard Gale’s post-Normandy career reflects well on his abilities as a leader and trainer. 
He replaced Browning as Deputy Commander of First Airborne Army in December 1944, and 
commander of 1 British Airborne Corps. He flew out to India to begin preparation for 
airborne operations against the Japanese, which would have used 44 Indian Airborne Div 
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and eventually 6 Airborne Div, but the war in the Far East ended before any operations 
could be launched. His post-war appointments included Director of Military Training at the 
WO, GOC British Troops in Egypt and C-in-C of the British Army on the Rhine in 1952, and 
later the NATO Northern Army Group. His skills as a coalition general were highlighted by his 
recall from retirement on the request of the Americans to take up the role of Deputy 
SACEUR (the commander of NATO forces in Europe).1093 
II. Thesis Research Results and Themes 
 
Leadership was the first thesis theme. This theme was of key importance not only in the 
creation and working up of 6 Airborne Division but in the creation of the entire British 
airborne establishment during the Second World War. As has been discussed, without the 
direct intervention of Churchill it is unlikely that Britain would have generated the extent of 
airborne forces eventually fielded at the speed of development it did.1094 Brooke’s personal 
conviction that airborne forces would play a key role in the development of offensive 
operations, and his determination to maintain them on a divisional scale secured their 
future such was his hold over the COS and influence over the Prime Minister in changing his 
mind to keep 1 Airborne Div.1095 The subsequent appointment of Frederick Browning to 
direct the airborne effort provided the new organisation with an energetic and purposeful 
leader who grasped a vision of what airborne forces could be, but one not gifted with the 
important skills necessary to engender collaboration with peers.   
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The potency of airborne forces, the possibilities they might open up operationally, was 
treasured by the most influential heads of the British Army as the Second Front loomed – 
Brooke, Montgomery, Alexander and Dempsey. This enthusiastic support of airborne forces’ 
potential is seen throughout the thesis. Together with the Commandos and SOE, they were 
novel units that the Prime Minister himself called to be formed in the aftermath of Dunkirk. 
Regardless of the heavy losses suffered during Ladbroke and Fustian, Brooke, Alexander and 
Montgomery all remained convinced of airborne forces value to invasion operations. 
Chapter Four revealed General Miles Dempsey’s full awareness of the new operational 
dimension airborne forces could add to his forthcoming Normandy operations, intending to 
use them en masse to either outflank the enemy when opportunities arose. 
At the formation and unit level, 6 Airborne was highly fortunate to be led by a mixture of 
superb leaders. Hugh Kindersley, Nigel Poett and James Hill were all excellent trainers of 
soldiers and implicitly understood the ideal that Gale wished to achieve with the Division. 
Every unit commander had to be a meticulous planner, such was the complexity of the tasks 
and the inherent risks assigned to 6 Airborne on D-Day. Terence Otway’s Merville plan was 
complicated, but his intricate scheme had been absorbed by his men, who when faced with 
adversity were flexible enough to quickly adapt to his improvised plan. Alistair Pearson and 
James Hill were both ‘warriors’, and led from the front at critical moments of the 
campaign.1096 Both were wounded on D-Day, Pearson was shot through the hand while Hill 
was quite severely wounded in the leg and buttocks, but both carried on with their duties. 
Colonel ‘Reggie’ Parker, the Deputy commander of 6 AL Bde, played an important role in the 
Division’s administration and training, and set up a battle school in Ouistreham once the 
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front had stabilised somewhat. Yet he was still quite prepared to go forward at Bréville 
when the CO of 12 Para Bn was killed, take charge of the situation and win a crucial victory. 
6 Airborne owed much of its success to the mixture of leadership types it possessed; 
‘thrusters’ identified by Gale and the Airborne Establishment, such as 53 RA’s CO Tony 
Teacher to airborne veterans like Peter Luard or Alistair Pearson.  
All of the above command and leadership personalities were the figures who played a role 
in the creation and moulding of 6 Airborne Div. Brooke, Browning and Gale were the most 
directly involved. Brooke facilitated and shielded Browning’s creation of an Airborne 
Establishment that in turn fostered Gale’s Divison which would play such a useful part in the 
D-Day landings. 
  This thesis has shown that Richard Gale acted as a combat effectiveness accelerator for the 
Division through his personal command characteristics and his directing tenets for the 
Normandy campaign specifically.  These characteristics are illustrated in Figure 3.The 
volunteers of the Division had first benefitted from the input of Browning and the AAC – 
their sense of personal value had been built by role-specific training and the transferred 
high standards of the Guards Brigade. Gale himself personally benefitted from attaining a 
talismanic status amongst Airborne Forces while projecting the exterior of a reassuring 
conventional role infantryman. An effective communicator at all levels, he carefully selected 
his leaders. While planning for D-Day Gale, 6 Airborne Div and the Airborne Establishment 
insured DZ/LZ were close to the objectives. Simple clear plans supported by repetitive 
relevant training and a redundancy of force enhanced the chances of success. The result 
was a Division that was cohesive, resilient and used local initiative to counter the enemy.  
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  The second thesis theme was training. The importance training of airborne forces during 
the Second World War cannot be overstated. The Airborne Establishment tested its 
volunteer recruits to the limit with both parachute or glider training and harsh but germane 
training on the ground at Hardwick Hall. Gale’s concept of leading was in effect to 
continually train and develop his subordinates continually. This carried over into the 
preparations for D-Day, resulting in a level of briefing that even the scattered landings and 
darkness did not prevent the Division from fulfilling its tasks. 
Hard and realistic training was a key component of Gale’s canon in building effective units 
and formations. First, the role-specific training received by British Airborne Forces recruits in 
1943-44. Once a soldier had volunteered for the Parachute Regiment he would be sent to 
the Airborne Forces Depot at Hardwick Hall in Derbyshire for an intensive two-week pre-
parachute training course. The role of this ‘toughening’ course was crucial; the men who 
passed were thereafter conditioned to accept a gruelling schedule of training once posted 
to their units. This formed the basis of high levels of performance once committed to battle.  
At the Parachute Training School (Ringway) he would be required to make two jumps from a 
captive balloon and five or six from aircraft. One of the aircraft jumps took place at night 
while two others would include kit bags attached.1097 The training for airlanding troops was 
hazardous; initial flying was carried out in Hotspur gliders which had no windows, and 
crashes for one battalion at least were ‘frequent.’1098 While paratroopers waited to make 
jumps and glider troops for flights, ‘the period of waiting was filled with strenuous military 
exercises and even more strenuous physical training.’1099 In the case of role-specific training 
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for his officers, Gale revisited issues observed on exercise but continually pushed an 
emphasis on aggression and simplicity in formulating solutions to tactical problems. The 
transplanted discipline and standards of the Guards Brigade helped here, as did the 
increasingly homogeneous nature of the AAC, and finally the ability to ‘return to unit’ any 
man found lacking while training did give Gale and his subordinates a great advantage in 
moulding the Division.  
   Gale and his commanders prepared 6 Airborne at a ferocious pace specifically for D-Day 
operations.  The balance of important personalities within the brigades can be seen as the 
Division prepared for its baptism of fire in the most demanding of circumstances. Each unit 
in the Division was prepared for specific tasks and rehearsed their role remorselessly, such 
as assaults on heavily defended enemy positions and river-crossings. The challenges and 
quality of armour and infantry training in the British army 1939-45 has been closely analysed 
by Timothy Harrison-Place.1100 He concluded that the key issue which blighted the Army’s 
training was a poorly developed and less than coherent doctrine for infantry: 
Doctrine was in many cases wrong. In any case, right or wrong, troops in training 
frequently ignored it the British Army’s performance was not hopeless. Much good 
work was done between Dunkirk and D-Day. But somehow the Army never managed   
to collect the good together and eliminate the bad.1101 
 
He pointed to the heavy reliance of the infantry on massive artillery support, ‘It left the 
expectation that an infantry set piece attack behind artillery support required little if any 
actual infantry fighting. When in battle that expectation was falsified, too few infantrymen 
knew what to do.’1102 The artillery-heavy ‘Colossal Cracks’ tactics developed by the Army 
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from 1942 onwards have been explored by Stephen Hart, who explained that this risk-
averse conservative approach was developed for three reasons: To avoid the huge infantry 
casualties of 1914-18; was easy to impress on war service soldiers, and upheld morale.1103 
This set-piece approach was entirely appropriate for the conventional role infantry fighting 
offensive battles of 1943-4, and made best use of the British Army’s massive artillery and 
armour resources. For the Normandy campaign, the ten British and Canadian infantry 
divisions would be supported by eight armoured or tank brigades and five Royal Artillery 
Groups (which divided five heavy and twenty-four medium artillery regiments between 
them).1104 It also went some way towards nullifying the German superiority in armoured 
vehicles and tactical panache learnt on the Eastern Front.1105 This is aside from the massive 
superiority the Allies enjoyed in the air. John Buckley has recently shown that the British 
Army in Normandy considerably developed its fighting prowess steadily through the 1944-
45 NW Europe campaign, and was able to match German formations in close combat when 
needed. He identifies developments in British ability to wield armoured formations, 
logistical organisational ability and firm leadership. Yet he still cites infantry capability as 
vital. ‘Notwithstanding all these improvements and refinements, close-combat troops, and 
particularly infantry, were still central to success and failure in battle.’1106 As already 
discussed in chapter two, for British airborne troops the battlefield reality once landed was 
very different when compared to that faced by conventional infantry. For the Tonga 
objectives they would not be supported by a massive air and artillery preparation and would 
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have to rely on the shock-surprise effect. They would land close to their objectives, often 
also valued by the enemy and so well defended, and would have to transmute the 
momentum gained by their sudden appearance into sharply focussed violence in the 
assault. They would have to rely solely on their own weapons. High standards of personal 
fitness and aggression were fostered at every turn in airborne training to further enhance 
fighting power and stamina in battle. 
  The third and final theme was adaptation and innovation. 6 Airborne Div was created to 
retain an airborne capability when 1 Airborne Div had been sent to North Africa. In a sense 
the Division was an adaptation of the remnants of 1 Airborne Div when it was sent to the 
Mediterranean. New formations were mixed with 6AARR, 1 RUR, 2 Ox Bucks and Gale used 
the commonly held building expectation of the Second Front landings to further energise his 
division’s preparations. Being the second airborne division Britain created 6 Airborne had 
the advantage that it was not viewed as an experimental organisation, a white elephant 
seeking role justification, an issue which perhaps at points its sister division had fallen victim 
to.  
 This adaption was often not ideal, and was representative at times of doing things on the 
cheap and muddled thinking. The aircraft used by 38 Group RAF to carry 6 Airborne into 
action were all adapted bomber types. They were not fit for purpose and at one point this 
fact had a direct and deleterious impact on the D-Day operations when Francis Lennox-
Boyd, the CO of 22 Pathfinder Coy, fell from the Albemarle aircraft he was flying in. In terms 
of applied technology and method, the dropping of parachutists and landing of gliders 
presented 6 Airborne in its most vulnerable state. The air or transit phase Tonga has to be 
viewed as a disaster due to the dislocation caused by the severe scattering suffered by the 
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parachute brigades. The idea of glider borne tanks was fallacious.  The Tetrarch tank was at 
best a mobile machine gun post, a task that the Bren Carrier could have equally fulfilled. 6 
AARR could have followed in the seaborne tail and been equipped with more powerful 
medium tanks that could have ably supported 6 Airborne. The co-option of 13/18 Hussars in 
the battles 7-12 June 1944 highlights this issue. 
 Yet Norris’ plan of co-opting the firepower of the Royal Navy and surrounding Royal 
Artillery assets to support reveals the Division’s use of adaptation at its best. His use of his 
officers as effectively Forward Observation officers for other units was practical and highly 
effective, as these conventional role forces were instrumental in breaking up enemy 
counter-attacks. 
   Combat effectiveness and success on the battlefield is bought at a price. Was 6 Airborne’s 
contribution to the Normandy landings and following campaign worth the expenditure? 
Chapter three addressed the issue of the cost of formation, focussing on the most valuable 
assets needed – the number of troops selected by the airborne units and the aircraft 
diverted for their transport. Airborne forces, like the commandos, have been accused of 
extracting all of the best men from the conventional role infantry, if not the whole Army. An 
assessment of the numbers involved show this cannot be so. The last Army Strength Return 
before D-Day showed that only just less than one per cent of the army’s total strength and 
three and a half per cent of the infantry were glider or parachute troops.1107 While airborne 
forces filled its ranks with volunteers, the 1941 WO ruling that no more than ten men could 
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be taken from a single unit stopped any battalion being completely stripped out.1108 Even if 
all the men taken from one unit were NCOs, that would still only account for approximately 
ten per cent of the total in a conventional infantry battalion.1109 The units that were 
converted to the parachute role typically retained their spine of NCOs and officers, while 
soldiers unwilling to take up the new role were recycled into other battalions within their 
county regiment. The glider battalions were transformed complete, and were reinforced as 
needed by their regimental depots. In terms of officers, while 6 Airborne’s parachute units 
contained a higher percentage of TA officers, they did not absorb a disproportionate 
number of pre-war regular officers, which by 1944 had become a precious resource for the 
army. The facts show that the manpower needs of airborne forces did not cripple either the 
army’s leadership cadre or infantry strength. 
  As stated in chapter six, 6 Airborne lost 745 ORs and 76 officers killed in action, 2,510 ORs 
and 199 officers wounded, with a further 886 ORs and 41 officers missing. 4,457 men lost, 
represented thirty-six per cent of war establishment divisional strength.1110 During the whole 
campaign 21 Army Group suffered 16,138 killed, 9,093 missing and 58, 594 wounded 
between D-Day and the end of August.1111 If these totals are divided by the number of active 
divisions present during the Normandy campaign (sixteen) 1,008 killed, 3,662 wounded and 
568 missing are the averages. Crudely, 6 Airborne is below the average in the each category 
bar missing. This simple sum obviously does not take into account the losses suffered by the 
considerable number of independent brigades, the larger size of the conventional role 
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divisions or the differences in role. 6 Airborne also essentially held its ground for two 
months of the campaign while other divisions were engaged in fierce battles to the south in 
the Odon valley for example, or operations such as Operation Goodwood. Yet it does point 
to the fact that 6 Airborne did not suffer exponential casualties when compared to the 
conventional role formations, even though it had to be left on the line with inadequate 
heavy weaponry and little organic transport. 
Aircraft for airborne forces were the second critical resource cost, but how much value did 
the RAF place on the aircraft donated? As C-in-C Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Harris 
showed considerable frustration with the types later allocated to transport airborne troops.  
The Albemarle was too underpowered to carry an acceptable bomb load; the Whitley was 
obsolete at the outbreak of the war while the Halifax and Stirling were increasingly outdated 
and unreliable. The creation of Harris’s great fleet of Lancaster heavy bombers was in no 
way hindered by the expansion of 38 Group with outmoded bombers. 46 Group was created 
by a US supplied unit equipment of C-47s in early 1944 and largely crewed with Coastal 
Command crews, increasingly idle as the struggle against the U-Boat had swung in the Allies’ 
favour. Harris and Portal’s vigorous defence of Bomber Command never allowed airborne 
forces’ requirement to jeopardise RAF operations, and the pooling of Allied aircraft 
production and the improving strategic position resolved the situation. 
   The combat effectiveness of 6 Airborne has been assessed using the airborne operations 
success/failure process (Figure 1) in chapter six and shown to have been successful in its 
Normandy operations. This process methodology introduced in chapter two could be 
applied to other areas of operational activity during the Second World War and other 
conflicts. For instance, a similar scheme could be developed for the assault of armoured 
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formations 1943-1944, and draw in such aspects as the depth of the defensive zone and 
density of anti-tank weapons versus the weight of preparatory bombardment and extent of 
close air support.1112  Even in the face of considerable confusion and interference caused by 
the scattering disaster, all the bridges on the Dives were found and destroyed; the Merville 
battery was seriously disrupted; the Orne barrier bridges captured and the position strongly 
held in the face of heavy Wehrmacht attacks in the following forty-eight hours. Later 6 AL 
Bde faced set-backs in the seizure of the villages needed to expand the bridgehead to the 
south, which bore testament to the fierce enemy opposition which quickly coalesced around 
the Orne bridgehead. 
 6 Airborne also achieved considerable intangible effects, particularly the shock and surprise 
inflicted on the enemy. This inhibited the Wehrmacht’s understanding of the developing 
situation and coherent response until around 0800 hours on D-Day, by which time the 
seaborne landings had begun and any operational initiative had completely slipped from 
their grasp. The massed daylight landing of 6 AL Bde at 2100 hours cowed some Wehrmacht 
observers, who believed Mallard was as an additional British airborne division being used 
spontaneously in response to the 21.Pz. Div’s afternoon counter-attacks. ‘But at that 
moment fresh British airborne forces landed immediately behind the attacking division, 
which therefore turned about and withdrew.’1113 So Kampfgruppe Rauch fell back from the 
coast, while it lifted the morale of the on looking Second Army as it pushed inland. 6 
Airborne held its line in Normandy for three months, and without the same artillery or 
motor transport resources of a conventional role division. The bloody battle of Bréville on 
12 June showed the Division at its best in the worst circumstances and eliminated the 
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Wehrmacht’s best opportunity to roll up the landings area from the east. Measuring 6 
Airborne’s combat effectiveness by two metrics, time spent on operations and success in 
operations, 6 Airborne Div scores well. It remained on the line for three months, thereby 
freeing up a conventional role infantry division for offensive operations and showing ‘utility’, 
while 6 Airborne’s modest size and range of operations on D-Day itself conforms with a 
notion of ‘proportionality.’ 
British airborne warfare technique was non-existent at the beginning of the Second World 
War, and poorly resourced for aircraft throughout. While supported by the additional 
firepower of surrounding conventional role units, the RN and the RAF, 6 Airborne Div 
generated and sustained its own combat effectiveness through the creation of a distinct 
airborne identity that boosted a sense of personal self-worth, and was then constantly 
trained and focussed on the task in hand by capable charismatic leaders. Richard Gale 
achieved a command ‘fusion’ as described by Sir John Hackett and was the main element 
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Table 1 - The Proportion of the Infantry which were Airborne or Commando Forces by D-
Day  
   
Infantry Strength No. Percentage of infantry total. 
Conventional Infantry role  
Bns 469496 81.92 
Machine Gun Bns 28248 4.93 
Motorised Infantry Bns 16734 2.92 
Foot/Motorised Guards Bns 27073 4.72 
Total Ab/Cdo Forces 31554 5.51 
Total Infantry 573105 5.5% OF TOTAL INFANTRY STRENGTH 







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





Conventional Infantry role  Bns 
Machine Gun Bns 
Motorised Infantry Bns 
Foot/Motorised Guards Bns 
Total Ab/Cdo Forces 
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Table 2 - The Proportion of the Army which were Airborne or Commando Forces by D-Day
 
The Total Strength of the Army, 31 March 1944 
  
    
Officers  16,7926     
Other Ranks 2,204,640     
Total 2,372,566     
        
 
Airborne Forces       
(WO 73/160 General Strength Return of the British 
Army 31 March 1944 p.56 - The Army Air Corps)       
  Officers ORs   
Total UK 733 11,479   
India Command   29   
Middle East 7 75   
North Africa 102 2440 4, 5, 6 Bns 
Total 842 14,023   
        
Total AAC 14,865 All Ranks   




Six Bns at 864 
W.E.         
1/RUR War 
Diary, 27/5/44 
      
 
Airborne Forces Total 20,049     
        
Special Service and Royal Marine Commandos       
NA CAB 106/7 Combined Operations Report, p.47 
March 1944 - The Special Service Group included 739 
Offrs, 10,308 ORs (plus 48 Cdo, which would have 
added another 458 all ranks -NA WO 204/8397. 
Commando and Infantry Establishments)       
        
Commando Forces Total 11,505     
        
Total Ab/Cdo Forces 31,554 













Table 4 - The status of the officers of the original units of 3rd Parachute Brigade and two conventional role infantry brigades  
(Sources – NA WO 171 series) 




3 Para Bde 
No. 48 (RM) 
Cdo 
No. 48 (RM) 
Cdo 
185 Inf Bde 185 Inf Bde 9 Inf Bde 9 Inf Bde 
    No. % No. % No. % No. % 
  Regular 10 9.17 3 10.7 19 17.43 18 14.28 
  ERC 88 80.73 
  
80 73.39 99 78.57 
  SUP RES  0 0 
  
0 0 1 0.79 
  MO 3 2.75 
  
3 2.75 2 1.58 
  CHAPLAIN 0 0 
  
2 1.83 2 1.58 
  UNKNOWN 0 0 
  
1 0.917 1 0.79 
  TA 8 7.33 
  
4 3.66 0 0 
  CDN 0 0 
    
3 2.38 









           Key 
          ERC - Emergency Regular Commission (war service) 
     SUP RES - Supplementary Reserve  
        MO - Medical Officer 
         TA - Territorial army 
         CDN - 'Canloan' Canadian officers 
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Table 5 - Cost Comparison of Bomber Command versus 38 and 46 Groups as of 6 June 1944 (approximate) 
  Squadrons 
Initial 
Establishment 
Aircraft Value £ Total £ 





              
Halifax 23 20 460 £21,752 £10,005,920   AIR 20/2023  
Stirling 3.5 20 70 £20,014 £1,400,980     
Lancaster 38.5 20 770 £21,866 £16,836,820     
B 17 1 20 20 £41,666 £833,320     
Total     1320   £29,077,040 70%   
                
38 Group   IE + R           
Albemarle 4 26 104 £31,470 £3,272,880   NA AIR 37/111  
Stirling 4 26 104 £20,014 £2,081,456     
Halifax 2 20 40 £21,752 £870,080     
Total     248   £6,224,416 15%   
                
46 Group               
DC-3 5 30 150 £41,666 £6,249,900   NA AIR 38/110 
Anson 5 5 25 £4,151 £103,775     
Total     175   £6,353,675 15%            
                   
         Notes 
                   Dakota value Phil Butler Air Arsenal North America (Hinckley, 2004) p.34 
          All British made aircraft values from RAF Museum Hendon 'Price Books', X005. 
             (1943 deliveries - 150 DC 3 for $25 million, this equates to £625,000, divided by 150 is £41,666)  
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Table 6 - Air Transport Asset Order of Battle: 38 Group and 46 Group, 6 June 1944 
 
Squadron Type 






Capacity –  
paras or glider 
towed 
Max paratroop 





load – IE x 
25 Troops 
Based at 
48 Anson   5 - - - Down Ampney 
48 Dakota 
 
30 20 or Horsa 600 750 
 
190 Stirling 22 + 4 26 22 or Horsa 484 550 Fairford 
196 Stirling 22 + 4 26 22 or Horsa 484 550 Keevil 
233 Anson   5 - - - Blakehill Farm 
233 Dakota 
 
30 20 or Horsa 600 750 
 
271 Anson   5 - - - Down Ampney 
271 Dakota 
 
30 20 or Horsa 600 750 
 
295 Albemarle 22 + 4 26 10 or Horsa  220 550 Harwell 
296 Albemarle 22 + 4 26 10 or Horsa 220 550 Brize Norton 
297 Albemarle 22 + 4 26 10 or Horsa 220 550 Brize Norton 
298 Halifax 18 + 2 20 Hamilicar 
 
500 Tarrant Rushden 
299 Stirling 22 + 4 26 22 or Horsa 484 550 Keevil 
512 Anson 
 
5 - - - Broadwell 
512 Dakota   30 20 or Horsa 600 750 
 
570 Albemarle 22 + 4 26 10 or Horsa 220 550 Harwell 
575 Anson   5 - - - Broadwell 
575 Dakota 
 
30 20 or Horsa 600 750 
 
620 Stirling 22 + 4 26 22 or Horsa 484 550 Fairford 
644 Halifax 18 + 2 20 Hamilicar  - 500 Tarrant Rushden 
Maximum 
Parachute lift 






Table 6 (continued) Sources and Notes 
 
 NA AIR 37/111 38 Group Organisation and Formation. Loose Minute 20 February 1944, '38 Group Squadrons'. 
 NA AIR 38/110, 46 Group fortnightly progress reports. Report, 15 & 25 February 1944. 
 Base locations and aircraft capacities – Otway, p.166, pp.398-401.  
 The Anson was a line of communication aircraft not used operationally during the Normandy landings. 





Table 7 - Air Assets and Timetable for 6th Airborne Division 
 
Source: Carl Shilleto, Pegasus Bridge and Merville Battery: British 6th Airborne Division Landings in Normandy D-Day 6th June (Conshacken, PA: Combined 
Publishing), p.30  
 
TIME DZ/LZ UNITS AIRCRAFT Dakotas Stirlings Albemarles Gliders 
DEADSTICK 00:20 X & Y D Coy 2/Ox & Bucks 6 Horsas       6 
TONGA   N Pathfinders 5 Para Bde 7 Albemarles     7   
TONGA   V Pathfinders 3 Para Bde 16 Albemarles     16   
TONGA 00:52 N 5 Para Bde 
89 Stirlings, 27 
Dakotas, 19 
Albemarles 
27 89 19   
TONGA   N Adv Party HQ 6th AB Div 2 Stirlings   2     
TONGA   V 3 Para Bde (less 8 Para) 
71 Dakotas, 11 
Horsas 
71     11 
TONGA   K 8 Para 
37 Dakotas, 6 
Horsas 
37     6 
TONGA 03:20 N HQ 6th AB Div, RE & RA 








Detachment from 9 Para 3 Horsas       3 
MALLARD 21:00 N HQ 6th AL Bde and 1/RUR 




  142 
MALLARD   N 6th AB Div Armd Recce Regt            
MALLARD 
 
W 2/Ox & Bucks less D Coy     
 
    
MALLARD   W  
A Coy 12/Devons plus supplies 
108 Horsas and Hamilcars 
108 Horsas and 
Hamilicars  
      108 












38 and 46 
Group 
Squadrons 
Sep-39 37     
May-40 36     
Jun-40 36   0.5 
Sep-40 41     
Dec-40 41     
Mar-41 43     
Jun-41 46     
Sep-41 52     
Dec-41 54     
Mar-42 54 2 2 
Jun-42 44 5   
Sep-42 45 9 4 
Dec-42 48 14   
Mar-43 62 17.5   
Jun-43 56 20 4 
Sep-43 62 22   
Dec-43 65.5 31.5 8 
Mar-44 75 34.5 15 
Jun-44 82 38.5 15 
Sep-44 87 41.5 15 
Dec-44 97 50 15 
Mar-45 99 54 15 
































































































































Total Bomber Squadrons 
Lancaster Squadrons 




Table 8 (continued) - Notes 
 
Columns A and B drawn from chart 'Number of Squadrons in Bomber Command by type of aircraft August 1939 - February 1946' (AIR 20/2023 
Summary of Squadrons by IE and class of aircraft) 
*Forming squadrons not included 
38 and 46 Group numbers drawn from the same sources as Table 6. 
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Identity - volunteer 
spirit 
Standards 















Redundancy of force + 
surprise 
Proximity of drop 
landing zone to 
objectives 
Simplicity - clarity of 
task 
Mission specific training 














 Lesson learning 
 Training 
 Equipment and manpower 
 Cohesion 
 Motivation 











I. Map Sheets A, B, C, and D – Ouistreham area, 20 May 1944 Stop Press Edition, 
War Office. (Bodleian Library C21 19B) 
II. Map Sheets E and F – Dozulé area, 20 May 1944 Stop Press Edition, War Office. 
(Bodleian Library C21 19B). 
III. Map Sheets G and H –Troarn area, 20 May 1944 Stop Press Edition, War Office. 
(Bodleian Library C21 19B). 
IV. Map Sheet I – 20 May 1944 Map Symbol Legend. 
V. Map Sheets J, K and L – 1943 Plan of Ouistreham Caen Canal (Bodleian Library)  
The Dozulé pages should be placed to the upper right of the full Ouistreham map, the 
Troarn pages to the lower right.  
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V. Map Sheets J, K and L – 1943 Plan of Ouistreham Caen Canal (Bodleian 
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